Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

290. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, September 10, 1979, 1731Z

18416. For the President from Strauss. Subject: Strauss Meeting With President Sadat.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Following a relaxed hour and a half private chat with Prime Minister Khalil, in which he foreshadowed what I would hear from President Sadat, I met for an hour and twenty minutes with Sadat at his Pyramids Guest House Sunday² night. Only Vice President Mubarak and Atherton were present. Sadat was relaxed, expansive, and confident, and reflected this mood in his comments to the press afterwards. Sitting on the balcony, overlooking the Pyramids with a full harvest moon shining, I was sufficiently impressed and emotionally moved to buy whatever he had to sell. Sadat took delight in contrasting the stability in Egypt with the disarray in the Arab world. He predicted confidently that the present negotiations would ultimately succeed in laying the basis for comprehensive peace and that Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians would join the negotiating process. With respect to the Palestinians, he said they were welcome to join anytime but it was not necessary for them to participate at the present stage. His description of the Haifa meeting³ with Begin was somewhat rambling and contradictory in places, but one message came through clearly: he has built a sound personal relationship with Begin and is fully committed to consolidating the Peace Treaty but now needs our help to make progress in the autonomy negotiations by the end of the year. In saying this, however, Sadat did not convey any great sense of urgency that matters had to be brought to a decisive head by that time.

3. Among the principal themes which ran through Sadat’s comments, I was struck by his repeated expressions of concern about Begin’s health and political problems at home. In view of Begin’s health and other problems, Sadat said he did not press Begin on the issues of full autonomy and Jerusalem; he merely reaffirmed that his views remained as he had stated them in Alexandria in July.⁴ At one point, Sadat said he was not sure Begin would survive for more than a matter of months. Sadat reiterated several times his deep feelings of friendship for Begin and his admiration for Begin’s political courage, interspersed with admonitions that we should not harass Begin in present circumstances. He said that even on issues where they disagreed, Begin was amiable but seemed fatigued. They had not agreed on a specific time for a next meeting, Sadat said, but he had invited Begin to stop in Egypt on his way back from the U.S. in November and Begin had accepted the invitation. Sadat spoke in glowing terms about his reception in Haifa by both Jews and Arabs, describing Haifa as a model for coexistence in the region.⁵

4. In discussing the future, Sadat made several points which he described as important and asked that we note carefully. Saying that he and Begin had not reached any agreement on the basic issues of full autonomy and Jerusalem, Sadat said, “until now I have built bridges with Begin; now is the time for the United States to take over.” At another point, he asked us to note carefully his comment on Israeli television that “instead of conflict, we now have differences of opinion.” Sadat said he and Begin agreed that Camp David and the peace treaty are the cornerstones for comprehensive peace and should be “consolidated every day.” He said he had told Begin, “let us agree that, no matter what, we will stick to Camp David and the Peace Treaty; we cannot go back.”

5. Toward the end of the meeting, stressing that we should note this carefully, Sadat said: “I ask you to resume your full partnership role. You should start convincing Begin, but you should not press him.” Sadat said that as our friend and partner, he advised us to try to help Begin. We should ease Israeli suspicions. It is necessary, Sadat said, to give directives to the delegations in the autonomy talks so that they can make progress by the end of the year. Begin had said, though “not in an aggressive way”, that he was not yet ready for this and in any case the negotiations have until next May to achieve results. Sadat said that he and Begin alone cannot agree on such directives, but this could be accomplished if the United States would help Begin. The United States, he said, must put forward its plans; the time had come for the United States to take the whole matter into its hands; he and his people were ready to work with us.

6. In response to my probing, Sadat did not reveal any specific ideas about how to move the negotiations forward. He reiterated his earlier concept that there should be agreement on full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza and on Jerusalem, but that implementation in the West Bank should be postponed because of its sensitivity for the Israelis, while going forward in Gaza and Jerusalem. He acknowledged that Jerusalem is also a sensitive issue but stressed its importance for winning support of the Muslim world. Sadat also repeated his familiar position that Israel wants King Hussein to take the West Bank and that Israel and Hussein together could work this out, but that it must be done in a way which permits the Palestinians to make their choice. Somewhat contradictorily, Sadat said at another point that he had told Begin that self-determination and an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza were inevitable but that this could be patterned on the Austrian treaty providing for full neutrality and need not be a threat to Israel. When I asked how Hussein might be brought into the negotiations, Sadat said it was up to us to find a way but, in his view, the key to Hussein was Saudi Arabia.

7. In view of Sadat’s emphasis on the need for the United States to “take over,” I thought I should inject at the end a note of caution that, while we must continue the effort, we had not found the answer to making a breakthrough on the autonomy talks. I said I did not believe anyone could convince Begin to modify his position at the present time. I also took the occasion to emphasize strongly your full commitment to the peace process and my commitment to continue my efforts unabated as your representative, and to put to rest reports of any problems in the personal and working relations between Cy Vance and myself.

8. While the bulk of our meeting was devoted to the subjects outlined above, Sadat also described the agreement reached with Begin on forces in the Sinai,⁶ which differs in important respects from the version we have had from General Ali but seems to accord with Begin’s account. On the other hand, Sadat’s description of the agreement reached with Begin on the supply of oil to Israel⁷ conforms to what we have already heard on this subject from other Egyptian sources and from the Israelis. (These two subjects will be covered more fully in separate reports.)

9. Finally, Sadat confirmed Begin’s agreement to withdraw from Santa Katerina by November 16. He said he did not expect you to be present for the ceremony on November 19 this year but would want you to attend the celebrations there in November, 1980. He invited me to this year’s ceremony, and I accepted.⁸

Atherton

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131-2464. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
2. September 9.
3. See Document 288.
4. See Document 271.
5. In telegram 18883 from Cairo, September 15, Atherton reported two additional details of the September 9 Strauss-Sadat meeting. Atherton noted that during the meeting, Sadat said he had told Begin in Haifa that once Israel had withdrawn to the interim line, travelers from Gaza to Egypt would no longer need the Red Cross to serve as an intermediary in facilitating travel. Sadat also described a conversation with Weizman while passing over Qalqilya during his flight from Haifa to Ben Gurion airport. Weizman, Sadat said, had “pointed out the narrow strip of Israel between Qalqilya and the sea as an example of Israel’s security problem with respect to the West Bank. Sadat commented to Strauss that Weizman was right; ‘You can throw a stone from Qalqilya to the sea.’ Sadat then commented that minor rectifications of the border are possible under Resolution 242, and this area is mainly where such rectifications should take place.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79)
6. In telegram 18504, from Cairo, September 11, Atherton relayed Sadat’s account of the agreement struck with Begin on observer forces in the Sinai. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79)
7. In telegram 18503 from Cairo, September 11, Atherton relayed Sadat’s account of his agreement with Begin on Egypt’s supply of oil to Israel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790415–0160)
8. The following day, September 10, Strauss met with Khalil. Strauss reported that during the meeting the Egyptian Prime Minister “filled in many of the blanks in my meeting with President Sadat.” In what Strauss called “one of the most valuable talks I have had since embarking on the Middle East negotiations,” Khalil suggested that the United States conduct policy on “parallel tracks: within and outside the autonomy talks.” Moreover, after outlining Egypt’s goals in the peace process, Khalil noted that to achieve these, “we must first stop all Israeli military action in Lebanon and all PLO terrorism within Israel.” (Telegram 2941 from Jerusalem, September 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1695)