Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

96. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1978, 7:30–10:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of President’s Meeting with the Israeli Delegation

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
• Mr. Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser to the Department of State
• Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
• H.E. Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
• H.E. Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense
• H.E. Aharon Barak, Justice of the Supreme Court
• H.E. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser to Minister of Foreign Affairs
• H.E. Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States

The President reviewed his talk² earlier in the day with the Egyptian delegation. He confirmed that the Israelis would be able to use the Suez Canal for their ships immediately upon signing of the peace treaty. On the question of priority of obligations, the President suggested that Barak might meet with our legal advisers to see if some acceptable language could be found.

Barak said that this problem had caused them great concern. It was a political and a legal question. Barak and Rosenne had gone to Yale today to meet with Professors [Eugene] Rostow, [Leon] Lipson, and [Myres S.] McDougal. They had explained their problem with the question of priority of obligations. The professors suggested some language. They all felt that the American draft³ was inadequate, and might even be worth nothing at all. Rosenne proceeded to read suggested language on this issue. Barak said that it did not solve all of the problems, and that they had concluded that they could not settle such questions as what might happen if Israel were engaged in a military conflict with Syria and Egypt felt obliged to go to Syria’s defense under the provision of the U.N. Charter which provides for collective measures of self-defense. Rosenne noted that some American treaties have contained language similar to that suggested by the Israelis. He quoted the NATO treaty⁴ and the 1953 treaties⁵ with Greece and Turkey. Israel’s concern is that it is entering a treaty with Egypt in the full knowledge that Egypt has fifty mutual defense pacts with adversaries of Israel.

The President asked if the Israelis could accept language similar to that which we used in NATO and in our treaties with Turkey and Greece. Rosenne said they could, provided there were an additional statement on the priority of this treaty over all others. Barak said that there were two ways of dealing with the issue. You could say that the most recent treaty supercedes those that have preceded it; or you could declare that there is no conflict between this treaty and any other. But the latter solution can be misunderstood. Rosenne said that it is not enough simply to state that there is no conflict. The President said that it would be easier to convince Sadat if the language used was similar to that in the NATO treaty. Barak noted that the problem with the NATO formula is that it is not adequate because it simply states that there is no conflict between the Egypt-Israel treaty and other obligations, and this is not in fact true.

Dayan said that he would be returning to Israel, and that if he reported that Barak and Rosenne had met with the highest legal authorities in the United States and that they were not satisfied with the language, he could not expect the Cabinet to accept it. The President bluntly asked if Dayan would prefer for us to withdraw from the negotiations entirely. Dayan repeated that the legal experts had said that the U.S. draft was not adequate. Barak said that Israel could not ask the Egyptians to withdraw from their other treaties. The language Israel has suggested is the best that they can hope for. This is a technical problem of international law. Rosenne added that if the Egyptians cannot accept this language, it will raise doubts in Israel about their sincerity.

The President said that Sadat had insisted⁶ that the interim withdrawal line be east of the settlement near al-Arish. The President had told Sadat that he could not agree with this.⁷ He would not be able to go on with the negotiations if Sadat were to insist. The President feels that the line should be around the settlement. If Sadat does agree to this, he will not allow the settlers to go into Egyptian territory from the settlement. The President said that he had also informed the Egyptians that they could only have SAM-7 missiles across the Canal. Weizman said that this would be no problem. The President said that all other missiles would have to be west of the Canal. The Egyptians have referred this to Cairo and they will provide an answer soon. They understand that they can move their other missiles up to the Canal.

The President said that he had also discussed the question of the timing of normalization. The Egyptians have talked of a seven-month period for normalization and the exchange of ambassadors. This was not specified at Camp David. The President’s first suggestion had been full normalization at the time of signing the peace treaty. Sadat had objected. He said that normalization could take place at the time of the interim withdrawal. The President said that he understood the Israelis wanted the exchange of ambassadors to be within one month of the interim withdrawal. The President had recommended to the Egyptians that they accept this one-month provision, and that it would be to their advantage. Israel is withdrawing faster than required, and will be out of al-Arish within two months. Israel has also offered open transportation between al-Arish and Gaza. The President asked if that was correct. Dayan said yes, although there might be some check posts along the way.

