Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

219. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Amman, March 18, 1979, 3:15–4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Warren Christopher
  • General David Jones
  • Chip Carter
  • Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes
  • Michael Sterner
  • Gary Sick

• Jordan

  • King Hussein
  • Crown Prince Hassan
  • Prime Minister Mudhar Badran
  • Abdul-Hamid Sharaf
  • Abd al-Salam Majali
  • Hasan Ibrahim

(At the beginning of the meeting there was a brief photo opportunity by the press.)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had asked him to give the King a personal letter.² Dr. Brzezinski said that our countries are bound by certain common interests and shared expectations. We have entered a particularly turbulent situation which affects social systems and the distribution of power. Perhaps the central choice in future international arrangements will be whether domination will be by radical or moderate forces. This is a problem that is both local and regional.

The President is seeking a just and lasting peace. No President since 1948 has been committed as deeply personally and willing to take risks to himself as this President with regard to this issue. If this President does not succeed, the next President will not try. His failure will be taken as an object lesson that it is better not to touch the problem because of the political risks. President Carter has staked his personal political fortunes on this issue. He wished to help moderate forces prevail. We would like to shape an Arab Middle East which is moderate in nature and at peace. Our premise is that what hurts U.S. power helps the Soviets and hurts our friends.

There are two basic threats—internal and external. The internal threat is the rising appeal of radicalism which is rooted in many social causes. The conflict with Israel contributes to this, particularly in the Palestinian case. So the internal struggles are strong, perhaps growing. The external threat is the Soviet ability to extend its power, to increase its military strength. The Soviet ideology is not congenial to the U.S. and does not have great appeal to very many people anywhere. But they do have an ability to project their military power, and that is serious.

The U.S. is prepared to respond to both threats. For the external threat, we are willing to use military power if our vital interests require it. An example of that was our sending of the carrier Constellation to the Arabian Sea.

There are three basic principles which guide our approach.

—First of all, we want to work with those Arab countries that are willing to work with us. We wish to have a consultative security arrangement which would be nothing like an alliance; however, there may be circumstances susceptible to bilateral or multilateral security arrangements, depending on the situation.

—Secondly, we are ready to cooperate with all Arab states. It is not our intention to split the Arabs. We wish to work closer with our friends and moderates, and we are not excluding others. Iraq, for example, has been helpful in Yemen. We see the Islamic resurgence as terribly important. It marks the rebirth of Arab vitality which is the best bulwark against communism.

—Thirdly, we wish to promote a process of a comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israel dispute.

The Israel-Egyptian treaty will be concluded shortly. We have promoted it and we see no other choice. Trying to solve all differences at once is, in fact, to solve nothing for a long time, or ever. Rather, we believe that setting in motion a process will establish the principles of withdrawal and the dismantling of settlements. It establishes a precedent. Maybe this will not be universally applied. However, if it is exploited intelligently it can help the Palestinians. The President has made a public pledge to that effect, both in Cairo and in Israel. Once that process begins, people will have to focus on clearcut issues such as elections, registration, who votes, and other clear problems. That will have an important political effect and help to mobilize world public opinion on this issue.

We have been asked why do we not state clearly or precisely what the final outcome of this process will be. First of all, we do not know the answer to the question. Secondly, to state it would, in fact, be counterproductive. If we state an outcome favorable to the Arabs, the Israelis will not join. If we state an outcome favorable to the Israelis, then no Arabs will join. And if we require major concessions of both sides, neither will join. Rather, we need to set in motion a process which is somewhat open-ended. Let the process shape attitudes. There have been major changes, both among the Arabs and the Israelis. Mr. Peres now speaks about the rights of the Palestinians. Begin once told me at Camp David that he would rather cut off his hand than to see a settlement dismantled. However, now he says that he will resign if they do not dismantle some settlements in the Sinai. This is a dramatic change in attitudes.

Arab stereotypes have often been found offensive in the U.S., but that is changing radically today. If credit is to be given, Sadat has to be given credit for this change. The American public now sees a difference in those most interested in peace.

Therefore, we intend to persist. We intend to complete the treaty and move on to the next phase. We want to seek through negotiations to resolve the issues of the West Bank and Gaza. This will certainly be more difficult than the first phase. But what we have is an opening wedge to a serious, sustained effort leading to respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Our own vital interests are involved. This is the only way to real security. The only way to stop an inimical process. We wish that our friends not engage in actions which will make our job more difficult. We also hope that in quiet ways our friends can help us. We recognize that our friends have constraints and may possibly have to act indirectly.

