217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

65824. Entire text. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Weizman March 16.

1. Secretary met with Weizman for about an hour afternoon March 16, for first half hour with group comprising Evron and Tehila on Israeli side and on US side Mrs. Benson, Atherton, Saunders, Hansell and Korn, and for second half hour alone. Following are main points that came up in group session.

2. Weizman expressed concern that in their talks this weekend on sub-phasing General Ali might press him for withdrawal from Al Arish in three months. He said Dayan has already told the Likud Knesset group that withdrawal from Al Arish would be in four months; short [Page 753] ening of that time would cause problems. Secretary said he would do his best to help get agreement on four months. He could not guarantee that Ali wouldn’t start by asking for three months, but he did not think this was something the parties should get hungup on. Secretary pointed out that there are two other things that might cause problems in the talks on sub-phasing: 1) the fact that Alma comes at the end of 9 months instead of 5 or 6 as earlier agreed; and 2) only allowing Egyptian civilian police into evacuated areas when full withdrawal is completed. Weizman indicated that if Israel could get some further assurance on provision of oil from Egypt transfer of Alma could take place earlier than nine months.

3. Weizman’s main concern was with levels of assistance.2 In Knesset debate on the treaty next week he wanted to be able to say that “our defense problems are being taken care of.” He would like to leave the US with assurances on this. Israel had asked only for $3 billion in redeployment assistance but it now looks as though actual cost will be $4 billion, or $3.5 billion at minimum. Airbases3 will cost $1.1 billion; if US assistance is $2.5 billion this will leave only $1.4 billion for all other costs. Weizman stressed magnitude of work Israel will have to do to build infrastructure in Negev and value of infrastructure and installations it is giving up in Sinai. Furthermore inflation is steadily eroding value of US annual $1 billion FMS program. Weizman asked that annual assistance program be increased by $500 million and that another billion dollars be added to proposed USG redeployment aid package. This would cover Israel’s needs and give Israelis a feeling of security. It would be very good if I could go back with this, Weizman said. If not, Israel will still sign the treaty but “there will be much less joy,” in later remarks, Evron expressed concern over what he had heard concerning terms of our redeployment assistance package. Evron said there had been talk about commercial bank loan and this was worrisome (owing to an interruption Evron was unable to spell out fully his concern and there was no time for further discussion of it).

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4. Evron said he had instructions from Prime Minister to raise Sadat’s statement4 that the treaty should be signed only in Washington. Evron said the Prime Minister was surprised that Sadat seems to be changing his mind about signing in Jerusalem and Cairo; he wonders what else President Sadat will change his mind about. Prime Minister would like to stick to the original plan. Secretary and Saunders explained that it was our understanding that Sadat was not ruling out signing in Jerusalem and Cairo but that this was a matter that he and Begin would discuss in Washington. Evron said word he had from Jerusalem was that Sadat had made specific statement that there should be signing only in Washington. Secretary said we would look into this.

5. Weizman said he was “awfully sorry” about killing of the two West Bank youths at Halhul.5 With Begin in bed and his (Weizman’s) absence, Yadin had convened a conference of army and political leaders and given an instruction for a court of inquiry. Weizman said he would look into the matter personally on his return.

Vance
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Joseph Hulings (S/S–O); approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2633)
  2. Meeting with Weizman on March 16, Brown stated that the annual foreign military sales level was “likely to remain at present level given congressional attitudes and state of American economy.” Moreover, Brown indicated that the United States intended to budget $2–2.5 billion to assist with Israel’s redeployment from Sinai. (Telegram 65826 to Tel Aviv, March 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79)
  3. On March 16, Department of Defense officials briefed Weizman on the conclusions of the U.S. airbase survey group, and informed the Israeli Defense Minister that the United States would “take responsibility” to make operational four Israeli squadrons from the proposed Ovda and Matred bases in the Negev desert within three years. (Telegram 65825 to Tel Aviv, March 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79)
  4. Speaking with journalists in his village of Mit Abul Kom on March 16, Sadat stated that there should be a single signing ceremony in Washington for the Arabic, English, and Hebrew texts of the peace treaty, a view Khalil asked Eilts to forward to Washington. (Telegram 5453 from Cairo, March 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0872) Earlier, on March 14, Sadat had communicated to Begin his view that Washington should serve as the site of the first treaty signing ceremony as Carter should “receive full credit” for the treaty, a position Begin endorsed. (Telegram 5225 from Cairo, March 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0890; Telegram 5309 from Tel Aviv, March 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2640) On March 17, Ciechanover informed Lewis of Begin’s “great concern” over the possibility of a single signing ceremony. Begin believed Sadat’s presence for a signing ceremony in Jerusalem would be “a powerful political symbol” and would be “very upset” if Sadat chose not to come. (Telegram 5386 from Tel Aviv, March 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2623)
  5. Reference is to the shooting of two Palestinian demonstrators by Israeli troops in the West Bank town of Halhul on March 15. A summary of the incident is in telegram 882 from Jerusalem, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790119–0350.