The President said the Egyptian delegation would ask Sadat’s views on the settlement issue and the exchange of ambassadors. On Gaza, the President said he thought the Israelis understood the problem and asked if they had found a solution. Barak replied that something along the lines of the “question of Gaza will be solved according to the framework agreement” might be adequate. The President [asked?] if Israel could accept the language in the text as it now stands. Barak said that he had called the Prime Minister who had said the language was unacceptable. This is not a legal problem, but it is one of public opinion. It could imply that Israel accepted the status of Gaza as it was previously and that Israel had given up its claims. Barak had suggested “the issue of the status of Gaza”. Begin gave no answer to this. Barak had also suggested this language to al-Baz and had not gotten any reaction.

The President noted that Sadat does not want to acknowledge that Gaza is a part of Israel. Dayan said that we might refer to the Camp David agreement. The final status of Gaza might be settled according to the Camp David agreement. Barak suggested language on “without prejudice to the status of Gaza, which will be settled in accordance with the framework agreement”. The President said he felt that Israel was trying to assert its own claim to sovereignty over Gaza. Dayan said that they just wanted to tie this to the Camp David agreement. He suggested the following language: “the issue of the final status of Gaza, which will be decided in accordance with the Camp David framework agreements.” The President said that Israel cannot lay a claim to Gaza on this basis. The President said he was wondering what Israel’s intentions were in not accepting the language as it presently was written. He suggested that we stick to the Camp David language and show a map with a line at the border and around Gaza.

The President turned to the letter⁸ that the Egyptians were planning to write referring to the general framework agreement. He said that he had urged them to cut down dramatically the specific references from the Camp David agreement. He asked the Israelis if there were anything they would like to have in that letter. Dayan said that they knew what they did not want in the letter. The President urged them to be in a constructive mood and to leave something in the letter for the Egyptians. Barak said that the main problem with the letter was that it could be seen as implying some legal link between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the broader framework agreement. The letter should not be binding on Israel. The President said that this would not be the case. The Egyptian and Israeli letters did not have to be identical. Barak said that if Israel can write whatever it wants in the letter, then Israel does not care what the Egyptians write in their letter. He had thought that a common letter was envisaged.

Messrs. Hansell and Rosenne returned to the room at this point after having worked on the priority of obligations language. They suggested some new language, which Barak said he could accept. The President suggested that we try this language with the Egyptians.

Turning to the exchange of letters, The President argued for a single joint letter on the beginning of negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza issue within one month, to which the text of the Camp David agreements would be appended. In addition, there would be mention in the preamble of the treaty of the Camp David framework agreement. Barak said that this raised the question of linkage. Barak said that the Israeli commitment to the framework agreement is a fact, but that it should not be mentioned in the treaty itself. If it were, it could be seen as the foundation stone for the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and could call into question the viability of the treaty if the broader framework were not to be implemented. The President said that this was not a new concept. The Sinai framework itself was predicated on the acceptance of the general framework.

Barak said that Israel’s problem was that any mention of the general framework as the basis for the Egyptian-Israeli treaty would seem to make the Egypt-Israel treaty conditional upon the implementation of the broader framework. If this is mentioned, somewhere in the treaty there must be a sentence that the treaty stands on its own. If that is included, then Israel does not care how much reference is made to the broader framework. Rosenne suggested language which would make the treaty completely separate from the broader framework agreement. Barak said that this would balance off any reference to the general framework. If this were included, the Egyptians could even add language in the preamble referring to the comprehensive peace. But if this sentence were not in the treaty, then no reference could be made to the broader framework. The President said that he did not believe that Sadat could agree to the Israeli language. He insists that there is some tie between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the comprehensive peace. The Sinai agreement was meant to be part of a general framework. This is why he was able to agree to it at Camp David. He needs to be able to make some specific reference to the broader framework. It seems to the President that the Israelis were moving backwards.

