Attachment
White Paper Prepared in the Department of
State6
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS
Where They Stand on December
17
On September 17, 1978, at the end of the historic meetings at Camp
David, President Sadat and
Prime Minister Begin set for
themselves a goal of concluding a peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel within three months. Since October 12, difficult but
productive negotiations have taken place between their delegations
at Blair House in Washington with the help of the United States.
While it has not been possible to meet their goal, these
negotiations have produced the main elements of a treaty package.
But several issues remain to be resolved. Some reflect basic
differences. Others are less important. In the United States’ view,
these few remaining gaps can be closed. The United States, as a
friend and partner of both parties, remains committed to helping
Egypt and Israel resolve these issues in a continuing
negotiation.
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The purpose of this paper is to explain what has been achieved, the
role the United States has played, and the issues that remain. While
much information has been made public about the negotiations,
preserving the integrity of the negotiating process has required
that the talks be conducted confidentially. In such a situation and
when issues of a highly technical nature are involved, some
confusion and misapprehension are bound to arise.
The United States has been a full partner in this process, as at Camp
David, because peace in the Middle East is crucial to its national
interests and to the peace and security of its friends there. We are
involved in the Middle East because of our permanent historic and
moral commitment to the State of Israel, because of our friendships
and important interests in the Arab world, because of the strategic
importance of moderate government there, and because renewed tension
or warfare in the area carries the risk of confrontation between the
major powers, severe global economic dislocation, and strains in
relations with our friends and allies. We have been able to
participate in the process and to play the role of partner because
we enjoy the confidence of both sides.
Where the Treaty Package Stands
Two Framework Agreements were signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and witnessed by President
Carter, on September 17:
A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, and A Framework for the
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.7 The first sets out broad guidelines for peace
between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and its other neighbors
including the Palestinians, with the objective of achieving a
comprehensive peace; it describes in some detail a framework for the
West Bank and Gaza; it enunciates general principles governing
negotiations between Egypt and Israel; and it sets out associated
principles that should apply to peace treaties between Israel and
each of its neighbors. In the Framework for the Conclusion of a
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Parties set out the broad
outlines for this peace treaty.
As a result of the negotiations that began on October 12, the
framework agreed upon at Camp David has been translated into a set
of detailed documents which comprise a treaty package. Agreement has
been reached on most of these documents. But as of December 17,
neither Party is prepared to agree on all of the elements of the
treaty package. Until there is agreement on the complete package,
there cannot be a peace treaty.
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The complete treaty package now before the Governments of Egypt and
Israel contains the following documents:
—a Protocol concerning Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and
accompanying security arrangements;
—maps delineating the line for an interim Israeli withdrawal and the
security zones to be established in the Sinai and the Negev after
Israel’s final withdrawal;
—a Protocol concerning the normalization of relations between the
Parties under conditions of peace;
—a set of letters and interpretive notes.
In those documents, the two Parties have reached agreement on: the
basic text of a peace treaty, the Annex on withdrawal and security
arrangements, the maps, virtually all of the Annex on the
normalization of relations, the beginning of the next round of
negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza one month after ratification
of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty.
There are three principle outstanding issues:
—How to express the relationship between the
Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and the political process in the West
Bank/Gaza which both sides agreed at Camp David should be
negotiated and set in motion. Egypt wants assurances that
the sequence of steps leading to Palestinian autonomy will take
place within a specific timeframe. Israel agrees to start
negotiations promptly, but takes the position that it is impossible
to determine when those negotiations can be concluded. Israel does
not want implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty conditioned
on other negotiations. Egypt has insisted since President Sadat’s visit to Israel in
November, 1977, that Egypt can make peace with Israel only in the
context of progress toward peace between Israel and its other Arab
neighbors.8 This issue is touched on in two
proposed letters—one specifying the time period within which these
negotiations would be concluded and another in which Egypt relates
the exchange of ambassadors to inauguration of a Palestinian
self-governing authority.
—How to define the relationship between the
obligations under this Treaty and those under other
international obligations. Israel wants the obligations
under this Treaty to have priority over Egypt’s commitments to other
Arab nations. Egypt has insisted on the right, under the UN Charter, to honor the several mutual
defense pacts it has with other Arab States in the event of armed
attack against them. These issues are dealt with in Article VI of
the Treaty.
