Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

220. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Cairo, March 18, 1979, 8:20–9:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Warren Christopher, Dep. Sec. State
  • General David Jones, Chairman, JCS
  • Chip Carter
  • Ambassador Hermann Eilts
  • Michael Sterner, DAS/Near East Affairs
  • Gary Sick, NSC Staff Member

• Egypt

  • President Anwar al-Sadat
  • Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil
  • Hassan Ahmed Kamel, the Chef de Cabinet

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had asked us to go to Saudi Arabia and Jordan to get their attitudes and get a feeling for their pattern of behavior in the weeks and months ahead. We had very extensive talks. We had prolonged sessions with Prince Saud² and Crown Prince Fahd³ then Prince Sultan⁴ and a courtesy call on the King.⁵ We stressed the importance of the process that has been set in motion. The President sees the prospect of a stable Middle East tied to a peace treaty. We indicated that we are very concerned that any reaction by Saudi Arabia directed negatively at the treaty, such as attacks or tangible economic actions, could adversely affect our interests. We had intense discussions.

In the eyes of the Saudis this initiative greatly complicates their situation. They are faced with conflicting pulls from the U.S. and the other Arabs. They feel that you (Sadat) have not consulted with them and they see a difficult period following the treaty. They see themselves bound by collective obligations of the Arab League. We pressed them with regard to the differentiation between the collective obligations and bilateral actions. We noted that we are involved in a growing relation with Egypt and it would be senseless if the Saudis diminished their relations.

I believe it is fair to say that our discussions usefully conveyed to the Saudi leadership the gravity with which we would view such action. We sought an understanding from them that they discuss very precisely the technical steps they intend to take, distinguishing between symbolic steps as opposed to those that have tangible, bilateral effects. We heard the answer from Saud and from Fahd with unanimity. We find ourselves encouraged.

They made a point which struck us as sensible, that you have not done enough to explain your motives and actions. They find themselves in the position of explaining your actions to others. It would be helpful if you could make a public case using the kind of argument that we made to them, stressing that the victims of any freeze in the present situation would be the Palestinians. Dr. Brzezinski then invited Mr. Christopher to comment.

Mr. Christopher said that Dr. Brzezinski’s account was entirely accurate. He would say that Saudi Arabia was pulled in three directions. First, by their Arab brothers; secondly, by their friendship with the U.S.; and third, by their friendship and admiration for Egypt. They want to do everything in their power not to hurt Egypt over the next weeks and months. On a bilateral basis they are prepared to continue the aid relations and they referred to two substantial aid programs as recent signal or talisman of their good faith. They were careful to note that things may change, but they intend to be a good friend of Egypt.

On the collective side it is different. They intend to send an emissary to the other Arab countries to promote moderation. They will join only in the technical outcome, i.e., the move of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo, suspension of Egyptian membership in the Arab League, and the application of the boycott to Egyptian companies dealing with Israel. They could not stop action short of that.

We are in for a period of very careful waiting and watching. They will try quietly and in their own way on the collective front. We got the collective responsibility of the Saudi leadership. They had met in advance and decided. I am encouraged. Their attitude was warmer toward you and toward us than I had feared.

General Jones said that he had talked with the Saudis about the Yemen situation, noting that ammunition had moved in only a few hours and that the F–5s were arriving in Dhahran today. The carrier task force was now in the Gulf of Aden, with the carrier Constellation, a cruiser, three destroyers and three frigates. It had very good fire power on board. It could take out the South Yemeni Air Force in a matter of hours. The AWACS was performing command and control training, and surveillance and other actions were underway. We want to shore up the situation in Yemen and develop closer and warmer relations with the Saudis. A planning team is going to be coming soon to Saudi Arabia. We hope the ceasefire will hold since other nations have now come to Saudi and Yemen’s aid.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Saudis realized that if they take any actions it will have an effect on their relations with us. We were quite reassured. They indicated that we may face unpredictable acts, but they felt that we gave more assurances on the strategic side and on the relations between you and ourselves. They know where we stand.