Barak said that whatever connection existed between the two frameworks still remained, but out of the framework agreement on Sinai there was not going to be a specific treaty, and it should stand on its own. It is a contract between two parties. Rosenne said that the United States had made reference to the treaty standing on its own. The Israelis do not want to point to a separate peace with Egypt, but in legal terms the Egypt-Israel treaty should not be dependent upon anything else. Israel will still adhere to the broader framework agreement, but Israel needs some guarantee that the language in the preamble will not pose any conditions.

The President said that if the Israelis could convince Sadat, it would be okay with him. But he would personally not try. He would not propose this language to Sadat. He would not say that there was no connection whatsoever. Two framework agreements were negotiated at Camp David. Everyone knew it at the time that they were linked. Sadat only signed the Egyptian-Israeli framework on the premise that the West Bank and Gaza framework was viable and agreed upon.

Rosenne said that there was a difference between a political link and a legal link. The President said that the Israelis were wasting time on this issue with him. He would not propose a completely separate agreement. Rosenne said that this caused a serious problem. The President replied that if that was the case he could not help matters. But he would not ask Sadat to say that the agreement with Israel was not related to the broader framework. Israel had already agreed to language in the preamble reaffirming her commitment to the broader framework. The President has tried to get the Egyptians to remove excess verbage from their letter and he has proposed simply to have the text of the framework agreement appended to the exchange of letters.

Rosenne said that the implementation of the broader framework agreement might depend on some third party and that would give them the possibility of preventing the implementation of the Egypt-Israel treaty as well. Dayan added that Israel had accepted the reference to the general Camp David framework in the preamble. In addition, there might be an exchange of letters, although they would not necessarily be identical. But there should be nothing in the preamble other than what the American draft contained. The President asked whether Israel would accept everything else in our proposal. The Israelis are trying selectively to accept our suggestions. The President said that he had tried to get the Israelis to say what they could accept. Barak said that the text of the framework agreement could be annexed to the exchange of letters. This could be done with the letter on setting up negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza within one month. Barak said that when Israel agreed to reaffirm its commitment to the framework, it did so in conjunction with a section in the treaty which stated that the Egypt-Israel treaty would stand on its own feet. This is not a new point.

The President asked the Israelis if they really wanted a peace treaty. Dayan said that he could not imagine anyone thinking they did not. The President said that he detected an attitude among the Israelis that they had gone too far at Camp David, and they now seemed to be trying to back off some of their undertakings there. Dayan denied this. The President asked why then they were not willing to reaffirm their commitment to those agreements.

Barak asked if the West Bank framework did not work out for some reason, would the Egyptian-Israeli treaty stand? The President said yes. Barak said that is what the Israelis were trying to say. The President asked what would happen in a situation where the interim withdrawal would be complete, ambassadors had been exchanged, and then Israel would refuse to withdraw her military government or to redeploy her forces, or would not negotiate on the West Bank and Gaza, what should Egypt do? Barak said that Israel would then be breaking her agreement under the framework document. The President asked whether the Egyptian-Israeli treaty should then stand. Barak said that it should stand on its own, but Israel would then be in breach of another agreement.

Hansell said that the preamble language did not constitute a binding obligation. It could not be grounds for the termination of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty if the general framework were not implemented. Atherton added that the Egyptians have not seen that as setting a condition on the Egypt-Israel treaty. Barak said that he was afraid it could provide a legal basis for breaking their obligations. The President added that Egypt merely wants Israel to say in the preamble that it will reaffirm its commitment to the framework agreement. If after doing so, you were to declare sovereignty over Gaza, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty won’t be worth anything. Barak said that politically that was true, but not legally. Israel wants the legal structure to be correct.

