Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 29, 1978, 2214Z

25990. Subject: President Sadat’s Letter to President Carter. Ref: Cairo 25779, para 2.²

1. During Codel Byrd’s meeting³ with Sadat this morning, VP Mubarak whispered to me that he wanted to see me this evening, after PriMin Khalil had left. I met with him at 2000 at NDP headquarters. He said that Khalil will be presenting a written message from Sadat to President Carter during upcoming Friday meeting.⁴ He claimed to have persuaded Sadat to give me an advance text of that message for President Carter’s information. He asked, however, that we not rpt not give any indication to PriMin Khalil that an advance text has been provided to [us?].

2. Text of Sadat’s letter to President Carter follows: Quote: Dear President Carter,

Pursuant to our telephone conversation,⁵ I would like to share with you some thoughts on the present state of the negotiations and how best to proceed in the days ahead. I am doing so in the spirit of friendship that binds us together and in all appreciation of your relentless effort in the pursuit of peace. I am also undertaking this exchange of views with full awareness of the historic significance of the task we have assumed for the good of our two nations and that of mankind.

I believe that the negotiations held in Washington have reached a crossroads. Much has been accomplished with your help and determination. However, what remains to be finalized could affect the outcome of our endeavor at present and in the future. I also believe that this could be achieved without any undue delay.

As I stated before, most of the task was done in Camp David. There, we laid down the foundations of a comprehensive peace that addresses itself to all aspects of the conflict. Special emphasis was placed on the Palestinian problem as it was agreed that it remains the heart and core of the dispute.⁶

Thus, it was only logical that we made it crystal clear that any attempt to work for a separate agreement must be rejected. You would recall that I told Prime Minister Begin that it is absolutely unacceptable to us to conclude a separate agreement, a partial agreement or a third disengagement.⁷ This was the overriding theme in the Camp David talks. Hence, it should be clearly reflected in the outcome of the current negotiations which are held under the umbrella⁸ of the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East”. This should be achieved, not by the insertion of a few words, but by reaching agreement on specific measures to be taken on certain dates in the direction of transferring authority to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

In all candor, I find the Israeli attitude in the Washington negotiations and the statements issued by members of the Israeli Cabinet rather alarming. Apparently, they are still thinking and behaving with the old mentality and complexes. The pre-initiative spirit persists, even though the Israeli people left no doubt that their yearning for peace is the paramount factor in their life. They received my message with enthusiasm and hope. To me, their response was gratifying. Nonetheless, the Israeli delegation remained seized by the worn-out concepts and the old suspicion. They fail to conceive the process as one of peace building for this generation and the generations to come. Their attitude toward the Camp David Accords is very telling. They want to pick and choose from it whatever they deem to be in their interest while evading as much as possible what they conceive of as being in the interest of the cause of peace. They cite it to support their exaggerated claims, and forget it when they are confronted with a decision they think is painful. You have done your best to moderate their demands and attitude. But I believe that much remains to be done, for I am determined to make the peace we are working for a solid and lasting structure. I want to leave it as a legacy for our grandchildren as well as the history of mankind.

In view of this situation, I decided to take the step of addressing a message to Prime Minister Begin to draw his attention to the real nature of what we are doing and ask him and his colleagues in the Israeli Cabinet to view the matter in a different light. I believe that such a step is a necessary and needed supplement to my initiative. In a nut shell, I want them to wake up, look beyond mere words and rise to the level of the great events we are creating. In addition to that, I do not want you to carry all the burden. You have been most understanding and patient. You kept your pledge to be a full and honest partner.⁹

I trust that you agree with me on the futility of any attempt to conclude a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is both morally wrong and practically not workable. Nevertheless, the Israeli Government seems to be aiming at that. From their tactics and maneuvers throughout the negotiations, it appears that they are determined to bring the treaty as close as possible to a separate agreement. They misrepresented, and even distorted, the linkage issue. Consequently, they approached it from a negative angle.¹⁰ But as I told you before, I am determined to prevent this from happening. To me, working for a genuinely comprehensive peace is a conscientious commitment not a matter of political expediency.