Jordan is more difficult to describe. The discussion⁶ did not focus on tangible things. For one thing, there was less chance to talk. The King was in a very somber mood. He had a tone of sadness and disappointment about the future and about relations between us and you. I cannot precisely summarize exactly where he stands. We did make clear that any obstruction of the peace process would affect them and us. (President Sadat interjected, “This is Hussein. This is Hussein.”) We suggested that although it might be difficult for him to join in, he could possibly encourage the Palestinians to join in. He did not rule this out, but gave us no positive indication. He talked at great length, but all in very dark, somber tones.

Mr. Christopher said that the King feels events have moved away from the direction he had hoped. We urged him to keep doors open, but we cannot honestly report any encouraging result.

Dr. Brzezinski said the best we can say is that it was not negative. All we can express, all we can expect from him is a wavery course. I believe that covers the essence. Then Dr. Brzezinski said he wanted to mention the question of the signing ceremony.

President Sadat said he had received a message from Begin.⁷ He would show it to him.

Dr. Brzezinski said it was psychologically important not to exclude Begin from visiting Cairo, or you from visiting Jerusalem.

President Sadat said we will be good neighbors, and we have no objection if he comes here. However, the whole show is Carter and for that reason he had suggested signing all three of them in Washington. He then read the message from Prime Minister Begin which indicated that the Washington signing was acceptable, with two additional signings in Cairo and Jerusalem, with the order to be determined later. President Sadat then read his proposed answer which was that “All that President Carter told you, as you mentioned in your message is correct and I⁸ everywhere. My statement about signing three copies in Washington was motivated only by the fact that it was entirely a Carter show. Until we meet in Washington, please accept my warmest wishes and congratulations.”

Dr. Brzezinski said it was especially President Sadat and Carter, since you started the process by your trip to Jerusalem.⁹

Mr. Christopher said I am very reassured. I am sure the President will be also. I assume the modalities will be agreed upon in Washington.

President Sadat said yes. He said you have seen my people.

Dr. Brzezinski said they are your great strength.

Mr. Christopher said the treaty is also extremely popular in the United States.

President Sadat said yes and the whole world, except among the Arabs. Referring to the Mubarak visit to Saudi Arabia¹⁰ he said that he had set a target date before which he could not send anyone to Saudi Arabia. They (the Saudis) are scared about the Palestinians, the Iraqis, the Syrians. I had not intended to send Mubarak from Sudan to Saudi Arabia. I was in the garden when President Numayri called me and told me of his proposal that Vice President Mubarak go to Saudi Arabia after Sudan. He said Mubarak was beside him there (when he called). Why not send him to Saudi Arabia? I said that it goes with the target date. But then I agreed to do it if Numayri would contact the Saudis. He did so and they welcomed Mubarak.

Dr. Brzezinski asked when.

Prime Minister Khalil said two days ago.

President Sadat said that before Mubarak went to Europe to report he met with King Khalid and Abdullah and Sultan. He received an open reception. King Khalid asked someone in his entourage why will he go to Jerusalem in 1977. He did not yet know that 1977 or 1978 had passed. He asked some questions and Mubarak gave him the answers. Abdullah rode with him on the way back to the airport. He said please do not tell President Sadat what King Khalid asked you. Mubarak said that the question is not anything important. Abdullah told him that all of us are behind Sadat. He then proceeded to Jidda where Fahd was keen to meet with him. Indoors, the Saudis say one thing; outdoors, it is something completely different. But this time Fahd went too far in support. He proposed a plan which he will give to Mubarak when he returns from Europe. The situation in Saudi Arabia is exactly as you analyzed it. The Saudis are important, first of all, on the Gulf where all except Kuwait are with me—Oman, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain. But since Saudi Arabia is the big one, they will not proclaim this until the Saudis do. Secondly, I received yesterday a Japanese delegation, a Deputy for Economic Aid, to discuss the possibility of economic cooperation with us. What they fear is that Saudi Arabia, which is their main source of oil, may join with the Baghdad group and, for example, boycott them in Japan if they deal with Egypt. I agree they will think twice before doing that. They will not cut aid off or oil. The most important thing is that we send this message—Egypt and you too—since others will try to put pressure on us. There will be a hysteric state for one month maximum. After the second disengagement agreement, it was much more vehement than now. You should have heard it.

