Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

287. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Alexandria, August 7, 1978, 4:10–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Meeting with Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Kamil

PARTICIPANTS

• Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Hon. Hermann Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
• Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State
• Hon. Hodding Carter, Assistant Secretary of State
• Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff Member
• H.E. Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• H.E. Butrus Butrus Gahil, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• H.E. Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to U.S.
• H.E. Usama Al-Baz, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Ahmed Maher, Director of the Foreign Minister’s Office

Foreign Minister Kamil welcomed Secretary Vance and emphasized how much Egypt counts on its relations and its friendship with the United States. Both for internal progress and for progress toward peace in the Middle East, Egypt relies on the United States. The Foreign Minister asked about the Secretary’s visit to Israel.

Secretary Vance expressed his pleasure in being back in Egypt and agreed that the future of our two countries is bound together and will remain so. We share the same objectives of a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement. We cannot let this opportunity slip away. There have been some misunderstandings in recent weeks, and we must put these behind us. There has been no change in the American position. There is apparently some feeling in Egypt that the United States is wavering on the “peace for withdrawal” formula, but our views have not changed. Our view on Resolution 242 has been consistent; it requires withdrawal on all fronts. We were getting ready to move as we had agreed to do, and we were disappointed that our plan was disrupted. This apparently grew out of a misunderstanding.

Secretary Vance emphasized that the United States wants to be a full partner in the peace process, and he will tell that to President Sadat.² He also has a message for President Sadat from President Carter, a handwritten note in which the President expresses his views.³ We want to make it clear that we stand behind what we have said, and we will proceed as we have agreed. Time is short, and we should move rapidly. We hope to reach agreement on how to proceed. Any doubts that Egypt may have concerning our wavering, are wrong.

Minister Kamil said that the misunderstanding had been unfortunate. At Leeds the Egyptians had discussed a second round of talks, but had said that as long as no positive elements were forthcoming it would be hard to justify a meeting. If nothing came out of the talks at Leeds, there would then be the possibility of agreeing to a new meeting when Secretary Vance came to the area. If the Secretary had something positive to report, then Egypt would be willing to go on short notice. But at Leeds, the Israeli position was stated clearly and bluntly by Dayan when he said there could be no substitute for acquisition of territory. This is followed by the decision of the Israeli Cabinet and by the declaration of Begin in which he said that he would never give something for nothing, and that he would negotiate for every grain of sand in Sinai. Then he sent a letter to Sadat which was leaked in advance. Dayan tried later to deny that he said that there was no substitute for territory, and that Israel had agreed to discuss the question of sovereignty, but Egypt considers that to be the case. It will take years if that is the spirit of the negotiations. We think that Israel’s objective is to gain time for themselves, so that they can establish the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza and consolidate their occupation. We cannot be dragged through this kind of negotiation without having the right frame of reference.

The Foreign Minister added that Israel had aggravated the small misunderstanding that existed between Egypt and the United States, and Israeli leaks had tried to embarrass Egypt. When Atherton came to Egypt, he gave us some ideas. We were unhappy with the tendency and the occupation behind these ideas. We explained that these were not the kind of proposals that we had envisaged. They were based on trying to find common ground between two proposals which differ completely in philosophies. This will get nowhere. The basic point in a U.S. proposal should be a clear American position. Egypt expected at least the points contained in the White House statement after the Sadat visit: the applicability of 242 on all fronts, the illegality of settlements and their obstruction of the peace effort, and the Aswan language.⁴ These should be stated clearly. An idea of an American plan based on the two proposals will lead nowhere. In substance, the American and Egyptian positions have been close. Secretary Vance said that they had been very close. Kamil continued that Israel is trying to widen the gap between Egypt and the United States.

Kamil said that since Sadat went to Jerusalem, the negotiations had never stopped. There had been meetings in Jerusalem, Cairo, Ismailia, meetings of the political committee, meetings with Weizman, visits by Secretary Vance and Ambassador Atherton, and the conference at Leeds. Israel replied negatively to the American questions. Nonetheless, Sadat agreed to send a delegation to Leeds. The Egyptians had been reluctant to propose anything for the West Bank and Gaza, but on American advice Egypt did present a proposal. Negotiations have been continuing, directly or indirectly. Minister Kamil said that the Egyptians’ decision had been made in Egypt, and not because of Saudi influence. Saudi Arabia had nothing to do with it. The Secretary said that he accepted that. Kamil said that Fahd did come to Egypt after Atherton’s visit and Sadat informed him of his decision. Israel has proposed a pre-condition that there must be bargaining on land. Egypt cannot accept this. A continuation of the talks requires the right framework. Kamil said he had spoken to King Hussein as well as the Saudis. If the right framework is set, we can bring in these other parties with Saudi support. The Israelis are trying to make it difficult for Jordan. The Egyptian proposal for the West Bank and Gaza is based on the need for Jordanian and Palestinian participation. If Israel prevents Jordan from coming in, then the Egyptian proposal will not work. That would leave us only with the Israeli proposal.

