Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

140. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 16, 1978, 2:40–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary Vance’s Meeting with Minister Weizman

PARTICIPANTS

• Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
• H.E. Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense
• H.E. Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
• Colonel Ilan Tehila

Minister Weizman began by describing his meeting with Egyptian Vice President Mubarak. He said that it had not been very enlightening. The Egyptians did, however, promise to provide some written comments on the two main problems: the West Bank and Gaza linkage issue, and Article VI of the treaty on the priority of obligations.² Weizman made it clear to the Egyptians that Israel does not want to reopen Article VI. Ambassador Dinitz explained that Minister Weizman had told Mubarak that his purpose was to understand what the Egyptians want. Mubarak explained that the Egyptians want a redraft of what they call the American letter, or the Israeli letter, and some slight changes in Article VI, paragraphs 2 and 5.

Weizman told the Egyptians that he was not in a position to negotiate, but that he could report to the Cabinet on what was agreed and on what were the differences. He asked the Egyptians to put their positions in writing, and they said they would do so. Weizman feels that there are important differences, but they should not be exaggerated or distorted. Weizman said that he had the strong impression that the Egyptians do not want to break off the talks. Mubarak said that he would even [be] prepared to come back to Washington, if necessary. He was reluctant, however, to accept the idea of meeting with Prime Minister Begin or other Israeli leaders in Jerusalem. In brief, Weizman believes that there will be no break in the talks; Article VI is a problem; and the West Bank and Gaza issue remains to be solved. On the West Bank and Gaza problem, they want a time period that is somewhat less than the end of 1979. They did not raise the question of substages of withdrawal in Sinai. In private, Mubarak told Weizman that Egypt will not go to war again. Weizman said that he believed that, but it was not so easy to convince his government.

The Secretary said that he agreed that the Egyptians want to continue the talks. He asked Weizman what issues he would take back to the Cabinet. Weizman said that he would have to raise the question of the letter, but that he would not reopen the question of the preamble. He would also report that the Egyptians want to change Article VI, paragraph 5. He also understands from the Egyptians that if the West Bank does not go as expected, the Egyptians are prepared to proceed with Gaza alone. Secretary Vance asked if the Egyptians would give them a written statement on Article VI and on the joint letter. Weizman confirmed that they would. He also expressed some question concerning Mubarak’s basic message to him. He did not seem sure what the Egyptian position was. The Secretary asked Weizman when he would return. The Minister said he would wait until Sunday.³ The Secretary said that he hoped that it would be clear that Weizman was only returning on a temporary basis for the Cabinet meeting and that he would be coming back to Washington. Weizman said that he would be seeing Mubarak again at three-thirty. Ambassador Dinitz explained that this would not be for the purpose of negotiations, but rather to get an idea of [what] the Egyptians really want. Weizman said that Mubarak had made it clear that he does not want Gaza as a part of Egypt, but that he does have to face the Arab world. Therefore, he wants a specific date and an Egyptian police presence in Gaza. Weizman said that the Egyptians want a fixed date, whereas it would be better to stick with the idea of a target date. This seemed to be acceptable to al-Baz. Weizman also said that al-Baz had raised the difference between the abolition of the military government and its withdrawal. He wants to include language on the abolition of the government; Israel will insist on sticking with the language of Camp David.

Weizman said that he had explained to Mubarak that the Israelis want to stay in the West Bank and Gaza and share responsibility there, and that they do no intend to leave completely. They expect to have some settlements there.

Secretary Vance said that anything the two parties could agree upon would be fine with us. He did not think it was wise, however, to reopen the treaty text. This would pose lots of problems. Weizman said that his understanding of the Egyptian position is that they want the full autonomy implemented by the end of 1979. Weizman added that he had told Mubarak that it might be time for Sadat and Begin to meet again, or perhaps to have the Vice President come Israel.

Weizman asked what remained to be done if he were to come back to Washington. Secretary Vance said that we had proposed a package and we will stick with it. Weizman said that he understood that the treaty should be considered as it is. Annex I is virtually finished except for some language on subphasing. Weizman said that he would do his best with the Israeli Cabinet. Ambassador Dinitz noted that Minister of Finance Ehrlich had had a good talk with OMB Director McIntyre and that this represented a serious professional analysis of the economic issues. Weizman added that he was concerned by the mood back in Israel. People should be happy at the prospect of peace, but instead there is a heavy feeling and Weizman has spoken of the “peace calamity”. He then said to the Secretary that despite the differences that we have with Israel over the West Bank and the question of settlements, we should understand that the key to success is still in Begin’s hands. He is not now in a positive mood, but he does want peace and he did invent the concept of autonomy. The Central Committee of the Herut Party will be meeting on Sunday. Weizman said that he wanted to be there. He had had his differences with Begin. Weizman still believes that he is the key to a solution. He needs to have some encouragement. He needs to see that everything is not collapsing around him. Weizman said that his talk⁴ with the President had been helpful, and that we now need to draw Prime Minister Begin back to the point of wanting to reach an agreement.

In closing, Secretary Vance said that he would like to talk with Minister Weizman at some point about UNIFIL. He said that he was worried about its renewal.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—Secretary. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Vance’s office at the Department of State.
2. See Document 95.
3. November 19.
4. See Documents 82 and 96.