Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

150. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the Embassy in Egypt¹

Tel Aviv, December 4, 1978, 2018Z

18708. Subject: Begin Letter to Sadat.

Begin letter to Sadat delivered to Embassy in unsealed envelope. Text follows:

Begin text;

Dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your kind communication delivered to me on November 30 by the United States Ambassador in Israel.² I read its contents with deep attention.

The biblical reference you cite concerning the kinship and brotherhood between our peoples is very moving. I share its sentiment. May I say, however, that the comparison between David and Goliath does not apply in our time. We believe in the brotherhood and equality of all nations.

Let us now turn from ancient to contemporary history. To conclude, to sign, to ratify the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel; to reach, if possible, appropriate peace treaties with the other neighbors—Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; to resolve the problem of the Palestinian Arabs through the full autonomy of the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, together with genuine security for Israel and her citizens—this, truly, is history in the making. We wrote a page of it at Camp David with the great and unforgettable assistance of our good friend President Carter. Surely, we must persist together to bring our efforts to fruition.

First, we should and can finalize the peace treaty between our two countries. In the Camp David Framework we agreed that:

“In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area.”

This is our commitment. With respect to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, it is an absolute commitment. It is not predicated on any other factor, including acceptance of the invitation as quoted above. Certainly, we both seek a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. As you know, I have never suggested to you to conclude a separate peace with Israel. The envisaged peace treaty between our countries constitutes the first indispensable step towards the broader settlement we seek.

In order to make this momentous prospect possible, the Government of Israel a fortnight ago took the decision that it was ready to sign the draft Egyptian-Israel peace treaty as it stands.³ In so doing, the government expressed its willingness to forego two amendments to the draft which it had held to throughout the negotiations. Those amendments are important, but I will not dwell on their significance now because of the action we took in favor of what we hoped would lead to the immediate achievement of our common goal.

As far as the text of the peace treaty is concerned, it seems that the obstacle in the way of our two governments putting our signatures to it—a turning point, indeed, not only in our mutual relations but for the whole region—is your insistance on changing or deleting sections of Article VI and, I am informed, also Article IV. These articles, as they read, were negotiated and renegotiated by our delegations. They are vital and indispensable.

In this context may I comment on your remark about “legal formulations.” To put it simply, everyone tends to display a preference for his own formulation while showing little sympathy for that of his partner. Beginning with the paper you read to President Carter and myself at Camp David⁴ and continuing through all the other Egyptian draft documents, I have found numerous “legal formulations.” I say this without any recrimination. We should both agree, surely, that this is in the nature of things, for after all, we are dealing with political documents that should have proper international standing. Hence, by definition, they are formulated in judicial language. The “legal formulation” to which you address yourself in seeking to change both the letter and substance of Article VI of the draft peace treaty is an immediate case in point. May I tell you that a number of the greatest authorities in international law share our view that under the circumstances this Article VI is absolutely vital to make our document a treaty of peace.

Therefore, should you, Mr. President, now give your approval to the text⁵ of the draft peace treaty as elaborated by our delegations, then no obstacle whatsoever exists to its signing within the specified three months, before the 17th of December 1978. This is the positive suggestion I make to you today.

On page nine of your letter you enumerated six points about which you express criticism of the attitudes of the Israeli delegation and government. May I respond:

A) and B): It is true that your delegates and our delegates talked about the possibility of sub-phases in the interim withdrawal and the feasibility of reducing this withdrawal period to six months. Never did they reach an agreed protocol on these two subjects. In the natural course of discussion it was mentioned by the Israeli representatives as an idea, as a concept, or a possibility to be looked at. And, indeed, as the negotiations proceeded, the Government of Israel considered the issue and decided that we could not undertake to reduce the interim withdrawal period to six months. We will fulfill completely our commitment under the Camp David Framework of the interim withdrawal within three to nine months. On the other hand, sub-phases will be considered, in accordance with the decisions of the government, within the framework of a joint Egyptian-Israeli commission.

C): We have not objected to the concept of an exchange of letters concerning Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

D): We do, indeed, reject what you call “a tangible Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip.” Such a tangible or any other presence in Gaza is nowhere mentioned in the Camp David Accord.

E) and F): In the course of the negotiations we objected to several of your proposals as you did to ours. Certain of our objections were approved by your delegation and vice versa. Such is the nature of free negotiations.

Respectfully, I must take exception to the sentence in your letter that reads:

“In my view you should not attempt, or appear to attempt, to evade your obligations under the Camp David ‘Framework’”.

We shall carry out our commitments fully under the Camp David Agreement. We signed the framework. Our signature is the commitment. We live by the famous rule: pacta sunt servanda.

Permit me to illustrate this truth by referring to the matter of the autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The Camp David Framework states:

“Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza.”

