Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 16, 1978, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Vice President Mubarak

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
• Mr. Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
• Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
• Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
• H.E. Muhammad Husni Mubarak, Vice President of Egypt
• H.E. Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.

The President: It is an honor to have you here. Please extend to President Sadat my best greetings and remind him of the personal friendship I feel for him. The Camp David agreements were an interim step in the fulfillment of President Sadat’s dream when he went to Jerusalem. It would [be] a tragedy if his effort were not to result in peace. It will help us for you to present the Egyptian position clearly.

Your negotiating team in Washington has done a superb job. They are competent, tough negotiators. It is hard for the delegations from Egypt or Israel to negotiate when the leaders of their countries are not present. At Camp David, Begin or Sadat could make final decisions. This resulted in hundreds of compromises. This is more difficult for the negotiators to do since they are uncertain of what the reactions will be back home. General Ali and Minister Ghali have done a great job and they deserve credit and appreciation for that. I am concerned about the future of the negotiations. Our most serious problem is that public statements are made in Egypt and Israel which can become a source of diplomatic incidents. This did not take place at Camp David. Now all the proposals that are made are in the international news and this causes serious problems.

We have tried to find common ground between the parties, and later Egypt or Israel rejects the agreements that have been reached by the negotiators. This has been frustrating for us but we will continue as a negotiating partner. Both Secretary Vance and I have many other responsibilities which we have been neglecting to some extent. We thought that the treaty negotiations could [be] done in a few days. We have other problems, such as with the Soviet Union, in Africa, Cyprus, NATO, and Nicaragua. We need a commitment now to succeed, and this requires understanding of the other side’s political problems, and there is a need for flexibility on both sides. No ultimatum can help. That would aggravate the already difficult problems.

Your presence here will be constructive and we know that you speak for President Sadat. There have been some recent statements that have added a new dimension and I am sure that you will want to discuss them. We believe that to separate Gaza from the West Bank is a new development, if the news reports are accurate, and I am eager to hear directly from you on the Egyptian position. I hope your position will open the door quickly to a peace treaty.

Vice President Mubarak: Thank you for your warm welcome. I met with Secretary Vance last night² and bring you greetings from President Sadat. We want to thank you for the effort you made at Camp David. Ninety percent of the problems were solved there. The Egyptian people are aware of your efforts and appreciate them.

There are two main points I want to make: the first deals with the West Bank and Gaza; the second deals with the priority of obligations. I want to explain both of these issues to you.

Since the negotiations began, we believe that there should be a link between our peace treaty and the comprehensive solution. If there is just an Egyptian-Israeli treaty without a solution to the Palestinian problem, this will not lead to peace. It will complicate matters. So President Sadat hopes that you will understand that there should be more done for the West Bank and Gaza, there should be a guarantee of the negotiations there. This does not mean that we want to divide the West Bank from Gaza at all. We are very keen to keep both tied together. But Gaza was under our administration in 1967 and may be easier to deal with. We could build a good model there to start. We have influence, and there are many Palestinians from Gaza in Egypt. We can start on the West Bank and Gaza, but Gaza will be easier. It can serve as a model for Hussein and others. We don’t want to separate the West Bank and Gaza at all.

Sadat wants to start with the timetable for the West Bank and Gaza both, but he knows that the West Bank will be more complex. Gaza may be easier. We don’t want to separate the two, but if there is a timetable for negotiating on both, this will be all right. But we think it will take time for the West Bank and we want to stimulate King Hussein to join the negotiations. He has to see real action taking place. I have met King Hussein several times. He is afraid of the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, as well as of the PLO. He wants peace, but he is in a difficult situation. He won’t join the negotiations unless he sees something at least happening in Gaza and if possible in the West Bank too. If we neglect Gaza and the West Bank, the whole Arab world will attack—you saw what happened in Baghdad—and they will accuse Sadat and President Carter. They will raise hell. They will say that Egypt has gone for a separate agreement.

The President: They are already saying that.