—Both sides agree to the principle of a review
in Article IV of the Treaty and that any changes must be by mutual
agreement. Egypt wants it made explicit that review is mandatory
upon the request of either side and has suggested a fixed date for
review. Israel agrees that review should be mandatory if either side
requets a review but does not accept the mention of a review in 5
years.
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How these issues are dealt with in the documents of the treaty
package is discussed in greater detail below.
How the Negotiations Have Been Conducted
To understand where the negotiations stand as of December 17, it is
important to understand several points about how the negotiations
have been conducted.
First, it is essential to understand the process by
which agreement is reached in a negotiation of this kind.
The Egyptian and Israeli Governments sent to Washington highly
qualified negotiating teams headed by Cabinet Ministers. These two
teams came empowered to negotiate but not to give final approval.
Each could and did frequently accept certain provisions ad referendum—that is, subject to later
approval by their governments. In a few instances provisions that
were agreed to by each of the negotiating teams were disapproved
when referred to the home government. This is a normal and accepted
part of the negotiating process. When the recommendations of the
negotiators are overruled, the solution is further negotiation to
settle the unresolved issues.
Second, it is important to understand the U.S. role in
these negotiations. As at Camp David, we have worked
separately and together with the negotiating Parties. We have served
as communicators between them, helping each to understand the
other’s positions. We have helped them to crystallize and write down
the positions that evolved from their discussions. At the beginning
of each phase in the negotiations at Blair House, we put to the
Parties draft texts to be used as a basis for negotiation. These
texts were not intended to be binding upon anyone; their aim was
simply to give the Parties a point from which to start. In later
instances, when the Parties had negotiated for some time but found
themselves unable to reach agreement, we proposed drafts that we
thought represented fair and reasonable compromises which would
advance the negotiations without prejudicing the fundamental
interests of either Party. In short, most of the documents now in
the Treaty package have resulted from a combination of all of these
methods and from intensive discussion of the issues after a
prolonged period.
Third, it may be useful to have in mind a
simple chronology of events during the period
of these negotiations:
| October 12: |
Negotiations begin at Blair House. |
| October 20–21: |
Intensive sessions with President Carter. |
| October 22: |
Ministers Dayan and
Weizman return to
Israel to consult the Cabinet. |
| November 11–12: |
U.S. effort to present a
complete text of the Treaty, of Annex III, and of a letter
on the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. |
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| November 13: |
Egyptian Acting Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali returned to
Egypt to consult with President Sadat. Egypt did not agree to two Treaty
articles and the West Bank/Gaza letter. |
| November 15–18: |
Egyptian Vice President Mubarak visited Washington. |
| November 21: |
The Israeli Cabinet approved the Treaty text and Annexes
while rejecting an Egyptian draft of a West Bank/Gaza letter
and not approving a U.S.
draft. |
| November 30–December 4: |
Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil visited Washington. |
| December 8: |
Secretary Vance
left for Egypt and Israel. |
The Outstanding Issues
The differences between Egypt and Israel have been reduced to very
few. Both Parties are now prepared to accept the Treaty text,9 subject to Egyptian request for
two clarifications, Annex I on withdrawal and security arrangements,
the maps, and Annex III with the exception of disagreement on one
sentence.
Side understandings relating to Annex I had been agreed, and
extensive work had been done on a letter which would deal with the
West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Because of the sharply divergent
positions taken by Egypt and Israel on this last issue, the United
States had put forward a compromise draft calling for negotiations
on the West Bank and Gaza to begin one month after the ratification
of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty with a goal of concluding those
negotiations and holding elections not later than the end of 1979.
After extensive discussions on November 11–12,10 the Israeli
negotiators accepted the U.S.
proposal subject to approval by the Israeli Cabinet. The Cabinet on
November 21 did not approve the U.S.
