Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

156. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, December 12, 1978, 2225Z

Secto 14043. White House for Dr. Brzezinski only. State for Christopher Only. Subject: Secretary’s Negotiations With Egyptians—Dec. 12.

1. Following my return² from Israel today, I had two hours of further meetings with the Egyptians this evening, first with the Prime Minister and Boutros Ghali and subsequently with Sadat and his advisors at the Barrages. In the earlier meeting, we again had a tough time with the Prime Minister over the problem of Article VI, but at the end of our meeting with Sadat, after the President had given his advisors a full opportunity to express their views, Sadat overruled the Prime Minister and agreed to accept our approach to handling the Article VI problem through the letter and legal memorandum previously proposed. Together with the other texts which we worked out yesterday³ and today⁴ with the Prime Minister, we now have U.S.-Egyptian agreement on a package which is along the lines of the one we hoped for and which will enable us to demonstrate in Israel that Sadat has shown considerable flexibility.

2. Sadat’s advisors fought the Article VI question to the very end, arguing that we should insist on an interpretive note that would be annexed to the treaty, therefore requiring Israeli concurrence. In overruling his advisors, Sadat stressed to me that he was doing so in order to create a “package deal” that would have to be put to the Israelis on a this-is-as-far-as-I-can go basis. He said candidly that the Egyptian concern was that the Israelis would put his concession on Article VI in their pocket and then bargain for further concessions on the other issues, by which he means primarily the approach we have worked out on the West Bank/Gaza side letter and exchange of ambassadors issue. Sadat said, “I must make it clear Cy, this is a final position and there is no room for further compromise.”

3. After Sadat made this decision, Khalil asked what we would do if the Israelis refused the package. Before I could answer, Sadat commented he was prepared to wait “a month or two” if necessary to get Israeli agreement. Addressing the Prime Minister, Sadat said the important thing was that he would be fighting “this last round” with the U.S. at his side. He said it had taken us nine months to get Begin to

Camp David; now we should be prepared for it to take another month or so to wrap up the treaty.

4. In accepting our approach on Article VI, Sadat said he would defend the Egyptian position in his Parliament by saying he had asked me to convey to Prime Minister Begin what in effect is the U.S.-Egyptian interpretation of what this article means. I readily agreed to do this.

5. On the exchange of ambassadors letter, the Egyptians today accepted our proposal to link the exchange of resident ambassadors with inauguration of the self-governing authority. Egyptians accepted slightly revised wording to our proposed change to Article I of Annex III.

6. At the very end of our meeting with Sadat, he also sliced rapidly through two remaining minor unresolved problems in Annex I—concerning whether Egyptian transports could land in Zone C and the number of aircraft Egypt could station in Zone B. In both cases he overruled General Ali, who was present, agreeing in effect to accept the Israeli position on these points. This will not mean a great deal to the Israelis in comparison with the other issues but it will be helpful in the atmospherics of my presentation tomorrow.

7. This will be a difficult package to sell in Israel (as indeed anything attainable would be), but I think we have done about as well as could be expected here. Sadat has in effect agreed to our strategy by being as flexible as possible on both the Article VI issue and in accepting a target date instead of a fixed timetable in the West Bank/Gaza letter so that the full weight of our persuasive powers can be concentrated on getting the Israelis to accept our new proposition for a linkage trade-off.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1484. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance arrived in Cairo on December 10.
2. Earlier in the day on December 12, Vance attended the funeral of former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in Jerusalem before returning to Cairo.
3. On December 11, Vance met with Khalil, Ali, Boutros Ghali, and al-Baz to go over the formulations of the linkage letter, and the interpretive notes to Articles IV and VI. Summarizing the meeting, Vance noted: “In general, I believe the Egyptians were impressed by our concept, which I discussed with President Sadat last night, of linking the exchange of ambassadors to inauguration of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. They seem to have made a constructive effort overnight to solve a number of points, and although we still have a problem on Article VI, I feel we are in a good position to take things up in Israel having demonstrated that some definite progress has been made here.” (Telegram Secto 14033 from Jerusalem, December 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1494) The texts of the revised set of documents resulting from this meeting were sent by Vance to Washington on December 11. (Telegram Secto 14030 from Jerusalem, December 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1502) Vance met with Sadat later in the afternoon of December 11. On the discussion, Vance reported: “The tone of the meeting was characterized by Sadat’s comment at one point as he brushed an el-Baz comment aside: ‘I don’t want to make things more difficult for my friend, Cy.’” (Telegram Secto 14032 from Jerusalem, December 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1500)
4. The textual changes to the treaty documents agreed in this meeting were compiled and sent by Vance to the Department and the White House in telegram Secto 14042 from Cairo, December 12. A copy of this telegram, bearing Carter’s handwritten comments approving the agreed changes, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3. Another facsimile version of this document package, bearing a handwritten notation indicating its acceptance by Sadat on December 12, is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East—Reading—December, 1978.