Our delegation left for Washington with clear instructions to emphasize the comprehensive character of the peace we are making.¹¹ To this end, we demanded, on October 13, the insertion of the following article into the text of the peace treaty:

—“Egypt and Israel pledge theirselves to work for the solution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects on the basis of the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”

On the same day, our delegation submitted to you a memorandum on measures to be taken towards improving the political conditions in the West Bank and Gaza with a view to facilitate the implementation of the Camp David “Framework”.¹²

As the Israelis balked and insisted on omitting any reference in the treaty to the Palestinian problem, you proposed dealing with the issue as follows:

A) Emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the peace settlement in the preamble;¹³

B) Spelling out the steps which must be taken for the implementation of the provisions of the “Framework” in the West Bank and Gaza in a letter to be exchanged between Egypt and Israel and signed simultaneously with the treaty.¹⁴ The content of that letter as inunciated (sic) by you was to include taking certain steps on specified dates,¹⁵ namely the entering into negotiation and the holding of elections for the establishment of the self-governing authority, in implementation of the Camp David plan for full autonomy.

C) Obtaining a letter from Israel to the United States on measures to be taken unilaterally for the purpose of improving the political situation in the West Bank and Gaza, such as lifting the ban on political activities, freeing political prisoners and allowing the return of some displaced persons for the unification of families.¹⁶

Although the idea of an exchange of letters was at variance with our concept, we cooperated with it and submitted several drafts for the letter. Discussions of these drafts, together with the U.S. draft, revealed an Israeli reluctance to be committed to any step beyond beginning the negotiations. With this Israeli attitude, the proposed date for holding the elections kept moving backward, from three to six months and finally to a full year.¹⁷ After being conceived as a fixed time, it was watered down to a target date which might and might not be met.¹⁸ Furthermore, the form of the document was changed from a letter to be exchanged between Egypt and Israel to a note issued by the United States.¹⁹ This was done despite the fact that Israel has accepted for several weeks the form of an exchanged letter. I honestly believe that this trend is likely to complicate rather than facilitate our task when we start negotiating with them on the West Bank and Gaza in the weeks and months ahead. They are likely to think that they can go back on what they consented to and water it down systematically as we proceed from one stage to the other. This would be quite a regressive development as it would confront us with a situation no one would benefit from even though the Israelis do not seem to be aware of that.

Our common experience has thought (sic) us to be very specific on every point if we are to guarantee any real movement.²⁰ We should do all what (sic) we can to eliminate the causes of controversy or misunderstanding in the future as we are engaged in a continuous process which is likely to reach full fruition within a few years. Therefore, I suggest that we stick to your original idea of an exchanged letter between Egypt and Israel witnessed by the United States as our full partner.²¹ The letter can be meaningful and significant only if it includes a timetable²² for the basic steps:

A) Beginning the negotiations for establishing the elected self-governing authority (not the administrative autonomy the Israeli Government is talking about these days) as well as defining the powers and responsibilities of that authority;²³

B) Holding the elections for the self-governing authority;²⁴

C) Inaugurating that authority, abolishing the Israeli military government together with its civilian administration, and effecting the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations.²⁵

An Egyptian presence in the Gaza strip is vital to the success of our plan, not only in the strip but also in the West Bank.²⁶ It is only fair to deduce that the Israelis are not acting in good faith when they oppose the presence of some Egyptian police units or frontier guards in Gaza during the interim period. First of all, they had previously consented to this very idea as they realized that it would be quite useful. In a reversal of their position, they contend that such presence would be inconsistent with the “Framework for Peace²⁷ in the Middle East” signed in Camp David. Nothing could be further from the truth, for the “Framework” does not contain one word that could weigh against such presence.²⁸ The framework provided that the local police force will maintain a continuous liaison with Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian officers.²⁹ Furthermore, there is a provision concerning the participation of Jordanian forces in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts. There is another provision which allows the recruitment of Jordanian citizens in the local police.