Vice President Mubarak: We hear this everywhere, even in Europe. They are all pushing the Palestinian problem. They all say that if only an agreement is reached on Sinai this will amount to a separate peace. So President Sadat insists that we push the Palestinian problem along with Sinai, even if we must postpone the withdrawal in Sinai. Things will be easier in Gaza. It can be a good model to the Palestinians and King Hussein. This is the main point. It does not mean separation. President Sadat sees this as a concession. He wants both the West Bank and Gaza, but offers Gaza alone as a concession. He expects you to see that Gaza will make things easier.

The President: We have a wonderful relationship with Egypt. We also have an equally good relationship with Saudi Arabia, and a fairly good relationship with Jordan. For there to be divisions among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan causes us deep concerns. It makes the achievement of our common purposes more difficult, especially when Egypt and Saudi Arabia are in disagreement.

My feeling is that President Sadat has not consulted enough with Saudi Arabia, and this makes my job more difficult. I asked President Sadat to talk with Crown Prince Fahd. Sadat said that he is punishing Saudi Arabia. I understand his concern, but I hope that you can keep in mind the concept that we have of the United States cooperating closely with Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and perhaps Jordan. This could form a strong, continuing alliance of friendly countries which would present a common front. We have very good relations with each of these nations, as do you. Divisions among these countries could weaken our cause. Beyond this, we believe that all of the Arab nations and Israel need protection against the Soviet Union and their hired help in North Africa and the Middle East. In the past, the priority among the Arabs was to fight Israel. Their secondary concerns were with the Soviet Union. President Sadat has helped me to understand that the stability of the entire Middle East and North Africa could depend upon the achievement of an Arab-Israeli peace. Your five divisions in the Suez Canal area could be relieved and they could help to balance threats elsewhere. So much has already been accomplished, and there is now a feeling of common purpose between Egypt and Israel. You can’t expect to get the approval now of Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

Vice President Mubarak: Not even of Jordan.

The President: Jordan is weak, but we can’t get the Iraqis, the Syrians, and the PLO to approve what we are doing. President Sadat has shown great courage. There is no way that I could violate my commitments to President Sadat, and to others, by approving a separate treaty between Egypt and Israel. We didn’t need to go to Camp David if we were just seeking a separate agreement. If we had been willing to abandon the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians, then we had no need of Camp David. We don’t want a separate peace treaty. We cannot abandon the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian question.

The Israelis have already made great concessions. It is hard for you and President Sadat to know how difficult these decisions are for Prime Minister Begin. He gave more in Sinai than the Labor Party would have given. They wanted to keep a corridor to Sharm el-Sheik, and they wanted to keep the settlements. They would not recognize the Palestinians’ right to self-government. Begin has made tremendous concessions, and President Sadat has also made generous concessions, but there is a tendency in Egypt not to see how far Begin has come. In the Camp David agreements, linkage is clearly spelled out. Camp David dealt not only with Sinai, but also with the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan. This is just as binding an agreement as the peace treaty that is now being negotiated. Israel wanted no linkage at all in the documents. They have good reason, although I don’t agree with them, but if there is linkage in the letters, in the annexes, then in the future, in three months or in three years, they are afraid that if there is no movement on the West Bank and Gaza, in setting up the self-government, and if Egypt does not approve of this, this could give President Sadat a reason to say the peace treaty with Israel is null and void. Once the treaty is signed, Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat, and I all want it to be permanent, just as Camp David is permanent. There should be no change unless both sides agree to it. The linkage is already there. After hours, after weeks, we have Israeli agreement on linkage. This is done both in the treaty and in other documents. Nothing could be clearer than the commitment to begin negotiations within one month of the ratification of the treaty on the West Bank and Gaza. This is tangible and clear. We have gotten that commitment from the Israelis. This will take place before anything else has happened in terms of implementing the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. This is a very clear linkage.

In the preamble, there is also a specified linkage. This is more than Israel wants, but it is less than you want.

