288. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
18212. Subject: Oral Message From President Sadat to President Carter About Haifa Talks With Prime Minister Begin.
1. (S-entire text).
2. At Vice President Mubarak’s instruction, Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Osama El Baz called me to Foreign Ministry Friday morning, September 7, to convey following oral message from President Sadat to President Carter.
[Page 927]—Begin message
3. President Sadat held talks with PriMin Begin on September 4 and 5. President Sadat found the talks satisfactory. The attitude of PriMin Begin and other Israeli officials was by and large positive.2 They seemed to realize the necessity of achieving some progress on the Palestinian question. President Sadat emphasized the necessity of reaching agreement on certain key points in the coming few months to give the negotiations on the self governing authority the shot in the arm they need at this point.
4. President Sadat also emphasized the need for achieving progress on the question of Jerusalem. He indicated that the present status of Jerusalem was not acceptable to 800 million Muslims and many Christians. He added that it should not be impossible, however difficult, to reach an agreement that would meet the aspirations of Muslims and Arabs while maintaining a united city. In the absence of such an arrangement, Jerusalem would remain an explosive point of hot contention and would cloud the peace making process.
5. PriMin Begin reiterated his views but was not as forceful as before. President Sadat noticed that PriMin Begin’s health was failing and that he was not in his best shape, so President Sadat did not want to press him harder on this issue at this point. But President Sadat left PriMin Begin with the impression that this is a sine qua non for progress and a point on which Israel must reach the necessary decisions.
6. President Sadat told PriMin Begin that they cannot reach a comprehensive peace without a solution to Jerusalem. Any solution perpetuating the status quo would be rejected by all Arabs, most Muslims and many Christians. President Sadat also said that East Jerusalem should be under the jurisdiction of the self governing authority as a first step, without prejudging the issue of its permanent status. Otherwise, most Palestinians would be reluctant to cooperate with the Camp David formula.
7. With respect to negotiations for the self governing authority, President Sadat told PriMin Begin that the Israeli conception of the powers and responsibilities of the self governing authority is too narrow and quite inadequate. He emphasized the need for giving the self governing authority real powers and responsibilities, without jeopardizing Israel’s security. President Carter will notice that President Sadat made a point of mentioning in his public speeches during his [Page 928] visit that realization of the national rights of the Palestinians does not place Israel’s security or interests in jeopardy.
8. PriMin Begin said that, as the negotiations develop, we would sort out points of agreement and disagreement about the jurisdiction of the self governing authority and would see what can be done to give the negotiations the push they need.
9. These two points were subjects of disagreement, but the disagreement was not as sharp or tense as in the past.
10. On bilateral issues, PriMin Begin raised two points: the supply of oil, and the stationing of forces in the Sinai. With respect to oil, Israel had two demands: (1) a written Egyptian commitment to supply Israel 2 million tons annually; and (2) to sell this amount at the OPEC base price—about 24 dollars a barrel. There was some disagreement between Egyptian and Israeli officials (Oil Minister Hilal and Energy Minister Modai) on these points. Israel also seeks this supply from the Alma field on the ground that it is now producing 1.9 million tons annually at the rate of 38000 barrels per day. Our officials think that this rate of production is detrimental to the Alma field and is causing a high level of attrition, and that production from Alma should be reduced to one million tons annually.
11. President Sadat agreed to provide an aide memoire to Israel to the effect that Egypt will supply Israel with two million tons annually without specifying the area of production from which it would come. With respect to price, President Sadat insisted that Egypt cannot give Israel a privileged position which would then have to apply to other buyers of Egyptian oil. Egypt cannot discriminate between customers. President Sadat indicated to PriMin Begin that if Egypt followed this practice, it would incur a loss of over 600 million dollars annually. PriMin Begin accepted the view of President Carter that the price should be left to the market. In other words, the prices charged will be the going prices at the time each contract is concluded.
12. With respect to the forces in the Sinai, this subject was discussed between President Sadat and PriMin Begin, and in parallel between Minister Weizman and Minister Kamal Hassan Ali. Weizman, who was opposed to UNTSO, met with President Sadat. Since Israel is opposed to UNTSO and is pressing for joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols, President Sadat indicated there was a need for U.S. participation. President Sadat instructed General Ali to take the position that we should follow the procedures provided for in the Peace Treaty, namely the establishment of a multi-national force, and should meanwhile resort to a temporary arrangement as follows:
—The U.S. would supervise Zone A, either through increasing the frequency of its aerial surveillance or through the use of representatives of the American Military Attache Office in Cairo.
[Page 929]—For Zone B, an Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. joint commission should be established consisting of one representative of each country. The American member could be from the Embassy staff and should preferably be a civilian or, if military, should not be in uniform. The joint commission would be on call to conduct inspections in Zone B at the request of any party.
—In the buffer zone, Egypt and Israel agreed in general that there should be observer posts, either with U.S. participation or manned by the two parties. There would also be a requirement for checkpoints, either with U.S. participation or bilateral, at points of entry into the buffer zone. The U.S. should supervise the Israeli technical installations in the buffer zone.
13. Egypt made clear that it prefers U.S. participation in all the arrangements. These arrangements would continue during the interim period until final withdrawal or until a multi-national force is established.
14. PriMin Begin and President Sadat agreed to meet again but did not specify a time. President Sadat feels it will not be soon because of PriMin Begin’s health.
15. Finally, Israel agreed to withdraw from Santa Katerina a few days before November 19, and President Sadat agreed that tourist visits there could continue from the time of Israeli withdrawal. End message.
16. Comment: El Baz dictated the foregoing from a sheaf of notes in Arabic. When he reached his notes on the Sinai supervision arrangements, he found they were not clear, and he and I at that point spoke to General Ali on the phone to seek clarification. That portion of the oral message on dealing with this subject was then reconstructed from our conversation with Ali. It is still not entirely clear how many of the details of the Sinai arrangements have been agreed with the Israelis and how many represent Egyptian preferences. For example, in saying that U.S. supervision of Zone A could be carried out by more frequent aerial surveillance, General Ali said, “If the Israelis agree.”
17. I reminded both Ali and El Baz that, on instructions, I had informed the Vice President that we were opposed to a U.S. role in policing the Sinai (State 231510).3 They both acknowledged that Mubarak had told them this but thought the arrangements they were now proposing might not be a problem for us since they did not involve full-time U.S. involvement in joint patrols on the ground. Of going more than half way to meet Israeli concerns on bilateral issues, has given up Egypt’s former strong insistence on a continuing UN role in the Sinai [Page 930] and has at least modified Egyptian opposition to joint Egyptian-Israeli supervision in some areas of the Sinai. At the same time, he has insisted on the principle earlier outlined in forceful terms by Mubarak that there should be some U.S. participation with the Egyptians and the Israelis and that there will be no Israelis, at least in western Sinai (Zone A), where the major Egyptian armed forces will be located. When this issue is discussed in Washington September 18–19,4 we will apparently again be faced with an Egyptian-Israeli position contrary to our own preferred course of action. End comment.
19. I assume the foregoing oral message is the only read out we will get from the Egyptian side until Bob Strauss meets with Sadat.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–2456. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House.↩
- Begin’s account of the Haifa meetings, the outcome of which the Prime Minister was “exceedingly pleased with,” was conveyed to Lewis and is in telegram 19336 from Tel Aviv, September 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2030)↩
- Telegram 231510 to Cairo, September 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0475)↩
- See Document 295.↩
- See Document 290.↩