286. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House1
Secto 9021. White House for Brzezinski. Subj: August 6 Meeting With Ministerial Security Committee: The Peace Process.
1. The Secretary met for three hours on the morning of August 6 with the Ministerial Security Committee.2 Begin stated that we are at a crucial moment and expressed hope that the peacemaking process would be resumed. He wished me success with my efforts and stressed that Israel would do its best to help. The Secretary agreed that we are at a crucial point in the peace process. He then stated that he was in the Middle East on behalf of the President to work with Israel and Egypt to see what the U.S. can do to contribute to regaining the momentum in the peace process. He stressed that no subject is more important to the U.S. than this one. The Secretary explained that the U.S. shared the Israeli view that negotiations are important. If we can move forward, we can keep the Soviets out of this stage of the peace process. Likewise, we will also be able to keep out the PLO. However, if we fail, we might well find discussions moving to a larger forum in which the Soviets and PLO will be involved. The U.S. is doing everything possible to make progress. The Secretary stressed to Begin that the U.S. understands the need for arrangements to protect Israeli security. However, in order for the Arabs to be able to negotiate peace, there will have to be some resolution of the territorial issue consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 242. This means acceptance of the principle of withdrawal on all fronts in return for peace and security. The Secretary then emphasized that we cannot let matters drift. If we miss this opportunity, Egypt may slip back into a confrontationist posture, opening the way for a Soviet return to the area. The Secretary added that he will be consulting with Sadat and trying to convince him to resume direct talks.
2. The Secretary then added a few words on the Leeds Castle Conference. Although the Arab media had claimed that no progress had been made at Leeds, he did not share that assessment. He stated his belief that the talks were useful. Furthermore, it is important that the process begun at Leeds be resumed. Discussions should take place again so that this direct exchange can continue.
[Page 1289]3. Begin responded that he wanted to make several remarks on the preconditions Egypt is setting for the resumption of direct negotiations. He agreed with the Secretary that the Leeds Conference had been useful. Begin noted that Dayan had said at Leeds that the territorial issue was an intrinsic part of Israel’s security problem. He stated that he emphatically agreed with Dayan’s comment and said that this was especially true since the 1967 border was only nine miles from the sea. “Every house in Tel Aviv could be within the range of mortars and conventional artillery,” Begin said. This would be just like Beirut, where the Christians today are being shelled in their homes. He stressed that discussion of the issues is the substance of negotiating. Secure and recognized boundaries must be determined in the course of negotiating peace treaties.
4. Begin noted that Egypt had demanded that Israel give a prior commitment to withdrawal to the 1967 borders. “This would make negotiations valueless. No one ever asked us to give such a commitment in the past and no one will ever get such a commitment.” He emphasized that there would have to be negotiations. He also noted that Israel has exercised restraint and not answered in kind to Egyptian insults. Begin said that whoever follows Israel’s debates in the Knesset knows Israel has the ability to respond, but the issue of peace is too serious for this. Nonetheless, Israelis are being called “racist dictators.” What the Egyptians say is a disservice to their country. The Israeli people are not impressed by Sadat’s efforts to divide them. Name calling does not serve the peace process. I broke in to say that I planned to speak on this subject to Sadat in Alexandria.
5. Begin explained that he wanted to make very clear what had been involved in Sadat’s demand for an El Arish gesture.3 Israel did not have a negative attitude towards this proposal. But, as happens in democracies, there was a leak. The press knew that the Cabinet was discussing this issue and Begin recounted how he had to announce the government’s position. He had tried to send a reply, but Sadat had refused to accept one. While it did not accept Sadat’s proposal, Israel was ready to negotiate over El Arish. Israel did not reject Sadat’s proposal but suggested that it be the subject of negotiations. Begin said he wanted Sadat to list what he had to propose regarding such a deal. He asked that the Secretary convey to Sadat the fact that the Israeli letter was written in a positive spirit. Israel is prepared to discuss such a gesture. “Israel is prepared to discuss everything with Egypt.” If on the road to peace there can be “a certain arrangement, why not?”
[Page 1290]6. Begin said Israel did not favor an interim arrangement for a limited period of time because such things cause problems. We should be following the path to a peace treaty. However, why shouldn’t Sadat be willing to discuss a partial agreement based on reciprocity? Begin also noted that Israel would certainly go to a conference at the Sinai Field Mission. He also asked that I dispel one particular misunderstanding Sadat may have. “President Sadat should know he cannot order us around. We will not accept prior conditions to negotiations. We will not recognize this. He cannot order Israel around.” Begin contemptuously referred to Sadat’s surprises. “We have had enough of shocks. Shocks are for medicine, not policy, let us deal with the issues around the table.” Begin then asked Dayan to present his views.
7. Dayan stated that at Leeds, discussion of the Palestinian issue had been imprecise. He noted that the Palestinian issue included territorial and security issues, as well as the refugee problem. However, the Egyptian delegation was not sufficiently knowledgeable of the situation on the West Bank and in Gaza to speak about territory, the inhabitants or the actual measures that could be taken with regard to them. “It is so theoretical with them.” The Egyptians only speak in terms of academic principles. It is difficult for them to get down to concrete issues. Dayan explained that focusing on the situation in Judea, Samaria and in the Gaza Strip is much more promising than the theoretical approach taken by Egypt. Dayan asked if it would be possible to have on the Arab side people who really knew what they were talking about in discussing the Palestinian problems in all its aspects.
