144. Editorial Note
On November 29, 1978, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in Cairo. Appointed as a presidential emissary by President Jimmy Carter on November 15, Byrd stopped in Egypt as part of a 16-day trip to the Middle East. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, page 2059) A full report of Byrd’s mission, which included talks in Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and submitted to Carter upon the completion of the trip, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Senator Byrd Report on Trip, 12/78. Byrd urged Sadat to accept the draft treaty as it was written “with the condition that this is contingent upon reaching an acceptable resolution of the West Bank/Gaza linkage issue,” noting that he “had never seen President Carter as determined as he is on this issue.” Moreover, he noted, Carter was “fully committed to continue working with Sadat” to resolve the remaining issues, including Egyptian problems with other Arab states. Sadat replied that he “saw no purpose in accepting a treaty which would be overturned within a year by the weight of Arab opinion,” observing the treaty “can not stand because it is not accepted at all.” Sadat rejected Byrd’s suggestion that Egypt had allowed Israel a [Page 506] “public relations advantage” by refusing to accept the draft treaty. “Israel,” Sadat stated, “is asking for concessions in Egypt unparalleled by any other state;” Egypt, he felt, had “given Israel everything.” Similarly, Sadat countered Byrd’s argument that reopening negotiations on treaty language posed “danger” by stating that “he would prefer to see the text unravel than accept a treaty which heavily damaged his position or President Carter.” As currently drafted, the treaty for Sadat was “against the aspirations of the Egyptian people” and he could not agree to it. The Embassy transmitted a full summary of this meeting in telegram 25977 from Cairo, November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492–1036) Analyzing the meeting later on November 29, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann F. Eilts observed that he had “never” seen Sadat “as emotional or upset as he was today.” “Sadat,” Eilts continued, “is clearly disturbed about what he considers as unfair pressure on him to accede to our request” to agree to the treaty. To explain Sadat’s resistance, Eilts proposed eight explanations: realization of Egyptian “isolation” following Baghdad, the “vacillating” Saudi role, “total distrust” of Begin, a “conviction” that the Israelis “have no intention of moving expeditiously on West Bank/Gaza” and intend to “interpret Camp David Framework as requiring no more than Begin[’s] self-rule plan,” “annoyance” at “unhelpful statements,” annoyance at settlement issues, “frustration” that the United States “does not really understand his problems in the Arab World,” and annoyance that the United States “seems to consider him to be line of least resistance whenever Israelis take hard stance.” (Telegram 25978 from Cairo, November 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492–1029)
The following day, November 30, Byrd met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin for 90 minutes in Jerusalem. He conveyed to Begin Sadat’s reservations with the draft treaty text, especially his objection to Articles IV and VI. Prefacing his remarks by stating that he understood Begin’s domestic political situation, Byrd emphasized the need for Egypt and Israel to “avoid public statements that poisoned [the] atmosphere” and continue their dialogue. “The U.S. could not accept a take it or leave it attitude on the part of either side.” Byrd emphasized that “there must be a target date for elections and there must be a resolution to the West Bank/Gaza problem.” In response, Begin stated that the Israeli Cabinet had rejected the idea of a timetable for elections “because Israel did not have the power to make that come to pass itself, and because it presented a ready-made excuse for Egypt to abrogate the treaty.” Begin, however, agreed with Byrd’s suggestion that the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel could be resolved by “reasonable men.” In a separate meeting with Byrd, November 30, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan (who was “clearly discomfited” by the idea of reopening text negotiations according to the [Page 507] U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis) pointed out that if Egypt wished to reopen discussions on Articles IV and VI, Israel “might respond by reopening discussions on the Preamble and the other provisions which it had found objectionable.” The Embassy transmitted a full summary of both conversations in telegram 18491 from Tel Aviv, November 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1645)