Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

146. Letter From Egyptian President Sadat to Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Cairo, November 30, 1978

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

I am addressing this letter to you with full awareness of the historic responsibility we both share before our peoples who gave us a solemn mandate to build a solid structure for peace. We owe it to this generation and the generations to come in both countries not to leave a stone unturned in our pursuit of peace. The ideal is the greatest one in the history of man and we have accepted the challenge to translate it from a cherished hope into a living reality.

You will recall that when I addressed the Israeli people from the rostrum of the Knesset more than a year ago, I said “In the history of nations and peoples, there come up certain moments when it becomes imperative for those who are endowed with wisdom and vision to penetrate beyond the past with all its complications and residue to usher in an undaunted elan toward new horizons”.² I believe that we are now witnessing one of these moments. It is a moment of truth which requires each one of us to take a new look at the situation and reexamine his thinking and calculations. I trust that you all know that when I undertook my sacred mission to Jerusalem against all odds and in the face of the most formidable complications, I was not trying to strike a deal. I was and I am still determined to make peace. If our commitment to that great cause is profound and unwavering, then our task should transcend words and legal formulations. Then also, the challenge before us ceases to be a contest of oratory and scoring points here and there. It becomes converted irreversably to one of winning the hearts and minds of our peoples and enabling them to look beyond the unhappy past.

It was in this spirit that we entered into direct negotiations with you in a sincere attempt to build new bridges for the future. These negotiations reached their high and low points as we went deeper into the core of our complex problem. We have achieved some progress. However, I feel that valuable time has frittered away in futile arguments and discussions about issues of little or no real significance. Apparently, some are still seized with the notion that the solution could be reached at the expense of the other party. Still others remain captives to concepts like that of David and Goliath instead of being inspired by the brotherhood of Ismail and Isaac. Evidently, some old barriers do exist and it is our joint responsibility to break them. A few days ago, one of your colleagues chose to speak of the present state of affairs in terms which are in clear contradiction with the new spirit of peace. He said that Egypt must not forget that part of its territory is occupied and could remain occupied. We reject that logic and I am sure that the vast majority of the Israeli people shares our view.

It might be appropriate to remind you of what we have offered to enable you to make the necessary decision for the establishment of peace. First and foremost, we proved our willingness to look seriously and sympathetically to your need to feel secure. Of course the need for security is mutual and not confined to you alone. Still, we lent an attentive ear to your concern for security in view of certain historical and psychological factors. This must not go unappreciated. Nor should it be misinterpreted or abused.

We offered you full recognition, not as a mere formality but as a dynamic process of coexistence that includes diplomatic relations, economic and cultural exchange for the mutual benefit of our two peoples and infact for the good of the entire region. By conventional norms, this process can take place only after the completion of withdrawal. However, I accepted the request of our good friend President Carter to start the process after the completion of the interim withdrawal. I did so as a token of my full confidence in the future as well my faith in our peoples who are going to be the final arbiter.

We said, and still maintain, that we are most willing to establish with you normal relations that exist between good-neighbors. No discriminatory barriers shall stand in the way of free movement of people or goods.³ Individuals and groups will have an opportunity to know more about one another and learn to live together in peace and amity.⁴ You shall enjoy the benefits of the freedom of passage⁵ through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Boycotts will be terminated.⁶ All of this is conceived with the understanding that neither party is to seek any special advantages or ask for the position of a favored nation. This can not be forced upon two sides which are terminating a state of war that lasted for over thirty years. It could not be achieved by ignoring the facts of our contemporary life. Only the natural development and growth of our relations in the future can lead to the intensification of exchange in the areas where the interests of both parties meet. It is much better to start on a solid basis and then proceed to add to the structure a brick every day. This operation of peace building will not be viewed or judged today or tomorrow, but several years after. It is still my conviction that the real peace process starts only after the signing. Thus, what is important is to start now and on the right foot. Once we started, the door will be wide open. We have not asked for any privileged position⁷ and I assume that this is reciprocated on your part.

Let me make another point crystal clear to you in this respect. When we express our readiness to offer you all what I just mentioned, we are not doing so in return for your commitment to withdraw from our territory. We think that this is an obligation you bear under all accepted norms of international law and contemporary international relations. While we are changing the course of history, we must not attempt to tamper with the law of nations. I think I made it abundantly clear on every occasion that we do not accept any bargaining over our sovereignty or territory. Sooner or later, our land will be liberated.

The proper return here must be a genuine acceptance on your part to coexist with your Arab neighbors. Your relations with them should not be viewed in terms of conquest or exploitation. Rather, it should be founded on mutual respect and a firm belief in the equality among nations. Coexistence with your Arab neighbors starts with coexistence with the Palestinian people.⁸ This is the message I have been trying to deliver to you since I arrived in Jerusalem on November 19, 1977. In Camp David, we reached agreement on a formula which we think can bring about an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem. If we value the ideal of peace highly, then we should not at all detract from that formula. On the contrary, we should add to it and give it every chance for success. In my view, you should not attempt, or appear to attempt, to evade your obligations under the Camp David “Framework”. Since we agreed that certain steps shall take place in the immediate future to effect a transfer of authority to the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza,⁹ I frankly see no reason why we should not agree on a timetable for these steps. You have asked for a timetable for such steps as the exchange of diplomatic relations,¹⁰ the conclusion of an agreement on trade and commerce,¹¹ the conclusion of another agreement on cultural exchange and the conclusion of a civil aviation agreement.¹² Is it not equally, if not more, important to fix a timetable for the envisaged transformation in the West Bank and Gaza?

