287. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Middle East Trip: the Way Forward (U)
As you will have seen from Bob Strauss’ reporting cables to the President,2 the trip produced even more negative reactions to our UN Resolution plan than we expected in calculating the price to be paid. The Israeli reaction went about as far as thought; but all of us were unprepared for the vehemence with which Sadat flatly opposed the idea of a U.S.-introduced resolution—or indeed any resolution at this time. Strauss had an Ambassador with him at all times who later prepared the cables for his signature. (S)
Sadat’s reasoning was as follows:
—any resolution which scares the Israelis is a mistake—and the U.S. resolution would do so;
—there is a good chance for progress in the autonomy talks, and in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship which needs to underpin anything else, provided they are left alone and the process is not disrupted by our (unnecessary) actions; and
—even if a resolution were accepted by the PLO, this would not be desirable, since it would lead to the entry of disruptive elements into the talks themselves before they are well-established; in fact, Sadat said, this (acceptance of the resolution) might be the worst outcome of all. (S)
To be sure, Israel and Egypt have different interests from us in this process (and in major respects from each other). But to be opposed publicly and forcefully by both Camp David parties increases the dangers of the Resolution course (while, ironically, making it somewhat easier to get off this course—if that were desired—since this is in fact, if not in perception, no longer just an “Israel vs. U.S.” issue). (S)
Conversations with our local Ambassadors (Atherton, Lewis, West, and Veliotis) also helped to cast doubt on 1) the likelihood of PLO [Page 925] acceptance of any resolution we could reasonably support—especially following the PNC meeting in Damascus;3 and 2) the benefits to be achieved with Jordan and Saudi Arabia (though, to be sure, the costs of a UN veto with these and other Arab countries remain). (S)
Bob Strauss has left Begin and Sadat with the understanding that we are at the moment going forward with a resolution that will indicate support for 242 and 338, affirm Palestinian rights, and deal with the refugees in some general way. (Despite press reports to the contrary, Strauss impressed upon Begin that he could not promise to recommend to the President against moving forward). Both, however, have high expectations that their own personal appeals to the President will have an effect, in getting our position changed. Both appealed for a face-to-face meeting with the President (Khalil, Begin) before we proceed; and both urged that the President not destroy through this act what he has built up in the Camp David process. (S)
What next?
I discussed with Bill this evening the thinking that went on today in Washington. It parallels ours on the plane, to wit:
—we should not go forward with a resolution of our own;
—we should seek to get the UN business behind us this week, instead of trying to stretch it out. (S)
Bill’s three options seem best (and parallel to ours):
—seek a postponement (the attached cable4 indicates an inclination in Beirut on that point as well; if your meeting Tuesday5 morning goes in this direction, following up on this conversation with Tueni should be done urgently);
—Go for a neutral “consensus” statement out of the UNSC;
—simply veto. (S)
My own sense is that we should pursue them in the order stated. (S)
Strauss’ inclination is to give a press conference tomorrow, indicating that we will not put in a resolution (indicating that we had been exploring several, but met negative reactions in both Israel and [Page 926] Egypt—emphasizing the latter, in order to move this as much as possible away from a “U.S.-Israel” matter). He could outline whatever option we have selected, and stress our concern with the peace process as the best way of achieving Palestinian legitimate rights. (S)
We would need to be doing our diplomacy quickly (with seeking a postponement being the “least cost” way out). This includes:
—communication with the Kuwaitis (and Beirut);
—approach to the British (on postponement);
—instructions for damage limitation to West and Veliotis (who have basic background and have asked for Wednesday appointments, pending whatever decision is reached in Washington);
—communications to Israel and Egypt, Congressional contacts etc. (S)
I am appending a broader options paper6 put together by Hal Saunders on the plane (and which he will revise for tomorrow). Option 3 is the one presented here. (C)
P.S. Strauss and Ben Epstein arranged with Teddy Kollek for an invitation to Andy Young to visit Jerusalem, “to see how people can live together.” It will be sent privately in the near future. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 8–12/79. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information. In an undated handwritten note, Brzezinski set out a list of short points under the headings of “substance” and “process.” (Ibid.)↩
- See Documents 283, 285, and 286.↩
- In telegram 5410 from Damascus, August 16, the Embassy conveyed a report on the August 12 meeting of the Palestinian Central Council in Damascus. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790372–0360)↩
- Not found attached. In telegram 4641 from Beirut, August 20, Dean relayed a conversation he had with Tueni in which Tueni stated that he had called on Arafat on August 19 to “probe his receptivity” to a postponement in UN consideration of a resolution on Palestinian rights. Tueni told Dean that he had found Arafat “very receptive” to a postponement “in the event nothing constructive could be achieved at this time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2494)↩
- August 21.↩
- Attached but not printed. A revised version is also attached but not printed.↩