Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the Embassy in Israel¹

Cairo, July 15, 1978, 2043Z

17127. Subject: Sadat on His Meeting With Weizman.²

1. Summary: Sadat says Kreisky and Kahan instrumental in persuading him to receive Weizman. (Frankly, he did not need much persuading, since he wants to boost Weizman.) Describes his talks with Weizman as “important” and frank. He again rejected Weizman’s suggestion of a separate Egyptian/Israeli agreement since it would not create peace in Middle East. Assured Weizman that earlier points agreed upon, even though not in Egyptian West Bank/Gaza counter-proposal³ remain valid. Reiterated his belief that Israeli declaration to evacuate West Bank and Gaza on understanding parties sit down with Israel to discuss security arrangements is still needed and outlined scenario which would follow such declaration. Told Weizman that if Hussein does not join negotiations, he, Sadat, ready to proceed to work out arrangements, including sending Egyptian forces to work with Israelis in West Bank. Informed Weizman of his refusal to meet with Dayan on grounds latter is a “maneuverer and showy politician”. He wished discuss all serious peace matters with Weizman, not Dayan. Begin should be told this. Told Weizman that if nothing has happened by October he cannot renew UNEF, but will not decide until September. Suggested Israelis consider evacuating area between Al-Arish and Ras Mohamed between now and then, but without expecting reciprocal concessions since he has given enough for now. Said he intends to pray next Bairam prayer⁴ on Mount Sinai. In response Weizman welcomed him come to Mount Sinai, but commented time too short between now and October to consider such an evacuation. Sadat suggested perhaps Al-Arish and Mount Sinai could be made Egyptian “enclave” until withdrawal from Sinai is completed. Sadat emphasized importance he attaches to American role, noting that had it not been for Carter’s initiative he would not have agreed to meet with Weizman. Objected to Weizman’s suggestion that UN involvement be dropped, but agreed UNEF could be dispensed with after last phase of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Expressed willingness give Israel two years for both settlements and airbases in Sinai, but agreed give Israel civil aircraft privileges at Naqb or plow up latter if Israelis prefer. Said London meeting not likely to succeed because of Dayan and reiterated his desire work only through Weizman. Insisted GOE will not be dragged into years of negotiations as Dayan wants. Sadat is thinking of Weizman coming to Alexandria immediately after London talks. Says Weizman was “relaxed” after their talk and that Weizman told him majority of Israelis are for “Peace Now” movement.⁵ Sadat is considerably elated about his talks with Weizman, Peres, and Jewish leaders, and reaffirmed his optimism. End summary.

2. During two hour talk today with Sadat in Alexandria (Mubarak and Kamel also present), he provided a long account of his recent meeting with Weizman in Salzburg. I have tried to put together his sometimes rambling comments as best as I can:

3. When Sadat arrived in Vienna, Kreisky told him that Weizman, following the announcement of an intended meeting with Peres, had asked the Austrian President, through Austrian Jewish financier Kahan, also to arrange a meeting between Sadat and Weizman. Kriesky had refused, saying Begin would react badly. Then, Sadat recounted, had come the latest Weizman message to Gamasy.⁶ When that message was passed to him in Vienna, he had considered the matter. He had recalled that Begin regularly charges Sadat with trying to divide the Jewish community. He had therefore sent Hassan Tuhamy to Kreisky and Kahan to ask for their views. Tuhamy had come back with two alternatives: first, Sadat might agree to receive Weizman in Salzburg; second, if Sadat decided against receiving Weizman at this time, a warm reply should be sent back which would give Weizman support on the Israeli domestic scene. The argument for the first option was that Weizman is a friend and Sadat “should not fail him”. Sadat’s agreement to receive him would boost Weizman’s standing in Israel. He, Sadat, had therefore decided to receive him.