I feel very concerned about any inclination to separate Gaza from the West Bank. I am reassured by what you say. President Sadat told me on Sunday that he was making this suggestion in a positive way in order to make things easier for Israel. But the mistrust between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin is still very strong. It should not be there. I have confidence in President Sadat, but the Israelis do not share that feeling. So we have tried to reduce distrust by proven actions. The treaty text and its annexes, and all of the letters, will be permanent. If I sign a letter to both of you, the honor of the United States is at stake. I won’t sign such a letter unless I am sure that it will be honored. I won’t mislead either party. The treaty and the annexes and the letters are all equally binding. We cannot make more of a commitment in the treaty than was made at Camp David, and at Camp David there was already a complete linkage guaranteed and approved by Begin and Sadat.

We have a target date for beginning the negotiations and a date for the establishment of the self-government. I can see your concern. I have concerns myself, and I know that this is a very doubtful procedure even if Israel, Egypt, and the United States are ready to move. There has never been a registration of all the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to vote. There is no accurate census. We don’t know whether women will vote, or whether eighteen year olds or twenty-one year olds, will vote. Just to register everyone will be difficult. The PLO may threaten them. There is a question of Hussein’s attitude. To say that elections will definitely be held in five months would be difficult at best. If the elections can be completed in nine or ten or eleven or twelve months, this will be a notable step. The Israelis think that it can be done. Foreign Minister Dayan is getting to the end of his career, but he personally wants to carry out the elections and oversee the withdrawal of the military government. This is one of his great ambitions, to end the occupation. But to tie this together with a specific date could cast doubt on the treaty. If Israel agrees, that would suit me fine. Anything you agree to is all right. But I am afraid of what will happen if you set a coterminous date. The Israelis fear that even if they do their best, but if things fail, this could jeopardize the Egypt-Israel treaty. The entire process if very difficult. We have asked the Israelis for unilateral commitments to show good faith by allowing political meetings and the release of some political prisoners. They have said that they will do this as a unilateral gesture. I believe that we can be successful, and I hope that you will understand the special problems in Israel.

I see the peace treaty as being signed, and then within one month, there would be negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. There would be a registration of voters, elections would be held and the self-government would be established. The first thing on the agenda would be to define the duties and responsibilities of the self-governing body. If the negotiations go well, which I anticipate, then there will be an increase in trust, despite some difficulties. I assume that you saw our answers to King Hussein. I assume that these satisfied you, although the Israelis do not like them. We will take these views into those negotiations.

My preference is that Egypt and Israel will accept the treaty as it now is. If Israel is willing to link the elections in the West Bank and Gaza to the interim withdrawal date, I have no objections. I see Sadat’s offer to wait on withdrawal until there is proof of progress in the West Bank and Gaza as a generous step. But it could make the whole peace treaty tentative instead of final. The Israelis say they are prepared to negotiate in good faith. President Sadat doubts that. There are some doubts in Israel that President Sadat can prevail over the PLO. I have no assurance that the Israeli Cabinet will accept the present document.

Secretary Vance: On linkage, there is now language in the preamble that is basically derived from an Egyptian draft.

Vice President Mubarak: That’s okay.

The President: I met with Weizman recently,³ and I have met with Dayan.⁴ They see that linkage is there. They are prepared to begin negotiations in one month, and this is not in the Camp David agreement. They will go this far. If they were to violate this agreement or to act in bad faith, the whole world would see it.

Secretary Vance: The Israelis have now agreed to “continuous negotiations”, and to negotiate in good faith with the objective of holding elections by the end of 1979. This will lead to an end of the military government, and they will repeat their agreement to a withdrawal of Israeli forces as called for in Camp David.

Vice President Mubarak: The question is when.

The President: It says within a year. President Sadat is concerned by world reaction and especially reaction in the Arab world. He can either describe the language that we now have as establishing linkage, and he can point to this and remind people that at Camp David we had a solemn agreement on this. This will convince people around the world that there is linkage. If he takes the same language and says that it is not adequate, world opinion will be negative. It is important how we interpret the words. Many facets of Camp David were not entirely acceptable to either Egypt or Israel, but all of us could point to the benefits of the agreements. Lately, both sides have begun to emphasize the differences rather than the advantages.