8. Weizman said he believed Sadat wants peace. But what he wants now is a peace on terms which are unacceptable to Israel. He speculated that Sadat feels that his trip to Jerusalem had been something “so stupendous” that everything should be subservient to his initiative. Weizman stressed that we are at a crossroads. Both sides want peace. There are great possibilities for the region to flourish with peace. Alas, the consequences of war are also well known. Weizman said he had been trying to think of a solution between complete withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries—which was totally unacceptable to Israel—and the Likud Party platform which called for the West Bank and Gaza to become part and parcel of Israel.
9. Weizman noted that everyone was talking about what can be done for the security of Israel. But, more than anything else, on top of such military measures, a correct political solution is important. Israel can have excellent military measures, but the question is what will be the interrelationship between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. On March 30, Sadat had said very positive things about a joint police force, joint control of security and a veto on political decisions taken by an administrative council. But, Sadat changed his mind overnight and [Page 1291] placed limits on what he had suggested.4 Weizman was concerned that these discussions had taken place months ago and he did not know if Sadat was still in the mood to talk about these things today. Weizman emphasized, “If we talk about going back to the 1967 boundaries, then peace moves are in trouble.” Unless Sadat has completely changed his mind, which he did not rule out, Weizman believed that with a little discussion and understanding, the parties could achieve common ground. When they were in Salzburg, Weizman noted that he and Sadat had discussed the month of October. Weizman said, “Sadat is in a shock treatment mood.” If nothing happens between now and then, “something will happen.” Weizman said he would recommend that if anything happens, Israel take precautionary measures. “But, this is how brawls begin.” This is what happened in 1967. Weizman asked that I pay serious attention to this problem.
10. Yadin stated that he considered the immediate weeks ahead in August and September to be crucial. The maximum must be done to get the peace process resumed. Yadin said that Sadat’s current position simply made no sense to him. How could Sadat say that Israel would have to commit itself to withdraw to the 1967 boundaries or there would be no negotiations? Yadin said this was a non-starter. The three main points made by Dayan at Leeds and before the Knesset were serious and should be sufficient to advance the negotiations.5 However, Sadat and the U.S. should realize that no solution requiring a prior commitment to go back to the 1967 borders was acceptable. Alluding to the point made by Dayan, Yadin stated that if the other party makes a proposal on territorial compromise, Israel would negotiate over such a proposal. In addition, Yadin noted that the Foreign Minister had said that if another party wants to discuss sovereignty in five years, Israel would be prepared to do so. “We agree that in five years sovereignty will be resolved.”
11. The Secretary then tried to clarify the statements the Israelis had been making. He noted that they had said that the 1967 boundaries were not a basis for negotiation. They had also stated that if a proposal for territorial compromise were put on the table, this would be a subject for negotiation and considered by Israel. If this were not done, a modified self-rule plan would be put into effect. The Secretary then asked if the GOI would be prepared to discuss and “come to a decision” on sovereignty after five years. Begin immediately said yes. Regarding the phrase “territorial compromise,” Dayan referred to his Knesset formulation and stressed that he was being very careful in making this point. If a “concrete” suggestion of territorial compromise is put forward, Is [Page 1292] rael would not hesitate to discuss it. If someone had ideas, let them show on the map what they have in mind.
12. Reintroducing the third point made by Dayan in the Knesset, Begin noted that after five years “Israel would be prepared to discuss sovereignty” and that “a solution is possible.” (Begin had been passed a note by Legal Adviser Rosenne after his earlier response to my question and was clearly backtracking.) The Secretary said he was still uncertain and asked whether “it is possible” to find a solution for “sovereignty will be decided,” in response, Begin then had Rosenne read verbatim the statement Dayan had made at Leeds and before the Knesset. When the Secretary said he was still confused, Begin replied that the formulation meant what it said.
13. Begin then stated that he had closely scrutinized all the documents dealing with this coming October. He stressed that there was no basis for Sadat’s assumption that after October the Sinai Agreement could be terminated. As the U.S. knew, the Sinai Agreement would continue until superseded by another agreement. Sadat cannot claim the contrary. “This would be a breach of the agreement.”
14. Comment: Begin was in vital and confident form. He was obviously in upbeat mood because Sadat’s obdurateness has, at least for time being, ended extended period of Israel being on the spot. In this discussion, the Prime Minister was the paragon of reasonableness and flexibility, and only stumbled on discussion of sovereignty issue. His discomfiture was caused by presence in the room of right-wing Cabinet colleagues who were listening as carefully as our side for any sign of change on Begin’s part. His final answer in this meeting on this issue was aimed as much at them as at us.
15. Detailed memcon of this meeting is being returned to Department with Secretary’s party.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 45, 8/1–9/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent immediate for information to Cairo and Tel Aviv.↩
- No memorandum of conversation has been found.↩
- A reference to Sadat’s request that Israel offer a unilateral gesture by withdrawing from Al Arish and Mount Sinai. Begin rejected the request in a letter to Sadat, see footnote 2, Document 276 and footnote 5, Document 277.↩
- Presumably during Weizman’s visit to Cairo March 30–31.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 277.↩