By analogy, the some (sic) concept could apply to the Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip.³⁰ Our responsibility with respect to Gaza is more sanctioned in legal and political terms than the Jordanian role in the West Bank. We have never claimed sovereignty over Gaza. No one questions our intentions there. In fact, a tangible Egyptian presence would reassure the Palestinian population, a factor which is certain to generate enthusiasm for the Camp David formula. Thus, we would be building a model which would be envied by Jordan and the West Bank inhabitants. In short, our presence in Gaza would facilitate the implementation of the Camp David formula.³¹

If we are to require an explicit mention of every detail in the Camp David Accord, why, then, is Israel insisting on many points which were never mentioned directly or indirectly in the “Framework”? Such points include the priority of obligations, the exchange of ambassadors one month after the completion of the interim withdrawal, setting a specific date for the conclusion of an agreement on trade and commerce, the conclusion of a cultural agreement following the interim withdrawal and the preservation of war memorials.³²

Dear Friend,

I have given careful consideration to your idea of treating the present draft of the treaty as final. I fully understand the reasons behind that, namely putting an end to limitless controversy that could go on indefinitely. However, I must confide to you that we have serious problems with certain provisions. It was for this reason that our delegation requested your assistants not to state that you considered the text as final until we work out together a formula that would meet our minimum. We realized that the closure of negotiations on the text could confront us with an undesirable prospect, namely the prospect of having to oppose something which was proposed by you. For these reasons I would like to seek your help in solving the main problems and I am quite willing to forego the less important ones.

As it stands now, the provision of Article 6 remains explosive and detrimental.³³ As the negotiations evolved with respect to that issue, the successive proposed drafts tended to be harsher and more difficult to accept.³⁴ Your fifth draft, presented on October 19, carried the following text for paragraph 2 of that article:

—“The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under the present treaty”. The seventh draft, submitted on October 21 added a phrase to that text as follows:

—The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this treaty without regard to action or inaction of any other party.³⁵

The latest draft went further to state that:

—“The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this treaty without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any existing instrument external to this treaty”.³⁶

Such a sweeping provision which came at the last minute cannot be taken lightly. It could be used by Israel or any other party to prove that the treaty is in fact and by law a separate agreement.³⁷ If one stretches the argument further, it could be alleged that the treaty is independent even of the “Framework” of Camp David,³⁸ for it is merely “another instrument external to the treaty”. If it becomes plausible that the treaty constitutes a separate peace agreement, then it would be a violation of the “Framework”.

You can imagine the devastating impact of such a provision. Suffice it to refer to a statement made by the Israeli Foreign Minister on November 23 in which he said in effect that Egypt’s commitments to Israel have acquired priority over her Arab commitments. This trend is apt to continue and escalate in the future as we all know, thus creating a most unfavorable atmosphere.

On the other hand, we find the provision of paragraph 5 of the same article extremely difficult to accept. Like that of paragraph 2, it is both harmful and unnecessary. It gives rise to future controversy and contention.³⁹

As you certainly know, we proposed a solution to the problem which the Israelis raised with respect to the conflict of obligations. Following your conversation with Vice President Mubarak on November 15,⁴⁰ I instructed our delegation to prepare a new draft⁴¹ which was submitted to Secretary Vance and subsequently discussed with Defense Minister Weizman before being forwarded to the Israeli Cabinet. We proposed deleting paragraph 5 and amending paragraph 4 to read as follows:⁴²

—“The parties undertake not to enter into any obligation or take any action in conflict with this treaty.”⁴³

I trust that you agree with me that this formula meets the concerns of the Israelis if they are genuine. It covers all obligations so long as the parties are undertaking not to take any action which is inconsistent with their obligations under the treaty. Why should Israel insist on the present offensive language?