Dr. Brzezinski said they had mentioned the boycott as applying to Egyptian firms dealing with Israel. If they try to extend it to the countries which deal with Egypt, that would affect us. We were very clear about the limits of what we would accept: they are very narrow. There are things that you and we could do to mobilize the moderate Arabs. Urge the moderates to speak up. I have thought that Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and others would be willing to speak up.

President Sadat, referring to his critics, waved his hand and dismissed them as “all those scarecrows.” At best, they are protectorates.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had promised to do something about Japan. My Deputy, Henry Owen, is going to Japan with instructions to stress the importance we attach to Japanese assistance to Egypt. I also talked to David Rockefeller to organize a meeting of lots of U.S. business leaders during President Sadat’s visit to the U.S. (President Sadat interjected “Marvelous.”) Private enterprise is much more important than government in our country.

Ambassador Eilts said he had received an invitation for President Sadat to consider speaking at the New York Economic Club and wondered if he wished to consider it.

President Sadat responded “Right.” He continued that, with regard to the Saudis, our main effort should be to persuade them not to come to the point of involving other nations, such as Japan. I will drop them a line. In the end they would have only you and us as friends. With respect to Hussein, he was visiting an aide in London and announced that he was ready to come to Camp David. I called and asked what is your program. This came during a bad period at Camp David when things were not going well. King Hussein cannot miss any show. I could not ask him there when I was fighting Begin. He always tries for show, not for substance. I told him that when we decide anything, I will let you know. We can discuss it. Later on TV I was watching Barbara Walters.¹¹ Hussein said that he had been contacted by me and I had asked to meet him in Morocco, but he had no time and was proceeding back to Jordan. After we reached our agreement, I met Barbara Walters and I told her that I was going to choke her, since she misled everybody. She said “But the King told me that.” That man is a showy one. He thinks himself the most clever politician in this area, so this tactic. He wants me and President Carter to come and beg him to save the situation. There are three main influences on him. First, the Saudi; second, the U.S.; third, the Syrians, whom he fears. He does not heed the Palestinians, despite what he says, and he does not protect Palestinian rights. If President Carter and I give him the West Bank, he will be shouting praises. No objection to Jordan getting it after five years. This is his way. He is an opportunist. He waits for anything to collapse then save it. He is a schizophrenic. President Carter said to be patient with him, but be fair. I am not boasting. You have seen my people. I intend to submit the treaty to my Parliament on my return. I will ask if I should keep the Arab League when it

is Libya, Syria, and Iraq who pretend to protect the Palestinians. If that is so, take it away. All of them are shaking. We are not shaking here. No leader in any of these countries in Africa goes around in an open car. These 40 million people (in Egypt) are the dream of the Arab world. The others are bedouins. We are committed to defend Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It is marvelous that you acted so promptly. I told Congress two years ago, at that time it was Angola. I said next it is coming to East Africa. This was a good move. There must be a U.S. presence in the area. Where? The near future will tell me what to advise you. When we check the Soviets, then we have the upper hand. South Yemen, that boy Qadhafi, are nothing. The important thing is not to lose the upper hand. I sent a military team to Yemen. Also, I have antitank missiles. They shot 400 Israeli tanks in three days, the ones you tried to replace. They are very accurate, though they use the primitive Soviet material. Now we have the British Swingfire. It is better. If the situation deteriorates, I will send them. They will shoot every tank in the South Yemen Army. We are always ready. We have the Mirage, two squadrons of MIGs. From their base in the Red Sea, it is only one and one-half hours to the Gulf and one hour anyplace in Saudi Arabia. Tell them I am always ready to rescue them, whenever they ask. For Hussein, we will be patient and fair. He will now undermine the whole thing in the West Bank, but not in Gaza. It is his benefit. Whatever happens, I will fulfill this in Gaza. I will make it a model. I was asked about autonomy after one month. I said yes but Begin will raise hell. I am very optimistic. Before one year things will come to shape.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there has been a great change in Israel. Peres spent one-half of his speech on Palestinian rights. This is your effect. We will work together to keep Saudi Arabia in line. We were quite clear with Hussein.

