Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• Following up on Prince Bandar’s Approach (S)

At TAB A is Cy’s memorandum² for you on this subject, developed at State and NSC. In summary:

—[less than 1 line not declassified] the Bandar approach is a highly significant step on the part of Saudi Arabia: offering to recognize Israel, lift the boycott, freeze oil prices, and underwrite a Marshall Plan for the Middle East—in exchange for our calling for an end to Israeli military occupation to about the 1967 lines (with safeguards for Israel), and our calling for a West Bank entity, preferably confederated with Jordan or Egypt for at least five years;

—however, the Bandar presentation has been reflected in no other communication from Saudi Arabia, including Fahd’s rather negative response to the Eilts mission,³ sent to you a week after Bandar was here; and

—there are inherent problems, including Saudi Arabia’s limited capacity to swing oil prices; a predictable (and justified) Israeli perception that we were shifting away from Camp David before the autonomy talks had failed; and the risks of a political confrontation with Israel if we publicly endorsed the idea of a Palestinian entity—albeit one in association with Jordan. (S/S)

Cy therefore proposes—and I agree—that we test the Bandar proposition with an intermediate approach, centering in the first instance on a visit Hermann Eilts is paying privately to the area (he leaves for Egypt this week; but will not arrive in Saudi Arabia until January 8). This approach would be to put the Arab-Israeli conflict in the broader context of U.S. strategy and involvement for the Middle East, thus showing that we are prepared to discuss (and to respond to) key Saudi concerns about security of the region. This would a) go to the heart of Saudi preoccupations—where the Bandar approach is only one means to an end; and b) enable Eilts to smoke Fahd out [less than 1 line not declassified] of the Bandar approach, without committing us to steps which, at the very least, would provoke a political crisis with Israel and cause problems for the autonomy talks. (S/S)

The draft instructions we have prepared for Eilts (appended to Cy’s memo)⁴ would also give coherence to a number of efforts we are considering (or you have decided) for a long-range Middle East strategy. His visit would thus be a first effort to bring Saudi Arabia along—a key step in our effort to seize the initiative in Middle East policy as soon as we come out of the Iranian crisis. (S/S)

By our current thinking, if Fahd does reinforce Bandar’s presentation to Eilts, we would then consider how far we could usefully proceed at a time when the Camp David framework is still controlling. In any event, we would have intensified the dialogue with Saudi Arabia on the whole range of issues, and begun to restore our credibility. (S/S)

Cy, Sol, and I will meet Wednesday⁵ afternoon to discuss the Bandar approach and to refine Eilts’ instructions, pursuant to the guidance you give us. (S/S)

RECOMMENDATION: that you approve the guidance for a mission by Eilts to Saudi Arabia (page 6 of Cy’s memo)⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 12/79–1/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The date is handwritten. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Zbig. J.”
2. See Document 320.
3. The text of Fahd’s response has not been found.
4. Attached but not printed. The draft instructions for Eilts stated the objective of his Mission was “to continue a direct dialogue with the Saudi leadership—a dialogue we would like to broaden and deepen in the coming months.” To the list of attached talking points for Eilts’s meeting with Fahd, which focused on the Middle East strategic situation and the administration’s desire to see the development of a “credible regime” for Palestinian autonomy, including agreement on Jerusalem, Carter added, in a handwritten note, an instruction to “ask Fahd specifically & persistently for his best proposal (step by step) for a comprehensive Mid E peace.”
5. December 26.
6. Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation, adding the handwritten notation: “See addendum. J.” See footnote 4 above.