Is it not significant that they reversed their acceptance of certain provisions and concepts after they had secured certain benefits in return for their acceptance? A case in point is their sudden reversal of their position on the sub-phases of the interim withdrawal. This was done 26 days after informing both of us of their willingness to withdraw from El-Arish in two months and from the oil fields area on the Gulf of Suez in 4 months. This was also done after obtaining your support for their request of exchanging ambassadors within one month from the completion of the interim withdrawal. When you met with our delegates on October 17,⁴⁴ you used two arguments in order to persuade us to accept such a demand. The first was that Israel accepted to reduce the time for completing the interim withdrawal from nine to six months. The second argument was that Israel has offered to withdraw from El-Arish within two months. In other words, their previous position was used to extract some benefits for them. By legal norms, a strong case could be made for withdrawing our tentative acceptance of exchanging ambassadors within such a short period. When they reneged on the sub-phases, they upset the quid pro quo equation.

I realize that the process of negotiations entails a series of accommodations by both parties. But the outcome should present a reasonable balance between the rights and obligations of both of them. You and your able aides have devoted your time and energy so generously to help the two sides strike this equilibrium. But I feel that the Israelis insisted adamantly to have it their way. They invoke the Camp David “Framework” when it suits their purpose and ignore it when it requires them to honor certain commitments which they do not like. They insist on specificity when it comes to their benefit and ambiguity as to any of their obligations.

They do not seem to appreciate our flexibility and willingness to be responsive. It might be revealing to review the situation since we went to Camp David last September. If we examine the “Framework of a Comprehensive Settlement of the Problem of the Middle East”⁴⁵ which I submitted to you and Premier Begin on the opening of conference and compare it with the document we signed, we will find that we went a long way to make both ends meet.

We responded positively to their need to feel secure and we reflected this in the security arrangements we agreed to. Reciprocity was applied in a liberal rather than a literal sense. In addition to that, I accepted to start the process of normalization, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations after the completion of the interim withdrawal. Legally speaking, we had every right to defer that until the completion of the final withdrawal. We accepted your concept of solving the Palestinian problem including Arab Jerusalem in stages while leaving certain points to be settled in future negotiations.

The Israelis did not commit themselves to adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nor did they accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to disputes which emanate from the application or the interpretation of the parties’ contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, I decided to proceed in the hope that these shortcomings will be remedied in the future with the progressive development of peace, as I have believed and still believe that the real peace process starts only after the signing. Despite the risks involved, I took the decision to go ahead. I did this mainly for you and on account of my full faith that you are committed with us to work for a comprehensive peace which safeguards the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

I firmly believe that the negotiations should continue until we conclude a treaty we can accept without reservation. I would like to sign a treaty which is likely to start a new chapter in the history of the area and put an end to controversy, not one which adds to the old grievances or gives rise to endless claims and counterclaims.

With this in mind, I appeal to you to reopen the text of the treaty for certain rectifications which are necessary to redress the existing imbalance between the positions of the parties. The Israelis have to demonstrate the same flexibility and understanding we showed. I do not like anyone to misinterpret your request concerning the finality of the present text as a means of applying pressure on the cooperative party. Thus, I welcomed the statement Secretary Vance made on November 25 on the state of the negotiations and the draft proposals.⁴⁶ I also hope that my message to Prime Minister Begin⁴⁷ will persuade him to cooperate.

Before I conclude, allow me to raise a less significant point relative to the duration of the security arrangements which is a matter of concern to the Egyptian people. We would like to be sure that entering into negotiations for the purpose of amending these provisions becomes mandatory upon the request of either party. So long as these measures are intended to solidify the structure of peace, they should be subject to review as the normalization of relations between the parties reaches different horizons. Here, what is needed is a minor linguistic adjustment rather than the introduction of a new text. I am sure that you will be able to find the proper formula for that. My confidence in your sense of fairness and good judgment has no limit. May God Almighty grant you all the support you need while you discharge your awesome responsibilities.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat

Unquote.