We hope to engage the moderate Palestinians in negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza. We want to give local government as much power as possible and ensure that elections are real political exercises. This will not be easy. The Palestinians are suspicious. They live under a military occupation which challenges their sense of dignity. We recognize that a treaty could result in a frozen situation. We want to avoid that. We hope those who consider themselves friends will help, or at least not obstruct that effort.

King Hussein thanked him and expressed pleasure at this very brief visit. He asked that Dr. Brzezinski convey to the President his deep appreciation for the kind message, also for the opportunity to talk frankly about a subject that is important to all of us. It is a problem that [will] affect our hopes, our dreams, our rights. Perhaps my response will meet some of the points you raised.

First, for the sake of historical fact, this city and its people during the years I have had the privilege of being involved, has had the courage to stand by its convictions and defend them at a time when forces threatened the dignity of the Arabs. Israeli expansionism is a long-standing fact. It is the story of twenty years or more. When we speak to friends from the U.S., we know the limitations of our country, but our relations are based on mutual respect. The dignity of the people of this country is most important to me. When we saw a leftist tide almost overcome us, we stood, we were vocal, and we paid a price. Always, we thought we had a just cause and the American people believe in justice. If the U.S. had different positions from us in the past and we suffered, we felt it was partly our fault in the way we presented our cause.

I had the privilege of meeting President Carter, who gave me more time than any previous President. I know that he desires peace and stability and I respect that. Unfortunately, to the pain of myself and others, we have lost touch with each other. From a good beginning, we went our different ways. In the beginning we spoke of mutual problems. Then the President was the first to speak of Palestinian rights, then of going to Geneva.³ We began to prepare to go to Geneva, then came the surprise visit⁴ of Sadat to Israel.

This is a chance for me to express the feelings of the people as a whole. The visit to Jerusalem under occupation had great religious significance. My grandfather is buried there.⁵ He was involved in the Arab revolt against colonial rule and he died because he would not compromise. We lost Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command. We knew we would lose, but we went into that war anyway. Under Egyptian command and responsibility, the West Bank was lost. The Sadat visit was a very, very big shock. Yet we chose to take the moderate path and describe the visit as a courageous move. Sometime later, I asked Sadat, “Why did you not tell me. Why not ask what you could get for 242.” I never got a positive answer. Also in 1973, there was no consultation. Egypt has given much to unity, but it cannot be a unity of one. The losses and expenses since 1973 are losses that we suffered.

The real peace process was derailed by Sadat. We were close to Geneva. We were all getting ready to go. Sadat wrote me about Camp David and reiterated his determination to demand Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Jerusalem. I wrote to President Carter also.⁶ I told him that if Israel was intransigent, to consider going to the Security Council. I talked to Sadat while he was at Camp David and reiterated that position. Then came the agreement, a very limited agreement. We were told that the vagueness was intentional. The role provided for Jordan under the Camp David agreements was that of a policeman, to ensure the security. Of whom—the occupied? We tried to keep as quiet as possible. But that is not a role that we could play. What we wanted to know was what was the final object. Perhaps if we knew that, we could work it out.

The Arab view about Egypt is that it has been an abnegation of moral responsibility for those who took risks and suffered. Egypt is the largest of the Arab states, but they cannot first take in the Soviets then throw them out—make war, then make peace—without regard to our concerns. A small country, we here on these hills have the longest ceasefire line with Israel. Frankly, in recent time we have felt that we were both weak and strong. Strong because experience pulled us together as a nation. We have to face it the best we can. We are attached to the past of our nation. None of us can see ourselves being a weakling or giving up the fight for the rights of millions of people in East Jerusalem. We may cease to exist. But what interests us is the judgment of future will respect. I wish the weather were clearer today so that you could have seen Jerusalem from the window. The security question could be answered by how close we are. What makes the difference is the feelings on both sides. I agree this is a turbulent and dangerous period. Many things have shocked us in the recent past. The whole approach is involved in asking us to keep quiet. In the past, you did not ask, for at that time we were your only friend in the Arab world.

How does one draw the line between the extremist and the moderates? I know that our U.S. friends were upset by the Baghdad Conference.⁷ From my perspective and responsibility, this was the best that could be done. In light of Afghanistan, Iran, the Horn of Africa, all of these things were seen as threats to our very existence. That, plus the Palestinians, comprised the worst of all possible circumstances. South Yemen posed a serious threat; fortunately collective action was taken, successfully.