4. Sadat described his long, private meeting with Weizman as “important”. He had asked Weizman the same question that he had put to Peres, namely, “What do you want?” If it is peace, security and good-neighborliness, fine; if it is land and sovereignty, this is unacceptable. He, Sadat, did not see any great differences between Egypt and Israel except that Begin insists upon wanting Arab land. Begin is a bitter man. On his part, Weizman had asked the same two questions that Peres had raised, i.e., Jerusalem and West Bank borders and Sadat had given the same replies. Weizman had then said that the Begin government is in a dilemma. It does not know what Sadat’s second step will be and is therefore unable to decide on how to answer Sadat’s initiative. Sadat replied that Begin has lost the initiative by failing to respond to Sadat’s initiative. Asked how Israel should have responded, Sadat told Weizman that Israel should have on its own evacuated the area from beyond Al-Arish to Ras Mohamed. Had Israel done this the whole world would have been with it and would have demanded that Sadat now do something.

5. Weizman had again asked about a separate Egyptian/Israeli agreement. Sadat had recalled this subject had come up before. He had reiterated his view that a separate agreement will not create peace. Weizman had then noted that in the last Egyptian West Bank/Gaza counterproposal the reference to normalization had been dropped. That counterproposal had even asked for complete Israeli withdrawal in the West Bank and Gaza without the proviso that the parties sit down to discuss security arrangements. Weizman had asked whether he and Sadat had not agreed earlier that during the interim period, both sides should sit down and work out security arrangements. Sadat said this was so and remained his view. The two sides should sit down during the interim period and work out security arrangements—Egypt for Gaza and Hussein for the West Bank. Weizman had noted that Israel needs military positions in the West Bank and perhaps 50 to 100 tanks stationed there. Sadat said he told Weizman he agrees with this, but it is something that President Carter “should force on us”. Sadat said he had assured Weizman that Egypt is ready to discuss all security issues.

6. Weizman had then asked Sadat for latter’s scenario. Sadat had replied that an Israeli declaration is needed to evacuate the West Bank and Gaza, provided the parties sit down with Israel to discuss security arrangements. Whenever such a declaration is made, the parties can sit down to discuss details of the Israeli withdrawal and security. Once Israel is willing to make such a declaration, this would help Sadat in the Arab world. The concessions that Sadat would be making to the Israelis would be more acceptable in such a context. Weizman had also asked about police forces. Sadat said he had no objection, but something must also be given to the Arab world. There should be no more than one month between the time the Israeli military government ceases and an agreement is reached on the main issues. (Here Sadat recalled the withdrawal schedule set forth in Sinai I.) He had told Weizman that Egypt does not want Israel to drag it into a long discussion as Dayan would like to do. Immediately after signature of a West Bank/Gaza agreement, he would be ready to sign a Sinai agreement. Al-Arish should be the headquarters of an Egyptian/Israeli joint committee to supervise the implementation of any West Bank/Gaza agreement. He had reminded Weizman that it is not the signature of an agreement, but what comes after in terms of normalization that is important. There are PLO elements that are moderate, Sadat had noted, who could come to Al-Arish along with indigenous West Bank/Gaza Palestinians.

7. Weizman had asked what if Hussein does not join the negotiations. Sadat had told Weizman that in that case he would be prepared to proceed to work out a West Bank/Gaza arrangement with Israel, including sending Egyptian forces to work with Israeli forces in the West Bank. It might mean that some of his forces would be assassinated by the PLO, but he was not ready to put the destiny of Egypt in the hands of Syria, which had betrayed him, or the Palestinians, who are irresponsible.

8. He had reminded Weizman that “your man” (Begin) had “insulted” him by insistence on retaining the Israeli settlements in Sinai under IDF protection. Had it not been for President Carter, he, Sadat, would have broken off talks a long time ago. He had also told Weizman of his refusal to meet with Dayan. He did not want to deal with “maneuverers or showy politicians” such as Dayan. He wanted to discuss peace matters with Weizman, not Dayan. He had asked Weizman to tell Begin that these were his ideas. Whenever Begin is ready to do “big business”, he should let Sadat know. Begin should know that Sadat will never “cooperate” except through Weizman. Once agreement is reached, everything is possible, including petroleum sales, water deliveries, etc. Meetings could then take place at Al-Arish with Begin and with others.