draft. The Egyptians initially rejected the U.S. draft, but accepted it during Secretary Vance’s talks in Egypt December
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10–12.11 A special word is also
required about one aspect of the negotiations on Annex III, dealing
with normalization of relations between the two Parties. Early in
the Blair House talks, agreement ad
referendum was reached between the negotiators that in
return for Israel’s willingness to detail a sector-by-sector
timetable for accelerating its interim withdrawal in the Sinai,
Egypt would agree to maintain the momentum of rapid implementation
of the Treaty by agreeing to exchange ambassadors one month after
the completion of Israel’s withdrawal to the interim line. Neither
of these understandings had been agreed at Camp David; both were
reached in an atmosphere of trying to show quick results from the
signing of the Treaty. Subsequently, the Israeli Cabinet disapproved
detailing the phases for an early withdrawal. The Egyptian
Government then withdrew its reciprocal agreement for an early
exchange of ambassadors. The issues that remain following Secretary
Vance’s December 10–15
talks in Egypt and Israel are the following:
Treaty Text
—Article IV of the Treaty, paragraph 4, which
provises that: “The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs
1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either Party be
reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.” President
Sadat has agreed to
accept this paragraph but wanted an interpretive note which would
make clear that a review would be mandatory if requested by either
Party. Egypt has proposed the following note:
“Paragraph 4 of Article IV shall be construed to mean that review
provided for in that Article shall be undertaken promptly on the
request of either Party, and that an amendment can be made only with
the mutual agreement of the two Parties.
“It is understood that such a review will occur when the Treaty has
been in force for five years.”
—Article VI of the Treaty, which concerns the
obligations of the Parties toward each other under this Treaty and
toward third parties to whom they also have commitments. President
Sadat was concerned
mainly over paragraphs 2 and 5 of this Article:
—Paragraph 2 states: “The Parties undertake to
fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without
regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of
any instrument external to this Treaty.” President Sadat wanted clarification that
this language did not contradict the fact that the Treaty is
concluded in the context of a comprehensive peace in accordance with
provisions of the Camp David Framework. He prepared the following
interpretive note:
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“The provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article VI of this Treaty shall not
be construed in contradiction with the fact that this Treaty is
concluded in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement in
accordance with the provisions of the Framework for Peace in the
Middle East agreed at Camp David.” Israel has not yet responded
formally to this proposal.
—Paragraph 5 states that in the event of
conflict between the obligations under the Treaty and those stemming
from other international undertakings “. . . .the obligations under
the Treaty will be binding and implemented.” President Sadat was troubled that the Article
might be seen as abrogating legitimate defense commitments
undertaken by Egypt pursuant to the Arab League Charter. Egypt has
indicated willingness to accept a U.S. legal opinion “. . . . that the obligations which
Egypt assumes under the proposed Treaty text would not prevent Egypt
from legally coming to the assistance of any state with which it has
a collective security or mutual defense agreement in the event that
state is the victim of armed attack by a third state.” It is also
true that Egypt would have no duty or right to assist an Arab
country in initiating an attack on Israel.
It seems to the United States that each of these problems with the
Treaty text has a solution that is consistent with the agreements
reached at Camp David and with the interests of each Party.
The Letters
—The letter concerns the establishment of a
self-governing authority on the West Bank/Gaza. President
Sadat agreed that
negotiations for the West Bank/Gaza agreement should begin one month
after the ratification of the peace Treaty but was concerned over
having no assurance that they would progress satisfactorily. Rather
than a good faith target date, he wanted a firm date set for the
establishment of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza;
furthermore, he wanted this date to coincide with the date of
Israel’s withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line in Sinai, which
was the starting point, under the Camp David Framework Agreements,
for beginning normal relations, including diplomatic, economic and
cultural relations, and the termination of economic boycotts and
barriers to the free movement of goods and people. During Secretary
Vance’s recent trip to
Egypt, however, President Sadat accepted the idea of a target date to be
stated as “not later than the end of 1979.” No part of the
implementation of Annex III, except the exchange of ambassadors,
would be coupled with that date.
—The letter concerning exchange of
ambassadors. As described above, Egypt had earlier agreed
that, in order to maintain the momentum of rapid implementation of
the Treaty, ambassadors would be exchanged within one month after
completion of the interim withdrawal. Egyptian negotiators regarded
this as a significant concession while Israel
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would continue to occupy a substantial
portion of the Sinai. Egypt has now proposed to send the following
letter to President Carter:
“In response to your request, I can confirm that within one month
after the self-governing authority is inaugurated, which may take
place in Gaza first as a step towards full implementation of the
Camp David Framework, Egypt will send a resident Ambassador to
Israel and will receive a resident Israeli Ambassador in Egypt.”
Egypt regards the decision to exchange ambassadors as the
prerogative of the President of Egypt, not an appropriate subject
for inclusion in a peace Treaty. They regard the exchange of
ambassadors as an element in the normalization of relations between
Egypt and Israel which will in part depend—in a political though not
in a legal sense—on the progress in the negotiations establishing
peace between Israel and its other neighbors.