In 1950 Egypt took the initiative of ensuring that any country which signed a unilateral peace with Israel would be expelled from the Arab League, as well as certain other things. At the time this was probably aimed at Jordan. How can you have the Arab League at Cairo or the Chief of Staff of the Arab forces an Egyptian, when Egypt has signed a unilateral peace treaty? (At this point, Dr. Brzezinski passed a note across the table pointing out that the time was 4:15 which was when the American delegation was due to depart.) King Hussein continued, the last time Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Egypt was over the possibility of establishing a United Arab Kingdom⁸ to ensure the exercise of self-determination.

Unfortunately, this is not an inter-Arab dispute only. It involves the U.S. and we are very sad when this occurs. It is difficult to see how the U.S. can play a role as a mediator when it is so committed to the support of the Zionists. If they have everything, why should they consider giving anything up? Always they have had the strategy of separating Egypt from the Arab world. They have always wanted to turn this problem into an East-West problem. At times like this, Jordan becomes an embarrassment.

In the regional security plan, where does Israel fit? The holocaust did occur. Although this area had nothing to do with it, this city has suffered the most, receiving the victims of another kind of holocaust. Should we tell our people to cooperate with Israel? Here is the greatest threat to stability. I have known no President to take as many risks for peace; however, it is not like ’48, which was a disaster from our point of view, but like 1956. No one here is discussing the existence of Israel, but we are wondering what about the rights of others. Jordan could be an embarrassment if it relies totally on its friends. But I want to come back to the great problem.

Arab unity and coordination have always been resisted by our friends. The problem has been Israel. It must be addressed before it is too late. With regard to the precedent, the facts and figures that we have regarding the West Bank and the occupied territories, we have to bring before the Security Council. We were asked to postpone it for the third time; however, we went ahead because there were serious changes taking place on the ground. We saw postponement as being worse. What is the alternative to bringing it up? Could our friends prevent this? You may be right that the treaty will cement U.S.-Arab relations, but it is contrary to all of my expectations and experience.

Mr. Christopher said that he had listened intently to the eloquent and somber presentation by King Hussein. It seems that events in the last month may assist to achieve the rights of the Palestinians. This is your goal and we share it. It has given the U.S. a new sense of authority. A timetable has been agreed upon. There is a new sense of confidence in carrying out provisions leading to providing a homeland for the Palestinians. Before you act, we hope you will ask if it is in our interests and your own self-interests. Leave the door open to the possibility that we may be right. Do not take an irrevocable act or close doors. This is the thought I would like to leave with you.

King Hussein responded that he would not act on personal whim. His fears are genuine, even for Sadat.

Dr. Brzezinski thanked the King for the time he had given us and indicated that he would convey his views to the President. I think we understand each other. We will persist because we think it best. It would not be good for us or you if the problem were reduced to an East-West conflict. That is all the more important that we not be alone in what we are doing. There are different ways of being helpful, or unhelpful. We recognize that all parties have to act in different ways but we hope you will bear in mind that we have common interests. The final result, we hope, will be acceptable to those countries—to the Palestinians—not today, but as the consequence of a process over some years. We will persist.

King Hussein said that his main aim is to present the voices of the majority. All must have a voice. He had told Arafat the day before that he wished to maintain close contact with all those whose role will be critical in the future of the area.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 3–6/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Hashemite Palace.
2. See Document 215.
3. See footnote 5, Document 24.
4. See footnote 3, Document 4.
5. Hussein’s grandfather, King Abdullah I, was assassinated in July 1951 while visiting the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
6. See Document 17.
7. See footnote 7, Document 91.
8. On March 15, 1972, Hussein announced a proposal calling for the Israeli-occupied West Bank to be joined with Jordan in a unified kingdom under his rule. In protest, Sadat broke diplomatic relations with Jordan on April 6, 1972. (William Dullforce, “Egypt Cuts Relations with Jordan,” The Washington Post, April 7, 1972, p. A1) Following a joint conference between Sadat, Assad, and Hussein in Cairo, the Egyptian Government announced the re-establishment of Egyptian-Jordanian relations on September 12, 1973. (Jim Hoagland, “Egypt, Syria Renew Jordan Ties; Palestinians Silent,” The Washington Post, September 13, 1973, p. A27)