The President said that Begin had shown courage in taking a strong position on the removal of settlements. Sadat has also shown courage in breaking with the other Arabs. He has said that he will negotiate in the place of Jordan. Now Israel is suggesting that the framework might not go forward, but Egypt has said that it will negotiate. Barak asked what would happen if the Palestinians were to boycott the elections. The President said that there was no possibility that Sadat would declare the Egyptian-Israeli treaty null and void in that event. Barak replied that Israel is trying to find a way of stating the legal principle that the treaty will stand intact in those situations. Israel remains bound by the framework. Israel is not backing out of its obligations. Israel does not want the legal structure laid for an argument about the validity of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

The President said that Barak was not trying to help solve the problem that exists. If Israel cannot accept the language in the preamble, then perhaps other language could be drafted which would say that if the general framework could not be implemented because of the actions of third parties, this would not be an obstacle to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Barak said that this suggestion helped, but there could be a situation in which Egypt might say that Israel was to blame for the non-implementation of the West Bank/Gaza framework. In reply, the President said it was impossible to cover every eventuality. If the Egyptians want to attack Israel, they will find some pretext.

The President urged that we return to the kind of spirit that existed at Camp David when the agreements were signed. We want to remove obstacles. The Israelis know what Sadat needs in terms of his credibility in the Arab world. There has to be some reference to the Camp David agreements. The President said that he would be able to get Sadat to drop some references in the preamble, but not everything. Pretexts can always be found to break agreements. The Israelis might want to draft a paragraph dealing with the contingency in which the Palestinians and the Jordanians cause the problem for the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. But generally he has the impression that the Israelis are trying to back away from the minimal agreed linkage established at Camp David.

Barak said that Israel would reaffirm in a joint declaration or some other means the commitment to the Camp David agreement. But Sadat wants this in the preamble to the peace treaty. The President reminded Barak that Egypt had earlier wanted references made throughout the treaty and now they were prepared to accept a reference only in the preamble. If the Israelis can persuade Sadat otherwise, let them try. Barak insisted again that they do not want a legal link. A letter from them saying that there was no legal link would be all right.

The President asked whether the Israelis could accept the preamble as it now stands, with only minor deletions. Would Israel then refuse to sign the treaty? The President will try to get Israel the settlement in Sinai, as well as an exchange of ambassadors after one month. He cannot imagine that the Israelis would then reject the treaty because of a reaffirmation of the commitment to the Camp David framework. If that is a problem, we should simply stop the negotiations. Sadat will not renounce any linkage at all between the two frameworks. This was the whole basis for Sadat’s willingness to sign the Camp David agreements. If it is so important to Israel that they cannot reaffirm their commitment to the Camp David frameworks, then Sadat and Begin should just meet again to try to work this out. The President would drop out of the negotiations. The Israelis seem to be going back into Camp David.

Rosenne said once again that if mention were made of the framework in the preamble some reference had to be made in the treaty that the treaty itself would stand on its own. There had to be some reference. Events outside the control of the parties might hinder the implementation of the broader framework. Rosenne suggested adding language to the article on the priority of obligations which would say that this treaty was binding and was independent of any other agreement that might exist. Rosenne suggested that reference be made to the second framework agreement between Egypt and Israel at the end of the preamble.

Dayan suggested that these suggestions be put in writing. He said that he felt bad about the discussion. Israel has tried to explain its position and its honest feelings. Israel wants a peace treaty and it is committed to the Camp David agreements. He would be prepared to ask the Prime Minister if he could accept the preamble as it now stands, but the political decisions would have to be made by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

The President said that what Egypt wants goes into the preamble or in an exchange of letters. What Israel wants always has to be in the text. He suggested including the reaffirmation of the commitment to the framework in the preamble. He does not see that this causes any problem. If it does, the Israelis should suggest another paragraph to include in the preamble. If the President can understand the Israeli concern, he’ll recommend to the Egyptians that they accept. But he has already gone to the Egyptians on the Israelis’ problems, and he has tried to get favorable action. He has not seen any comparable effort by the Israelis. They wait for the Egyptian draft, we modify it, and they keep pushing for better advantage.