Had Israel sought to resort to “evasion” we could have declared that since Jordan—as one of the three above-mentioned parties—does not join now the negotiations, they should be held in abeyance. We have not said so, on the contrary, we have agreed that, notwithstanding the absence of Jordan, Egypt and Israel will conduct the negotiations with the aim of achieving an agreement. No further proof is necessary, if any, of Israel’s sincere intentions towards its commitments. Elsewhere in your letter you employ the phrase, “what you call administrative autonomy.” You put it as a negation. This is unjustified.

At Camp David we agreed on autonomy, on full autonomy for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We did not agree on sovereignty. We did not agree on a “Palestinian state,” nor on a nucleus for such a “state.” As the text declares, we both clearly agreed on a freely elected “self-governing authority (administrative council)”. This is the commitment we have both underwritten.

As far as a timetable is concerned, it is of course not indicated at all in the Camp David Agreement. Moreover, as I have already mentioned, we have to negotiate freely together with the aim of reaching an agreement in accordance with the Camp David Framework on the modalities, the powers, the responsibilities and other related matters concerning the administrative council and its election.

We, perforce, object to a timetable in connection with this matter. The example you give in your letter to determine the timetable for the exchange of diplomatic relations, for the conclusion of an agreement on trade and commerce, for the conclusion of another agreement on cultural exchange, or of a civil aviation accord—all these are proof of my thesis that a timetable cannot be applied to the matter of autonomy under the given circumstances. Each of the elements you mentioned are under the absolute control of the two sovereign states concerned, the states that sign the peace treaty and its specified annexes.

This is not the case with regard to the issues concerning the autonomy. As matters presently stand very many, if not all the elements are beyond our control. To hold an election one needs an electorate and candidates. At present, we have neither and they cannot be forced. I could send you a collection of original, exact quotations by PLO men threatening every Palestinian Arab with death if he dares support or cooperate with the autonomy scheme in any way. Recently, in Judea and Samaria, three meetings were held in which thousands participated. Words of incitement of the worst kind were voiced. We reacted with restraint although in other countries such inflammable incitement is either not tolerated or is punished. To my deep regret you, too, Mr. President, were violently attacked by, among others, the Mayor of Ramallah whose insulting words were uproariously applauded. Out of respect, I will not put his words into writing.

Suffice it to say, it is not a matter, as you put it to me, of Israel not being held responsible if developments beyond our control prevent certain desired results being realized. I am speaking of simple reason. All of us must learn from experience. Unwarranted charges may be made. It is our perfect right, a priori, to be in a position whereby we will not be required “to justify” ourselves.

Very soon, let me say one month, as agreed, after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of a peace treaty, it is Israel’s desire to enter into negotiations with you (even without Jordan’s participation) on all the issues relating to the election of the administrative council. We want the elections to be held as early as possible and we shall, of course, do all that we can to facilitate the necessary preparations. However, any attempt to fix a date before such preparations are made would not only be unreasonable but could also be very detrimental.

Dear President Sadat,

I entirely agree that both of us have taken upon ourselves an historic responsibility. In the course of our meetings and negotiations there have been good hours as well as some difficult ones. Were not the days in Jerusalem days of friendship and understanding? Did you not tell me that we should put our “cards” openly on the table, to speak with each other in complete candor? Did we not understand after our respective speeches⁶ from the rostrum of the Knesset that we have differences of opinion? Did I not tell you of my unshakeable faith in our people’s right to return to the land of our forefathers and to live in it with our Arab neighbors together in peace and in understanding? Did I not sincerely suggest to you to put behind us, all the memories of the past—and each one of us can speak about his memories—and then together we declared: no more war, no more bloodshed—we shall negotiate?

In Ismailiya we brought you a peace plan.⁷ We reached several serious understandings just as we agreed, as is the nature of things, to differ on several issues. But we found common language and, again, we pledged to each other to continue the negotiations.

Then, suddenly, and I will admit I was taken totally by surprise, there came a turning point towards a non-desirable direction. I will not go into details because—and this is the all important thing—there came

Camp David, the agreement, the evening at the White House, the joint reception by the Congress of the United States and the actual detailed negotiations on the peace treaty.

I feel it is the duty of both of us to overcome the remaining hurdles and strive to find the common language and understanding in order that we might, insofar as it depends upon us, realize all that we have undertaken and put our signatures to.

In conclusion, therefore, I put to you two positive proposals—one: let us sign the peace treaty as formulated on November 11, 1978. Two: let us, a month after the exchange of instruments of ratification, commence our free negotiations on all the issues relating to the aforementioned elected administrative council.

I can but repeat what I told you on the phone when congratulating you on the Nobel Prize award “. . . and the real prize is peace itself.”

Let us give peace to our nations and joy to the world.

With best wishes, Menachem Begin.

End text.

For Cairo: As noted previously, Prime Minister Begin requests that original of letter be delivered to Sadat, not telegraphic copy.

Lewis

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 35, Israel: 7–12/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis.
2. See Document 146.
3. See footnote 2, Document 141.
4. See footnote 8, Document 28.
5. See Document 131.
6. See footnote 2, Document 146.
7. For a report of Begin’s December 1977 discussions with President Sadat in Ismailiya, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1981, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 180.