An argument has been advanced in this respect which we do not find convincing. It is said that you do not want to be bound to produce certain results which require the cooperation of a reluctant party. My answer is that one should not assume the worse if we really believe in the necessity and wisdom of the course we are taking. If the implementation of any of these steps is hindered because of reasons beyond your control, you will not be held responsible for that.¹³ There is always an assumption of rationality. Furthermore, I must tell you in all candor that you are not doing much to encourage the moderate elements among the Palestinians to cooperate. On the contrary, much of your acts and words seem to be designed to dissuade them from joining in with us. I need not list to you any examples of these deeds and words for you are quite aware of them. If the Palestinians are left with the impression that the self-government plan, and not the administrative autonomy as you call it, is a sham, they will remain embittered and the voice of reason will be drowned among them. As you well know, peoples never abandon their cause in the face of neglect or force. You might recall that your predecessor Ben Gurion¹⁴ once said: “forgive . . . but never forget”. This admonition applies to the Palestinians too.

The issue of “linkage” underwent much distortion and confusion. Let me tell you that we are not seeking that linkage as a means of shirking our commitments or breaking our promises. If we make a commitment, we intend to honor it fully regardless of the cost. Our record speaks for itself in this respect. If we have any doubt that we can honor a certain commitment, we shall not make it in the first place.

We are talking about linkage because we are both committed to work for a comprehensive peace settlement not a separate agreement. If you go back to the days of Camp David, you will remember that I told you on September 7 that I am for permanent peace and not for a separate agreement, a partial arrangement or another disengagement. This attitude was clearly reflected in my address to the Israeli people through the Knesset last year, exactly as it is reflected in the outcome of our deliberations. The “Framework for peace in the Middle East” bears ample evidence to the nature of the peace we are working for. If this is the case, Why should it not be spelled out and reaffirmed.

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Parties often make mistakes in the course of negotiations which is an arduous process. They think that their task is to insist on their demands rightly or wrongly, justly or unjustly. But if this attitude is tolerated in negotiations for an armistice agreement, it should not at all be adopted when nations are making peace. I am not stating that to point a finger of accusation at you. I am merely referring to two unfortunate developments:

First: Your Delegation insisted on certain unreasonable provisions¹⁵ that serve no useful purpose. Certain concepts were blown out of proportions or stretched beyond the tolerable limit. This was the case with respect to the proposed draft of Article 6.¹⁶ What you are entitled to is a commitment from us to discharge our obligations in good faith as we hold you responsible to do the same. It is inappropriate for any of us to attempt to interfere with the way the other party conducts its relations with third countries. It is the responsibility of each party to reconcile its commitments to various partners.

Much of the language used in your proposed text in this respect is meaningless and self-contradictory. One way of dealing with it could be challenging the relevance of a certain provision in application. But you know that this is not my style. I always like to be clear and decisive for I believe that I am doing the right thing for my people and yours. I would like to set a model for others to follow.

Second: Your delegation retracted its acceptance of certain provisions or concepts after this acceptance had been acted upon. It is not my intention to get into a detailed account of what happened in this respect. Suffice it to cite a few examples:

a—withdrawing your proposal on the sub-phases of the interim withdrawal;¹⁷

b—Going back on your offer to reduce the period of the interim withdrawal to six months;¹⁸

c—Opposing, after consenting to, the formula of an exchange of letters on the West Bank and Gaza;¹⁹

d—Opposing a tangible Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip.²⁰

e—Reversing your previous position on the elimination of the arms race;²¹

f—Insisting on deleting a paragraph from the preamble after having accepted it.²² That paragraph spoke of the necessity for maintaining the balanced and reciprocal implementation of the Parties’ corresponding obligations.

Again, I am not stating the abovementioned for the purpose of chastizing your Government or attributing malice to anyone. I am simply urging you and your colleagues to reconsider your position and take a new look at recent events as well as ways and means for breaking the present impasse. I do not want to see a resurgence of suspicion and ill-feeling as I am mainly concerned for the future. I hope you will find it possible to respond to this new initiative in the same spirit which prompted me to write to you.

With best wishes,

Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78. No classification marking. Carter intialed “C” at the top of the letter, indicating that he saw the document. Quandt wrote that the letter was “probably” written by al-Baz. (Quandt, Camp David, p. 285)
2. For the full text of Sadat’s November 20, 1977, address to the Knesset, see Israel’s Foreign Policy, Historical Documents, vols. 4–5: 1977–1979, Document 73. Begin’s speech to the Knesset, which followed Sadat’s, is ibid., Document 80.
3. Carter underlined “free movement of people or goods.”
4. Carter underlined “live together in peace and amity.”
5. Carter underlined “freedom of passage.”
6. Carter underlined this sentence.
7. Carter underlined “not” and “privileged position” in this sentence.
8. Carter underlined “coexistence with the Palestinian people.”
9. Carter underlined “authority to the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza.”
10. Carter underlined “exchange of diplomatic relations.”
11. Carter underlined “agreement on trade and commerce.”
12. Carter underlined “cultural exchange” and “civil aviation agreement” in this sentence.
13. Carter underlined this sentence.
14. David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister from 1948 until 1954 and from 1955 until 1963.
15. Carter underlined “unreasonable provisions.”
16. Carter underlined “Article 6.”
17. Carter underlined “withdrawing,” “sub-phases,” and “interim withdrawal” in this point.
18. Carter underlined “reduce the period” and “interim withdrawal to six months” in this point.
19. Carter underlined “an exchange of letters on the West Bank and Gaza.”
20. Carter underlined this point.
21. Carter underlined “the elimination of the arms race.”
22. Carter underlined “deleting a paragraph from the preamble after having accepted it.”