President Sadat said that he (Hussein) is always pessimistic. It is a psychological thing. He is a schizophrenic like his father. He is full of show. Now he is not able to make any show.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Hussein had asked what the results would be after five years. I told him that there were three things that we could say. If it was pro-Arab, the Israelis would not join in. If it was pro-Israel, the Arabs would not join in. If it required concessions of both sides, neither would join in. We need to shape an outcome that is acceptable. No one can predict what that is now. It would be ridiculous to try.

President Sadat said Hussein wants the West Bank for his United Kingdom. I will tell in my speech why did he not form a Palestinian state when he had it. His grandfather, Abdullah, agreed against every code of morals. Whenever we stand together, all will come together. I anticipate a Syrian change. An important fact is that no one opposes me who has strong ground to stand in their own country. If Israel had not lost the last fifteen months, things would be much better. It is my theory that the peace process starts after the signing, not like Begin who wants to get everything. We will bring the Israelis to something you cannot imagine. In Jerusalem I said that 75% of the problem is psychological. We will give all of them psychological satisfaction. Do not fear the scarecrows.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if there was anything we could do to help.

President Sadat said the economic and military aid is important. We need 200 tanks with crew maintenance. We need surface-to-air missiles. That will change the situation there and around the Bab al-Mandeb when we give them to Somalia. In my speech I will call on Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine and tell them that I am ready to receive them in Al-Arish, which has been liberated. Are they ready to take the cause in their own hands and fight? Egypt did and made peace.

Dr. Brzezinski said that is a good idea—to build popular pressures.

Prime Minister Khalil said that he agreed with Dr. Brzezinski that the Saudis would not boycott the country, but can boycott individual firms. This will not happen in the near future since it must wait for the normalization of relations and that is not imminent. He felt that we can neutralize the members of the Arab League. The most will depend on the outcome of the negotiations with Israel on the West Bank.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we are with you as is world public opinion. Israel is now talking about survival and people listen to that. But when they are talking about Palestinian rights, their right to vote, water rights and such issues, it will be a different matter.

Prime Minister Khalil said that if we succeed in the West Bank negotiations, I think our position will be strong. But if it drags on more than a year . . .

President Sadat said I think we will succeed. It is in the interest of Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Mr. Begin does not see it that way. He is suspicious about Gaza. It is only with some effort that those suspicions were overcome.

President Sadat said what about the military, looking at General Jones. I shall choke you in the Pentagon.

General Jones noted that Defense Minister Ali is in Washington and will be talking with Secretary Brown.¹² He mentioned that he had seen Ezer Weizman¹³ and he sent his regards (Sadat interjected. “I like that Ezer.”) General Jones continued that a treaty is like a marriage license. You sign it and throw it in the drawer and it is what happens after that that counts.