3. Mubarak noted that PriMin Khalil will also be presenting an oral message.⁴⁸ Asked what that oral message was, he said it will simply be an elaboration of some of the points in the written message. Among other things, Khalil will cite for President Carter all of the concessions that Sadat has made since the beginning of the peace process and compare them to the few that the Israelis have made.

4. Request that no indication be given to Khalil that Mubarak has provided us with an advance copy of the Sadat message.

Eilts

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, Middle East—Misc. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. On November 27, Mubarak informed Eilts that he wished to meet with him “immediately after Khalil’s departure” for Washington. Eilts reported November 28 that Mubarak “said he would have some things to tell me at that time, but gave no specifics. I suspect that he wants to brief me on Egyptian position after Sadat’s review of technical committee recommendations.” (Telegram 25779 from Cairo, November 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780489–1282)
3. See Document 144.
4. See Document 148. The signed original of the letter, dated November 30, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78. Quandt wrote that the letter was “probably” written by al-Baz. (Quandt, Camp David, p. 285)
5. See Document 143.
6. Vance underlined the final two sentences of this paragraph.
7. Vance underlined this sentence.
8. Vance underlined the phrase “held under the umbrella.”
9. Vance highlighted this sentence.
10. Vance underlined this sentence and the preceding sentence.
11. Vance underlined this sentence.
12. Vance underlined this sentence.
13. Vance underlined the portion of this phrase beginning with “you proposed” and ending with “the preamble.”
14. Vance underlined this sentence.
15. Vance underlined and highlighted the phrase “taking certain steps on specified dates.”
16. Vance underlined and highlighted this point.
17. Vance underlined this sentence.
18. Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: “target is fixed date” in the right-hand margin next to it.
19. Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: “form” in the right-hand margin next to it.
20. Vance underlined this sentence.
21. Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: “exchange of letters” in the right-hand margin next to it.
22. Vance underlined “includes a timetable.”
23. Vance underlined this sentence with the exception of the parenthetical clause.
24. Vance underlined this point.
25. Vance underlined “Inaugurating that authority, abolishing the Israeli” and “effecting the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations” and put brackets around “abolishing.”
26. Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: “Egyptian presence?” in the right-hand margin next to it.
27. Vance underlined “they contend that such presence would be inconsistent with the ‘Framework for Peace.’”
28. Vance underlined this sentence.
29. Vance underlined “local police force will maintain a continuous liaison with Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian officers.”
30. Vance underlined this sentence.
31. Vance underlined this sentence and the preceding sentence. He wrote: “good argument” in the right-hand margin next to it.
32. Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence.
33. Vance underlined this sentence.
34. Vance underlined “the successive proposed drafts tended to be harsher and more difficult to accept,” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “not so.”
35. Vance highlighted this sentence, and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Pres. language.”
36. Vance highlighted this sentence.
37. Vance underlined this sentence.
38. Vance underlined “could be alleged that the treaty is independent even of the ‘Framework’ of Camp David,” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “No.”
39. Vance underlined this paragraph.
40. Presumably, a mistaken reference to Document 140.
41. Not found.
42. Vance underlined and highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph. He wrote in the right-hand margin: “Rejected by Israelis.”
43. Vance underlined this sentence.
44. See Document 89.
45. See footnote 8, Document 28.
46. Reference is likely to an interview with Vance which appeared in the The New York Times on November 25, in which Vance was reported to have stated that “acceptance by Israel of the draft text of a peace treaty with Egypt was insufficient in itself to permit the conclusion of negotiations” and that the “draft text did not meet Egypt’s insistence on a timetable for Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Vance Says Israel and Egyptians Need to Continue Talks,” The New York Times, November 25, 1978, p. 1)
47. See Document 146.
48. No written version of Khalil’s message has been found. For discussion of the December 1 meeting between Khalil and Carter, see Document 148.