Vice President Mubarak: Camp David already achieved ninety percent of what is needed.

The President: Now we have solved ninety-five percent of the remaining ten percent! But we still have obstacles.

Vice President Mubarak: We are anxious about when the full autonomy will begin. We want something tangible, even if we have to postpone withdrawal. That would be better in the Arab world. No one now believes that Israel will give full autonomy. If full autonomy and withdrawal of the military government can take place by January 1980, this will give us satisfaction.

The President: Suppose you sign an agreement and then Arafat and his supporters might try to prevent the holding of the elections which would then put an end to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. They could mount tremendous pressures to block the elections. The United States, Israel, and Egypt might not be able to do anything about that. I can assure you that Dayan and Weizman are completely committed to rapid movement toward self-government and autonomy, and they will agree to the withdrawal of Israeli forces to designated areas. I can’t speak as clearly for Begin.

Vice President Mubarak: The point is that we want to show the world that we are just not taking Sinai without something in the West Bank and Gaza. We know the West Bank will be more difficult. This is the reason we want Gaza to be a model. We have connections to the people there. The PLO can make trouble in the West Bank, and that is why it will take more time. This is why we want to give a model. We want to be able to defend our agreement in front of the entire world.

The President: The idea is generous, but it could create new problems. Israel distrusts Egypt and when you say that Gaza should go first, Israel sees Egypt as wanting Gaza back. We hope that you can consult with the Saudis and the Jordanians if possible. I don’t know what their reactions would be. I would guess that they would resent any unilateral move in Gaza. Let me clarify my understanding of your position. You want to sign the peace treaty, and as soon as it is ratified Israel will be able to use the Suez Canal and to enjoy free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. Within one month, negotiations will begin on the West Bank and Gaza, and the Egyptian delegation will include some Palestinians from Gaza, and maybe some from the West Bank also. The negotiations will define the duties and responsibilities of the new government, and will establish modalities for the elections—how voters should be registered, and how the elections should be carried out. Then voters will be registered, and the election will take place and the self-government will be established. The self-government might not be completely representative. Some people may boycott the election. Maybe only ten percent of the voters will vote in the West Bank and fifty percent in Gaza. We hope that Hussein will join and the Saudis will support this process. But if all of this is done in good time and in good faith, whenever those elections are completed, you want to have the self-government established, and then simultaneously you want the interim withdrawal in Sinai to take place. One month after the interim withdrawal, you are prepared to exchange ambassadors with Israel. Then there would be another two or three years before full withdrawal in Sinai—the earlier the better from our point of view—and then within five years of the establishment of the self-governing authority, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be determined in negotiations.

You prefer to see the West Bank and Gaza kept together, but if Hussein and the PLO prevent the establishment of self-government in the West Bank, then you favor progress in Gaza because of Egyptian influence there. If there is no progress in the West Bank, but there is some in Gaza, this would be adequate for your to conclude the interim withdrawal and to exchange ambassadors. Is this correct?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes.

Secretary Vance: When the peace treaty is signed, will the Suez Canal be opened to Israeli ships immediately?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes, there is no problem. The only point is the full autonomy in Gaza.

The President: I am trying to minimize what you demand from the Israelis. In the Camp David Agreement, it says that the military government will be withdrawn “as soon as” the self-governing authority is established. It would be easier if you were to set the interim date at the time of elections, not tied to the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Vice President Mubarak: We want the self-government to start functioning at the time the interim withdrawal is completed.

Secretary Vance: After one month, negotiations will begin. Do you see two sets of negotiations? One dealing with Israel, Egypt, and Gaza and the second involving Israel, Jordan, with the West Bank issue?

Vice President Mubarak: We want to start with the West Bank and Gaza together.

The President: This is your preference?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes. We are sure that the West Bank will be delayed. It would be very good if they were ready. It would be ideal for both to go together.