President Sadat said that he had been sent a list of ten countries to send weapons to in Africa. All are asking because they know I am your friend and that you support me. I have a hard problem with Siad Barre.¹⁴ He sent out the Soviets and then he asked me to come and hold Berbera for him. He fears a Soviet push and that the Ethiopians will take it. He has turned very bitter. He supported whole heartedly the treaty signing since he knows that I will send tanks. Let us not depress those who ask. You know that I do not seek an empire or others’ lands. I seek to stop the game of the Soviets, mainly against Egypt as the leader of the Arab world, especially after Iran faded. So I would like you to put into consideration this idea. The Soviets chose agents of no importance. That boy in Libya, South Yemen, they are all despised. Iraq and Syria are of no real significance. You do not need a base. You can get facilities better than any base. I could be asking for your help in building a very big base, a naval base at Berenice for the Red Sea Fleet. This is a very important location because of the Bab al-Mandeb, which is in North Yemen and must be protected.

Ambassador Eilts said that after Secretary Brown had talked to General Kamel, he sent a list of military equipment. I sent it to Secretary Brown.

President Sadat said that he had asked for a team from the Pentagon. With an Egyptian team, it would visit everyplace and reach an agreed certain strategy. All must be planned, not haphazard. We have Sudan with us. We shall defend Saudi Arabia. The last time Numayri met with Mengistu¹⁵ in Nigeria, Mengistu adopted a very hard line. He will cause trouble in South Sudan. That is my border. Our waters come half from Ethiopia, half from Sudan. Western Sudan alone is the size of Egypt plus the East and the South. I would join them in the next moment if anyone tried . . .

Dr. Brzezinski said you are a factor for stability and we will work with you. Dr. Brzezinski noted that he (Sadat) was an optimist and that only optimists shape history. He thanked President Sadat for the time that he had given the delegation.

As the meeting broke up, Chip Carter said to President Sadat that he considered him “one of the two greatest men in the world.” President Sadat put his arm around Chip and walked with him to the door.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 3–6/79. Secret. The meeting took place at the Barrages Guest House.
2. See footnote 2, Document 218.
3. See Document 218.
4. No record of this meeting has been found.
5. See footnote 2, Document 218.
6. See Document 219.
7. The message, sent by Begin to Sadat through Lewis on March 16, conveyed the substance of an exchange between Begin and Carter on the sequence of the signing ceremonies for the Arabic, English, and Hebrew versions of the peace treaty. Begin agreed with Carter’s suggestion that Washington should serve as the first signing location for the peace treaty and also stated his willingness to go to Cairo to sign the Arabic version before Sadat came to Jerusalem to sign the Hebrew version. (Telegram 5309 from Tel Aviv, March 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2640)
8. Text missing in the original document. The final version of Sadat’s message, conveyed to Begin through Eilts and Lewis on March 18, reads: “All that President Carter told you, as you mentioned in your message, is correct and I will honor every word of it. My statement in saying that the three copies should be signed in Washington was motivated solely by the fact that it should be President Carter’s show. Until we meet in Washington, please accept my warmest wishes and congratulations.” (Telegram 5486 from Cairo, March 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790126–0268)
9. See footnote 3, Document 4.
10. On instructions from Sadat, Mubarak visited Jidda and Riyadh on March 15, following meetings with Numeiri in Sudan, in order to discuss the peace treaty with Saudi officials. The same day, Sadat briefed Eilts on the talks, described by the Egyptian President as “more than good.” Sadat reported that Fahd proposed to Mubarak a “joint plan” for the Saudis and Egyptians to manage the “post-treaty situation” in the region, though he did not provide details of the proposal. Eilts relayed a full report of the briefing, observing that “pending harder evidence of a shift in the Saudi position, Mubarak’s report of the Saudi reaction should probably be taken with caution.” (Telegram 5403 from Cairo, March 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790152–0605)
11. U.S. television journalist.
12. Ali met with Brown in Washington on March 19 to discuss U.S. military aid to Egypt. The conclusions reached during this meeting are printed in Document 230.
13. See footnote 2, Document 217.
14. Mohamed Siad Barre, President of Somalia from 1969 until 1991.
15. Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Derg and Head of State of Ethiopia from 1977 until 1987; President of Ethiopia from 1987 until 1991.