The President said that he found this very frustrating. He said that the Israelis were trying to undo the degree of linkage that had been established at Camp David. He knew that the Israelis had wanted none in the first place, but he could not understand why they now wanted to drop things, such as the U.N. Security Council endorsement of the treaty. Sadat also wants Israel to help out on international waterways, but Israel has not been forthcoming. On the points of importance to Israel, such as Suez passage, settlements, and others, the President has tried to help. If the Israelis now insist on the language they want in the text of the treaty, they are trying to undo any linkage at all. The Egyptian-Israeli treaty is based on the overall framework agreement. Sadat made sure that Israel would understand that at Camp David. He told this to the Israelis. Now the Israelis are trying to undo that minimum degree of linkage. Sadat has his integrity at stake. The President has told Hussein and Fahd and Assad that the two agreements are related. We have said that Sadat has not agreed to a separate peace treaty. For Israel now to create the impression of a separate peace would cause Sadat great problems. The President does not personally care about this issue, but he cannot accept the Israeli position in good conscience. Israel should be helping Sadat solve his problem. He cannot say that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty stands completely on its own. The Israelis know that there is an interconnection.

Dayan said the President had referred to a political linkage, but not a legal linkage. The President agreed, and Dayan said that this is the Israeli position. Israel does not want a legal linkage. The President said that if the Jordanians and the Palestinians do not want to negotiate, neither he nor Sadat would use that as a pretext for saying that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty should not be honored. The Israelis could write something to deal with this situation. Dayan said that if there could be some statement on political linkage without implying legal linkage, the Israelis might be able to accept it. Barak was afraid that this might provide a pretext for not honoring the treaty, but the President replied again that a pretext can always be found. The Egyptians recognize that Israel wants to have influence in the West Bank and Gaza and in East Jerusalem. They know that Israel wants to keep settlements in the Golan. They are not forcing Israel to take a stand on these issues. They are not predicating this treaty on assurances that the Egyptian position will always prevail. Dayan said that they would have to check how legally binding a statement in the preamble would be on Israel.

The President suggested that at the end of the preamble language should be inserted saying that “in order to implement the framework [of] an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty the parties agree to the following provisions”. Rosenne said that this would help, but there should also be some mention that the validity of this treaty is not conditional upon any act or development under the control of the third party. Dayan said that the President might have to contact the Prime Minister directly on this point.

The President then suggested that we leave the preamble as it is, and that we add some language referring to the second framework agreement toward the end. Then later in the section on priorities, there should be some reference to the treaty not depending upon any action or inaction by third parties. Barak said that they would have to go to the Cabinet to get agreement on this, but that he could accept it wholeheartedly. Dayan confirmed that they would all recommend this formulation to the Cabinet.

The President said that he would try to sell it to Sadat. The Camp David agreement should also be appended to the treaty not the letter. Barak said that he felt bad about this whole discussion. The President said that he would then withdraw his suggestion that the Camp David agreement be appended to the treaty and that it could be attached to a letter in which the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the general framework. It might be appended to the letter on the talks beginning in one month. Dayan said that Boutros Ghali had agreed to a separate letter on the negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza beginning in one month. The President said that he wanted a joint text of that letter. It should say that the parties are prepared to carry out the provisions of the Camp David agreement, and that in order to do this Egypt and Israel would meet within one month to begin negotiations on establishing a self-governing authority. The Camp David agreements would be appended to that letter. Concerning the priority of obligations, language was suggested on page six, paragraph 2, which said that the treaty would stand “without regard to the action or inaction of any third party”. The President said he would try this with Sadat. Dayan said that this would be all right with the Israeli delegation.

The President then turned to the question of free navigation in the Strait of Tiran, and whether the Egyptians could find some way to close those waters to Soviet ships. Barak said that the right of ships from all nations had to be respected or ships carrying cargoes to Israel might be prevented from passing through the Strait. Mr. Aaron suggested that the phrase “for access to either country” be included as a way of indicating that the free passage was for ships going to or from Israel or Egypt. This would preclude Soviets coming in and maneuvering in the Gulf of Aqaba. The President suggested that the parties accept this and the Israelis agreed.