Kamil said that President Sadat is concerned with the American image in the Arab world and in Egypt. Egypt has put all its hopes in the United States. If there is no progress, the American image will be hurt. We don’t want to see chaos or an opening for Soviet or Communist influence in this area. The Minister said that he trusted what Secretary Vance said 100% and that the American commitment is not in doubt. But there is some worry about the domestic scene in the United States. If the United States would stick to its declared positions, no one could blame you. The American proposal should not be detailed. That will get nowhere. Egypt is thinking of a general outline based on withdrawal and the non-acquisition of territory, the need for peaceful relations, and for security measures. If you invite the parties to resume negotiations on that basis, it will be okay. But there can be no meeting without that basis or on Israeli terms. Egypt cannot agree to the idea of territorial compromise.

Secretary Vance said that we were thinking of two aspects. One would involve a declaration of principles, which would be combined with more specific views on how to deal with the West Bank and Gaza issues. The United States is prepared to help work for a declaration of principles. But we thought that at least one more meeting would be required to establish such a framework. At the next meeting we would put forward our declaration of principles. Roy Atherton was unable to go into more detail, because the President and the Secretary were still considering what our proposals would be. This did not mean, however, that we had changed any of our positions. The United States is prepared to make a statement of its own. We will also be prepared to put forward ideas on how to deal with the West Bank and Gaza. The question is now how to proceed with the present circumstances so that we can surface our own ideas.

Minister Kamil said that this sounded encouraging, but that we should understand that a declaration of principles should be clear and that there should be no ambiguity on withdrawal nor should there be anything less than the Aswan formula as a minimum. Secretary Vance said that we say withdrawal on all fronts and there is no question about our position on that. Kamil replied that our position of withdrawal on all fronts is known. That means that on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts there will not be rectifications in the borders, and we understand your position that there can be minor rectifications on the West Bank. When you come out with something, it should repeat this position. If you only say 242, or only “on all fronts”, they will not be convincing. At a minimum, the United States should refer to only minor rectifications in borders. Secretary Vance noted that the Minister himself had suggested using the phrase concerning the non-acquisition of territory by war. Kamil said that that was very good and we should stick to it 100%. This should be combined with the statement on minor modifications in the West Bank. The Minister suggested the use of the phrase withdrawal according to the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war, with only minor modifications in the 1967 lines. The Secretary noted that the Minister had also referred to language on the Palestinian question and on settlements, and Kamil added that there should also be a reference to peace and security. The Secretary agreed that there must be some language on peace and security. He wondered how much detail should be included on security. To what extent would it be desirable to say more than just the word security. This is central to Israel, and without this there can be no real progress. President Sadat has already given six points on security.⁵ Minister Kamil said that the six points could deal with security and that President Sadat had told Roy Atherton that Egypt will accept any international guarantees.⁶ Secretary Vance said that he had not thought of international guarantees at this stage, but he had said that they would be essential at the end of the process. But they would be too early at this stage. Kamil said that Egypt will not insist on them at this stage, but it would be worth considering what could be done beyond Sadat’s six points. Secretary Vance said he will think about how much could be considered. Kamil said that Egypt could elaborate on the six points and may think of others, such as making the Middle East a free zone for nuclear weapons, reducing forces on both sides, and other possibilities.

Secretary Vance asked if it would be possible to bring in others if a declaration were achieved. Could this be done soon? Kamil replied that with the right declaration, it could be done soon. Jordan insists on an Israeli commitment that 242 be implemented and that withdrawal be carried out. An American assurance that this will be done should be adequate. Jordan does not want to get in before knowing the outline of the results. The Secretary said that he understood.

Kamil said that he had seen reports in the American press that spoke of Arab solidarity as an alternative. But we should remember that at Rabat the Arabs did commit themselves to a peaceful settlement. Arab solidarity is not an alternative, because some of them excluded themselves. That is their business. Egypt would have been happy to have them involved. Secretary Vance said that we like to see an Arab consensus, but not at the expense of Sadat’s initiative. Kamil said that the President would stick with his initiative, and that others will join on Egypt’s terms, not on their own.

