155. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House1
Secto 14022. White House for Dr. Brzezinski. State for Christopher only. Subject: My Meeting With President Sadat 12/10/78.
1. I had a very good 1½ hour meeting alone with President Sadat this afternoon. We have come close to reaching agreement with him on the major outstanding issues, although he wants a bit more time to consult with his advisors and to reflect further. They, of course, may unwind some of what we agreed on this evening. Nonetheless, based on our first discussion, I believe that Sadat will accept the treaty text as it is, with interpretive notes on Articles 4 and 6, and that he will accept a revised side letter along the lines that we discussed in Washington on Friday.
2. We began our talk with a broad discussion of regional problems and of the need for us to have a common strategy in the area. I also gave President Sadat your letter,2 which he read with interest and which he agreed with virtually in its entirety. Our strategic overview discussion laid a good basis of common understanding, and I think it is fair to say that we see problems in Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, Sudan, Turkey, and elsewhere in very similar terms.
3. Turning to specifics, I emphasized the need to find a satisfactory solution for the West Bank/Gaza linkage question in the side letter. I indicated that we could also discuss additional steps that would reinforce whatever is in the letter. I gave Sadat a copy of a revised side letter,3 and his only immediate concern was the reference to including Palestinians in the Egyptian delegation. He said that he would not want to promise more than he could deliver, and that we might try to revise that language. He also wants some reference to Egypt’s special responsibility to Gaza. He was pleased that our reference to a target date for elections by the end of the year included the phrase “at least in Gaza.”
4. Sadat returned to his own idea that the interim withdrawal should be coterminous with the establishment of the self-governing authority. I told him this was not possible in our judgment, but that we [Page 544] had thought of an alternative. I then read to him the revised note on the exchange of ambassadors, the key element of which was the exchange of resident ambassadors one month after the establishment of the self-governing authority. I explained that we felt this change was justifiable, particularly in light of the fact that the Israelis had withdrawn their previous agreement to withdraw in sub-phases. Sadat reflected for a moment and said, “I think that solves my problem. You can consider it agreed.” In brief, as of this evening, he feels that we have found an adequate solution to the linkage problem. We will have to explore with his advisors tomorrow to make sure that they understand fully that Egypt would still be obliged to establish diplomatic relations after the interim withdrawal, but that the actual exchange of resident ambassadors could be delayed until the self-governing authority had been inaugurated.
5. Turning to Article 4 of the treaty, I read him our interpretive note,4 including an additional sentence which states that a review will be held after five years. He said that this was acceptable and that we could consider this issue closed.
6. On Article 6, I gave him a copy of our draft letter and our legal opinion.5 I explained that Article 6 does not mean that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty “prevails over” his other treaty obligations. I expressed my opinion that we should only send this letter to Egypt, and that he should confirm this as his interpretation. He said that he would have to consider this further, but that it helped meet some of his concerns. I also urged him to leave paragraph 2 of Article 6 as it now stands. Once again, he seemed to understand my reasoning, but said that he would need to discuss this with his advisors.
7. In conclusion, I urged him to leave the treaty text as it now stands, relying on the interpretations of Articles 4 and 6 that we had discussed. We could then focus all of our attention on the side letter. I told him that this would help change public opinion, which has put him on the defensive for not having agreed to the treaty. Sadat mentioned that he still hoped for some reference to Egyptian police in Gaza, which I termed a non-starter. He asked me to raise it with the Israelis again, but indicated that he would drop this if it does not work. He clearly does, however, want some Egyptian presence in Gaza. He then said that he thought we had the basis for an agreement, but that we were in for a period of confrontation with Israel and we should be ready for it. He said he wants to wind things up before the 17th, but we [Page 545] should be prepared to wait for another month if Israel will not now go along. He said he wants to conclude the negotiations, that he wants a treaty, and that he wants to coexist and cooperate with the Israelis. He recognizes that once the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza begin, there will be a dynamic process under way which will bring about significant changes. He now seems to appreciate that the key to breaking the deadlock is to reach agreement with us on the basis that I presented.
8. Sadat is still worried about Article 6, but he generally seems to be in a positive frame of mind, and I hope that we will make good progress with him in the next few days.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1507. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance arrived in Cairo on December 10.↩
- See Document 154.↩
- Not found.↩
- The text of this draft of the U.S. interpretive note on Article 4 has not been found.↩
- No copies of this draft letter and legal opinion have been found.↩