311. Briefing Memorandum From the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State (Habib) to Secretary of State Vance1
SUBJECT
- Lebanon—Discussion with Dobrynin
As instructed,2 I called on Dobrynin today to inform him of our views on the situation in Southern Lebanon and our support for the Lebanese initiative in that regard. I outlined for him the nature of the Lebanese initiative and its purpose, emphasizing that we believed it was worth supporting for humanitarian as well as political reasons. I noted the existence of a fragile ceasefire which we sought to make permanent, the relationship to Security Council Resolution 425,3 and the dangers of confrontation and escalation if the situation in Southern Lebanon was to heat up again.
I then gave him a brief account of my recent visit4 to the region and ended up by referring to the forthcoming discussion of this problem at the Arab Summit meeting in Tunis.
Dobrynin had obviously been informed of Soviet conversations on the subject with the Syrians and with the PLO. He said that the Syrians [Page 1019] to some extent, and the PLO to a much greater extent, were suspicious of the proposals. Both were concerned that the initiative was some sort of U.S.-Israel-Lebanon scheme to produce a Lebanese Camp David. That is, having in mind another partial settlement in the Middle East in place of dealing with a comprehensive peace in which the Palestinian question would be to the fore. The Syrians were also suspicious that the initiative was designed to reduce their influence and bring about an early end of their troop presence in Lebanon.
In describing the PLO position Dobrynin stressed their view that the initiative was also designed to squeeze them out of Lebanon, or to limit their presence there, before they had anywhere else to go and before the overall Palestinian question had been resolved. He said the PLO considered it important to be able to maintain pressure in and from Lebanon as a means of assuring that the overall issue of Palestine would not be forgotten internationally.
In response to my counter-arguments he pointed out that he had outlined the views of the Syrians and PLO, but he did not indicate that the Soviets disagreed or had in any way sought to dissuade them. He did confirm that the Lebanese had spoken to the Soviets, seeking support for their initiative which they described in the same manner as I had outlined to him.
He said he would inform Moscow of our conversation and left it that we would now await the results of the Arab Summit meeting.
Comment: I came away with the distinct feeling that the Soviets are not inclined to be helpful, although to what extent they may have stimulated the Syrian and PLO reaction is unclear. On balance, I would think they did not need to be stimulated. The various aspects will have to be thrashed out first at the Arab Summit, where hopefully the Lebanese can make some limited gains. Once we know the results we can review the matter and decide what needs to be done next. I do not think we need to conclude at this point that the prospects are all bleak, although it is probable that the suspicions on all sides will be such that progress will be slow and in small increments.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall D. Shulman—Jan 21, 74–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 2, Memorandums of Conversation, 1979. Confidential. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Christopher, Newsom, Saunders, Shulman, and Vest.↩
- On November 14, Hunter presented the proposal for the Habib-Dobrynin meeting to Brzezinski in a decision memorandum for the latter’s approval. Brzezinski initialed his approval, but asked in a handwritten notation, “Won’t this scare Sadat-Begin?” In a typed response on the back of the memorandum, Hunter wrote, “Habib thinks it will not scare Sadat and Begin—since it is kept separate from the autonomy talks (which he will not discuss). In fact, he says that the Israelis and Egyptians probably expect that we will be briefing the Soviets in a low-key way on what we are doing in Lebanon. The reason for doing it is to avoid the misimpression that it is a full-scale effort to get the Syrians out, etc.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: 11/79–3/80)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 306.↩
- For a summary of Habib’s visit to the region, see Document 306.↩