Secretary Vance: Gazans would be in the Egyptian delegation, and this would be a sign of your positive relationship.

The President: There is nothing to prevent West Bank Palestinians from joining your delegation, if they have someone to speak for them.

Vice President Mubarak: We are making contacts with them. Khalid al-Hassan is coming in one week. I’ll meet with him secretly. He is very moderate. Even Arafat is moderate, but he has a problem with the Syrians. They once put him in jail. The Palestinians in Kuwait are also in contact with us. Some Palestinians are totally opposed to any solution, but not all.

The President: You will be pleasantly surprised to know the quiet support for this process that the Saudis are giving. King Hassan has the same attitude, as does Numeiri. They expressed this support quietly.

Vice President Mubarak: I have been in touch with the Saudis.

The President: Good. This places a responsibility on us not to take any action or make any statements that will make it difficult for the Saudis. They want unity and moderation in the Arab world and they want to have some influence over the Iraqis and others. We shouldn’t make it hard for them to keep one foot in that camp. President Sadat should recognize their constructive role. It hurts the Saudis to be publicly criticized, and Fahd particularly feels this. The Saudis tried at Baghdad,⁵ and perhaps they made too many compromises, but I would like to see close cooperation between Sadat and Fahd.

Vice President Mubarak: We have contacts, but we keep them quiet. I saw Fahd before Camp David for four hours. He was very convinced. He approved the trip of President Sadat to Camp David. President Sadat is in full control of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, we are in touch, but neither of us talks about it.

The President: I am glad to hear this.

Secretary Vance: I still don’t see clearly how you will explain to the Arab world that you are prepared to complete the process with Gaza, while leaving the West Bank out.

The President: Let me try to answer. The world will see that Egypt prefers to move in both the West Bank and Gaza, and only if there are uncontrollable factors which prevent movement in the West Bank, Egypt would then continue with Gaza regardless.

Vice President Mubarak: When Sadat gives his word, he never deviates. If it is only going to be in Gaza, we will tell you. If we say both, we mean both and as quickly as possible.

The President: If you had the choice between getting progress in the West Bank and Gaza by next October or just in Gaza by next April, would you prefer October?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes. We would prefer to finish with both, even if it takes three or four or five months longer.

Secretary Vance: We still have the problem of how to explain this in public.

The President: Only President Sadat can do this. He needs to emphasize the importance of keeping the West Bank and Gaza together. Otherwise he gives the impression of wanting to separate Gaza.

Vice President Mubarak: I said there would be no separation.

The President: I hope you won’t raise the question of the priority of obligations. I understand the problem and we have had tedious negotiations on this. We understand the problem posed by some earlier agreements with Arab nations. It is clear that the present treaty is in conflict with those obligations. We have looked at our own agreements, and we have contacted international lawyers, and we have tried to put in common internationally accepted language of what is necessary in cases of this sort. Secretary Vance can explain it to you.

Vice President Mubarak: What is mentioned in the treaty will not do anything, but it will hurt us internally and the Communists and extremists will use it against us. They will say that Egypt and Israel are allies.

The President: We can’t satisfy the Iraqis and the Syrians ever.

Secretary Vance: If Syria is attacked by Israel, you can still help Syria.

The President: And President Sadat can say that. Egypt has the advantage of being able to explain this in a positive way. He can defend his Arab brothers in Syria and Jordan if they are attacked by Israel. But if President Sadat remains silent, then others may make criticisms. We think that this language allows Sadat to make a statement dealing with the self-defense. I understand your problem.

Vice President Mubarak: President Sadat is very annoyed on this point. We don’t want to add to your problems. Article VI, paragraph 2, adds nothing, nor does paragraph 5.

The President: We spent so much time on this.

Secretary Vance: If you open it up, Israel will go back to the preamble, and that is where you have the linkage, and they will reopen the language on Gaza.

Vice President Mubarak: I’ll talk to Weizman, but I’ll be going back to Sadat to explain this to him.