The Secretary asked about Fahd’s trip and whether it had been helpful. Kamil said the Saudis had informed the Jordanians that it would be wrong to break off all contacts. In Syria, the Saudis have helped soften Assad’s position, but doubts continue there. Everyone is now waiting for the United States. Butrus Ghali said that at Belgrade it had not been so difficult to get a consensus among the Arabs.⁷ They did not condemn Sadat’s initiative. It is not so difficult to get support if there are things to offer. A new consensus would be difficult if something could be offered. Arabs are concerned about the Soviets in Africa and Afghanistan. Minister Kamil said that there is no need for a consensus of all the Arabs, just the main countries. Secretary Vance said that this was encouraging. If things remain in Egypt’s hands, he feels confident. Kamil said that they will stay in Egypt’s hands and that Sadat is very firm. Then Minister Kamil asked about the Secretary’s talks in Israel.⁸ The Secretary provided a brief summary, saying that the Israeli position remains totally opposed to the 1967 borders with only minor modifications, but there has been some movement since Leeds. Now they accept at least the principle of negotiated settlement in which territory in the West Bank would be given up. There has also been some movement on the question of sovereignty. They have stated that they will discuss the question and it will be possible to get a decision on sovereignty. This is not enough, but it represents some movement. Mr. Atherton added that some members of the cabinet would go further than this.

Minister Kamil said that Egypt wanted to be firm on 242, its implementation, and especially withdrawal. Egypt believes that Israel has no right to discuss sovereignty at all. Egypt sees the offer of peace and security for Israel and the offer of withdrawal for the Arabs. Referring to the points that Mr. Atherton had made on the West Bank at an earlier meeting, Kamil said that the United States should deal only with principles. The language that he presented was contradictory to the Aswan formula. The United States should stick with Aswan. Mr. Atherton reminded him that what we had reviewed with him on the West Bank and Gaza was not a declaration. Mr. Kamil said that he understood it was a supplement, but that the second document should also represent the general principles.

Mr. Saunders said that he was uncertain of the function that the declaration was supposed to perform. If the United States issues such a declaration how would it help the negotiations? The Secretary said that we would put forward a declaration of principles; Mr. Saunders said that we would still have to consider how to make it work. Minister Kamil said that if we were to come out with a proposal for a declaration of principles dealing with withdrawal, the non-acquisition of territory by force, some reference to minor border adjustments, then there can be negotiations and we will be joined by others. Secretary Vance said what would happen if Israel were to say no. Kamil said that if Israel says no, then the moment of truth has arrived. If Israel refuses, then we can go to the UN or Geneva. Israel must be confronted by these facts. If Israel is offered peace, good relations, security, and all the principles of peace, she should withdraw. Israel will raise hell, but this will have to happen. We can’t allow moderate governments to be undermined.

Secretary Vance said that the United States might make a statement and then Israel would say it would negotiate, even if it did not accept all of the points. Minister Kamil asked what they would negotiate about. It should be about 242 and its implementation. Egypt disagrees that the negotiations should be based on 242. That approach will never get anywhere. When asked about the possibilities of Israeli refusal, the Minister again said that if an American position is declared and clear, the Israelis should not be allowed to oppose it. They would risk an erosion of their position in the United States. Israel has to see the final U.S. position, then there would be a real change toward moderation in Israel. Mr. Saunders referred to the fate of the Rogers Plan,⁹ when a U.S. position was put forward and nothing happened. There was no context. If we play this card, we want results. The Minister said that there could be no comparison to the Rogers proposal after the Sadat initiative. Mr. Saunders said there was still the problem of getting real negotiations going. Kamil said that he did not see this problem. If Israel refuses, they will accept their responsibilities, and we go to the Secretary of the Security Council [sic]or Geneva. But this would be the beginning of a change in Israel’s move toward moderation. Israel should be put in a position where they see they are challenging everybody in the world. A confrontation with the facts should take place. If the only way to get peace is through withdrawal, then this is what the Sadat initiative will have produced. Begin should not be able to feel that he can impose his terms by being militarily strong.

Secretary Vance said that when Begin was attacked personally, this solidifies his support and it is a tremendous mistake for the Egyptians to do this. Kamil agreed. He said that Egypt was trying to restrain these attacks. The real question, however, is the American position. If it is clear, people will start to know that Israel is intransigent. International public opinion in the West is prepared. Time is very important. We can’t let Israel change public opinion against Egypt. They are starting to do that now. The Secretary said that the attacks on Begin were hurting Sadat’s reputation in the United States. Mr. Kamil said that Secretary Vance might mention this to the President.