The President then showed the Israelis language that we would be prepared to use in a letter dealing with the U.N. force or a multilateral force if the U.N. would not agree to station troops in Sinai. This would be a letter from the United States to Israel. It should be kept secret for now, otherwise the U.N. will not act at all. Dayan said that the Israelis were concerned about the situation in which the United States might do its best to keep the U.N. force intact, but that it would fail. The President said that he would have to talk to Congress about the extent of the American obligation. Dayan said that he would ask the Cabinet not to publish the text of this letter. The President said it would be very embarrassing to him if it were published. He does not want to consult with Congress until we are closer to agreement on the treaty. Dayan agreed to this idea.

The President asked what problems would remain if the Egyptians were to accept what had been decided on this evening. Barak pointed to three other problems. One was the linguistic problem on page 1. The Israelis would like to say “upon completion of the interim withdrawal”, rather than “after completion of the interim withdrawal”. This would mean that the Suez Canal would be open immediately. Atherton suggested that specific reference to the passage of Israeli ships in the Suez immediately should be put in Annex III, and Barak agreed.

The President said that Egypt wanted to delete the reference to terrorism on page 3. Dayan said that he would have to refer this to the Cabinet, but that he would suggest that no reference be made to terrorism. The President suggested that some other word might be included. Weizman said that he would also recommend the deletion of the word.

Barak then turned to Article VII on arbitration. The Prime Minister wants to reopen this issue, and now favors an arbitration commission of four members, two from each party. If each party agrees that a deadlock has been reached in the talks, by agreement they would name a fifth. But it should not be automatic that there would be a fifth member. The President said that the Israelis were going on their agreement to Article VII and that it would be hard for the Egyptians. Dayan said that they could leave it as it is now, and there might be a problem on other points. The Israelis then might want to reopen this one as well. The President asked whether they would agree that there would be a four-person commission and if both agree there is a deadlock, then they will choose a fifth member. Barak said that this would be okay. The President said that he could agree to language as follows: “If the parties agree there is a deadlock, they will select a fifth member on the Arbitration Commission.”

Turning to the question of diplomatic relations in the Annex, the President responded to Dayan’s question by saying that he favored the exchange of ambassadors within a month or so of the interim withdrawal. This could be spelled out in an Annex or in an exchange of letters. He preferred the Annex. Barak said that this was vital to Israel and that it should be in the text, but that Israel could accept its being in the Annex, but it should not be in an exchange of letters.

Dayan said that he also raised the question of the American involvement as a guarantor, as a party to the agreement with a special responsibility for guaranteeing that the parties will honor the agreement. He said that the President’s reaction had been generally positive. The President said that Sadat will want this also. He will want us as a full partner. Dayan said that he would like to discuss this again. After the agreement is reached, there should be some American responsibility for assuring its implementation. The President said that this should not relate to the costs of implementation of the agreement. If the Israelis could suggest some language, he would consider it. Rosenne suggested language, but the President felt that it was too sweeping and that he could not accept it. The President cannot force compliance with the treaty, but he can agree to use his good offices and to consult with the parties.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 10/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum was found attached to an October 25 covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Boutros-Ghali and El-Ehrian in the Oval Office from 4:10 p.m. to 4:55 p.m. on October 20. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
3. See Document 95. As part of a package of negotiating materials for this October 20 evening meeting, including copies of the preamble, the Egyptian draft letter, and draft language on UN forces, Brzezinski forwarded an annotated text of the treaty (numbered Draft 5A) upon which Carter added his own notations. This copy of this draft of the treaty is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: Non-Meeting: 2–12/78.
4. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949, is in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. IV, Western Europe, pp. 281–285.
5. Reference is presumably to the “United States use of Defense Facilities: Agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, October 12, 1953.” (American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, pp. 2188–2189)
6. For Eilts’s conversation with Sadat on September 28, see footnote 2, Document 67.
7. No record of this exchange has been found.
8. See footnote 3, Document 96.