The President: When the treaty is signed, Sadat can say that his obligation to defend other Arabs from an Israeli attack is still binding. He can say this. He can even quote me that this is the U.S. interpretation.

Vice President Mubarak: I won’t argue over these two points. But I’ll tell Weizman that we do not agree to the letter and we do not agree to Article VI. I will be very vehement with him.

The President: (To Secretary Vance.) What will the Israeli reactions be?

Secretary Vance: The Israelis want to talk with us before the Cabinet meeting on Sunday.⁶ On linkage, there will be problems with Begin and Dayan. They will see this as an effort to split off Gaza and they are very sensitive and suspicious on this point.

The President: When you see Weizman, I hope you won’t separate Gaza from the West Bank in his mind.

Vice President Mubarak: I’ll talk about the Palestinian problem and the West Bank and Gaza together. I will take one line and I’ll pursue this. It will be easiest for me to proceed this way.

The President: That seems to be your preference.

Vice President Mubarak: I will speak of the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian question. I will let any separation between the West Bank and Gaza be a concession only if you request it and it is needed.

The President: That is better.

Vice President Mubarak: I will leave Gaza as a concession for you.

The President: Don’t make it an Egyptian proposal.

Vice President Mubarak: I’ll talk about the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian question. I will not talk about Gaza alone. I will leave that for the President.

The President: That is very helpful. I am glad to get to know you. I have heard fine things about you. I know President Sadat has confidence in you. We should try to minimize our public demands and statements. They have a way of becoming matters of national honor. The Israelis also do this, and we hope that neither side will talk so much to the press.

Vice President Mubarak: We were very upset about the Israeli settlements. When we decided to keep quiet, they said that we approved of what they were doing.

The President: They say that Egypt doesn’t care and that this is just a U.S.-Israeli problem.

Ambassador Ghorbal: When we talked to Weizman and Dayan, we took a very strong position on the settlements.

Secretary Vance: One issue which you have been pressing has been an Egyptian presence in Gaza, especially the presence of Egyptian police. This is a very explosive issue with the Israelis. Are you still insisting on it?

Vice President Mubarak: We are only interested in a symbolic presence. I’ll speak to Weizman. We don’t want police there to fight Israel. We know the situation in Gaza. We just want to send some police and have a presence.

Secretary Vance: I hope you can get this cleared up.

Vice President Mubarak: We mentioned it before.

The President: This is an additional problem. Even if there are only fifteen police, it opens up a new area. One possibility might be that when negotiations take place, when there is a registration of voters, when the elections are held, there would be some kind of international monitoring. This could involve the U.N., or perhaps a joint Israeli-Egyptian presence. They could attest to the fairness of the elections. This would be the best way for there to be an Egyptian presence.

Vice President Mubarak: We could think of an Egyptian-Israeli presence.

The President: Why don’t you explore this with Weizman?

Secretary Vance: The fear is that you want to take over the Gaza Strip.

Vice President Mubarak: I’ll explain to him. We want to finish with this problem. We don’t want Gaza.

The President: Try to make this clear to the Israelis.

Vice President Mubarak: I’ll talk about the priority of obligations with him. I won’t tell the Israelis that we agree yet. Mr. President, if you want to see me while I am here, I will be available.

Secretary Vance: There is only one other major issue and that is oil. There should be some way to work this through.

Vice President Mubarak: I’ll talk to Weizman. We can’t give them any privileged position, but we are ready to sell them oil. Why do they need a written note?

Secretary Vance: They are concerned over the present unstable oil situation. They are concerned over how they will get their oil. They want to be able to buy a certain quantity.

The President: We have an agreement with the Israelis to help them meet their oil needs.

Vice President Mubarak: We will sell them petroleum. Their mistrust should disappear.

The President: Maybe you can find some language that acknowledges that they will have an equal opportunity to purchase the oil.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 11/14–17/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Carter’s handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.
2. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
3. See footnote 5, Document 138.
4. See Document 96.
5. See footnote 7, Document 91.
6. November 19.