Mr. Al-Baz said that after the Americans put forward their position, there will be a possibility for negotiations resuming on a new plane. If Israel rejects the position, however, Egypt cannot go back into the negotiations. After the initial shock of an American proposal, there will be changes in Israel. Minister Kamil said that the real danger is that Israel will become desperate and will want to set off a war. Secretary Vance said that he did not believe that to be the case. Minister Kamil said that in that case, Israel would shout and then would have to think it over. Israel cannot challenge the entire world and the American position. Israel cannot ask the United States to help her secure the occupation of others’ territories. Ambassador Ghorbal asked why the United States was prepared to put forward its own ideas. What was the objective of doing this? Secretary Vance said that our purpose was two-fold. First, we wanted to help establish the proper framework. Secondly, we wanted to carry on what was agreed on at Camp David. Ambassador Ghorbal said that Israel would refuse a declaration with a facade of only generalities. But if the whole weight of the United States is behind it, Israel cannot object for very long. The United States should not just be interested in getting negotiations going for their own sake. Secretary Vance said no one wants negotiations for their own sake. We want a solution. Ambassador Atherton said that the Egyptian view seems to be that we should let some time pass, and perhaps consider other forums for negotiation. If Israel does not accept the U.S. position, pressures would build on Israel. This will take a great deal of patience and would be very frustrating. The Israelis, by comparison, believe that the process of negotiations is more important than you do. Minister Kamil said that the present Israeli position is impossible and unacceptable. Israel needs shock treatment from you. Let it happen. It may take some months, but if the American position is refused, why should we go into negotiations. We will get nowhere. It will be a waste of time. Ambassador Atherton said this approach does not include the concept that the process itself will require some decisions. Ambassador Ghorbal said that it might be useful if the United States would state a position without necessarily asking either side to accept or reject it. Kamil said this would get us nowhere. We need to get them to accept or reject. We anticipate that Israel will refuse. These people want our territory. Their biggest friends will now tell them that they can’t have peace and territory. But you should not be ambiguous. That would lose time. Secretary Vance reminded Minister Kamil that the format in which we put forward our proposals has to be our own decision. Minister Kamil agreed, with prior consultations. Mr. Al-Baz said that a clear U.S. position would have a favorable impact in the Arab world. The impact in Israel will only be quantitative at first, but eventually there will be a qualitative change. Israel needs to know that peace cannot be achieved on Begin’s terms. There has to be a debate within Israel. After a while, objective forces could go into motion. This will allow for negotiations at a later stage. Egypt still wants a settlement. Secretary Vance agreed that a statement by the United States on principles was still essential to establish a framework. It will have an impact, but there will be no monolic [monolithic?] reaction. The goal is still a negotiated solution, not a statement of principles.

Minister Kamil said that a statement of principles might include an invitation to both parties to negotiate. You could invite the parties to come together on the basis of these principles: the principles of withdrawal, the non-acquisition of territory by force, and maybe minor border rectifications. Egypt would be willing. Mr. Al-Baz said that the real dilemma would arise if the American proposals are much different from these principles. Then both sides might reject them. This could happen if the withdrawal concept is not spelled out clearly. Secretary Vance said that you know our basic proposal. We will show them to you before they are issued. Minister Kamil said that was fair.¹⁰

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Egypt: 1–8/78. Secret. The meeting took place at the Palestine Hotel. Vance visited Egypt from August 7 to August 9.
2. No memorandum of this conversation has been found.
3. See Document 284.
4. Reference is presumably to the President’s statement at his November 30, 1977, press conference. See footnote 2, Document 162.
5. See footnote 2, Document 259.
6. See Document 279.
7. See footnote 3, Document 272. Telegram 5558 from Belgrade, July 29, contains the Arab caucus’s draft language on the Middle East. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0238)
8. See Documents 285 and 286.
9. See footnote 9, Document 21.
10. Vance met with Sadat later in the evening on August 7 and delivered Carter’s invitation to meet with him and Begin at Camp David. According to Carter’s August 7 diary entry, “During supper Brzezinski called to tell me that Sadat accepted the invitation to the summit meeting, and September fifth was the date he suggested.” (White House Diary, p. 212) For the transcript of the joint press conference Vance and Sadat held in Alexandria on August 8, which summarized their discussions, see the Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pp. 43–45.