Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

149. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• New Egyptian Proposal (U)

On instructions from President Sadat, Prime Minister Khalil gave us this morning² a new Egyptian proposal (Tab A). Simultaneously, Ambassador Eilts has reported from Cairo³ that Sadat did not accept our suggested variation of the proposal for delaying the interim withdrawal so that it could coincide with the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, Sadat still insists on carrying out the interim withdrawal within nine months, and simultaneously establishing a Palestinian self-government at least in Gaza. (S)

Prime Minister Khalil suggested that Secretary Vance or you should meet directly with President Sadat before formally answering his letter. He clearly feels that he has done as much as he can to persuade Sadat to change his views and wants to leave the remaining task to us. (S)

With reference to Articles IV and VI of the treaty, the Prime Minister expressed his view that Sadat might eventually accept the idea of leaving the text of these Articles intact, while accommodating Egyptian concerns in interpretive notes. Nonetheless, the Egyptian proposal now contains language concerning the need for amendments in both of those Articles. The Egyptians also have left out of their proposal the idea of not holding the Israelis responsible if elections cannot be held because of Jordanian or Palestinian obstruction. Khalil maintains that this has already been conveyed to the Israelis in Sadat’s letter⁴ and they do not want to include it in any of the documents related to the peace negotiations. (S)

In brief, the Egyptians have come back to the idea of a target date for elections which coincides with the interim withdrawal. Compared to their earlier position, however, they are most insistent that the interim withdrawal and the establishment of a self-governing authority must occur simultaneously, unless otherwise agreed by both parties. As you know, this will be extremely difficult for the Israelis to accept. (S)

In a meeting this afternoon with Secretary Vance,⁵ Khalil strongly urged the Secretary to come to Cairo to see Sadat as early as this coming Sunday.⁶ He also informed the Secretary that he will be meeting, at Weizman’s suggestion, both Weizman and Dayan somewhere in Europe later this week.

Tab A

Egyptian Proposal⁷

December 4, 1978

1. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will be signed after effecting the amendments⁸ requested by Egypt in Articles 4 and 6. Simultaneously, identical letters will be exchanged between Egypt and Israel (witnessed by the US) providing for the election and inauguration of a self-governing authority on the West Bank and Gaza. The letters will provide for the holding of the elections not later than September 1979 and the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority within one month thereafter. The military government and civilian administration will be withdrawn from the West Bank and Gaza as specified in the Camp David Framework. The letters will also state that a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of Israel’s remaining forces into specified locations, as provided in the Camp David Framework. Simultaneously with the signing of the peace treaty and the exchange of letters, Israel will sign a letter addressed to the United States on measures it will take for the purpose of improving the political situation in the West Bank and Gaza.

2. Within one month after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the peace treaty, the parties agree to start negotiations to work out the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority and to define and agree upon its powers and responsibilities as well as related issues, prior to the elections, in accordance with the Camp David Framework. The parties will agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith.

3. Unless otherwise agreed, the interim withdrawal in the Sinai shall take place as provided for in the Camp David Framework simultaneously with the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority, possibly starting in Gaza. In order to facilitate the transfer of power to the self-governing authority in Gaza, Egypt will maintain a police force and a liaison office there.

4. One month after the interim withdrawal is completed, resident ambassadors will be exchanged. This will be covered in a separate exchange of letters and not in the letter referred to above.⁹

5. Full implementation of the peace treaty, including final withdrawal from the Sinai, will take place within three years from the signing and ratification of the peace treaty.

6. The letters shall have the same binding force as the treaty.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document. Brzezinski added the following notation to the top of the memorandum: “For the 5:30 p.m. meeting.” An additional notation in an unknown hand on the first page of the memorandum reads: “11.4.78.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Jordan, Powell, Brzezinski, Quandt, Atherton, and Saunders in the Cabinet Room from 5:35 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. on December 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found, though Quandt wrote that the meeting reviewed the details of the proposals made by Khalil. During this meeting, according to Quandt, the decision was taken to send Vance to Cairo to meet with Sadat. (Quandt, Camp David, p. 285)
2. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
3. Telegram 26225 from Cairo, December 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1725)
4. See Document 146.
5. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
6. December 10. The Department reported to Khalil, who was traveling in Belgrade, the decision to send Vance to Cairo on December 10. (Telegram 306812 to Belgrade, December 5; Carter Library; National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 12/1–14/78)
7. Secret.
8. An unknown hand put brackets around “amendments,” and inserted “interpretations” in the margin above it.
9. An unknown hand put brackets around this sentence.