9. Weizman had then asked about this coming October. What did Sadat intend to do? This was a subject which deeply concerned the Israeli Government. Sadat said he told Weizman that if nothing has happened by October, he cannot renew UNEF. He will not decide, however, until September. He had suggested to Weizman that Israel should consider evacuating the area between Al-Arish and Ras Mohamed between now and then. This should be “a silent withdrawal”. He, Sadat, will not give any concession for this. He had already given all the concessions. Recalling that during the last Bairam he had prayed at Jerusalem, Sadat had then told Weizman that he intends to pray next Bairam on Mount Sinai, where God spoke to Moses. If the Israelis try to shoot him, this was up to them. Weizman had assured him he will be welcome, but had argued that time is very short to consider such an evacuation. Sadat had thereupon told Weizman that if more time is needed, perhaps Al-Arish and Mount Sinai could be made an “enclave” (Egyptian) until the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai is completed. He had also noted that Yamit, the area which Israel is trying to “grab”, is beyond Al-Arish.

10. Weizman had then asked about the Melize airbase.⁷ Sadat had said this should be plowed up. Weizman had responded that this should not be done since the airbase might be important to Gamasy. Sadat said if this is the case, it did not matter to him. He repeated that he had told Weizman to go to Begin and tell the latter all that Sadat had said. He should emphasize to Begin that the latter’s hard line will bring nothing from Sadat. He had learned from Weizman’s messages and from comments made by General Tamir that the Israelis keep urging that the American involvement be dropped and that direct talks take place. He had emphasized to Weizman that the American role is very important. Had it not been for President Carter’s initiative, he would not have agreed to meet with Weizman. He knew that Begin is bitter about the United States, but even Israeli public opinion, which would resist U.S. pressure, still wants an American role. President Carter, Sadat had emphasized, is a friend and should be given full credit for any success. Weizman had finally agreed that the United States should remain actively involved. Sadat had also made clear to Weizman that he intended to tell us everything about the talks.

11. Weizman had then asked about the UN involvement. Why should this not be dropped? Sadat had replied that when the Israeli withdrawal reaches the international border in Sinai the possibility of dispensing with UNEF could be considered. In the meantime, UNEF is necessary. Weizman had then suggested dispensing with UNEF in the first phase of withdrawal from Sinai. Sadat had again insisted UNEF could only be dispensed with in the last phase, i.e. after combined Egyptian/Israeli supervisory committee is formed.

12. Weizman had asked about the settlements and the two remaining airbases in Sinai. Sadat said he was willing to give Israel two years for both the settlements and the airbases. This should be enough time to build new airbases in the Negev, but he would not cede one inch of Egyptian territory. He could give civil aircraft privileges for Israeli aircraft at Naqb or, if the Israelis prefer, Naqb could be plowed up. Sadat indicated full understanding of Israeli concern about Naqb and its relationship to Eilat.

13. Weizman had asked about the London meeting. Sadat says he told Weizman it will not succeed because Dayan will be going there to “maneuver”. Dayan will simply use it for “showmanship” and to try to improve his image. Asked what his attitude will be toward the London meeting, Sadat told Weizman to make it clear to Begin that he will not deal with anyone except Weizman. He did not want to deal with a “maneuverer” like Dayan. He, Sadat, was not a “traditional politician”. Dayan distorts everything and has no scruples. He would instruct Kamel to make the Egyptian position clear, but GOE will not be dragged into years of negotiations as Dayan wants. Kamel will not continue talks after London if Israelis do not introduce some new element. He had refused to give Weizman anything for Begin in the form of “further movement” (by that he meant new Egyptian concessions) as long as Begin continues to adopt his hard line attitude.

14. Weizman had urged that Sadat not break contacts with Israel. He had told Weizman that when he decided to receive the latter, it was to strengthen President Carter’s hand. The possibility of future meetings can be considered and GOE will be in constant contact with President Carter. Weizman had asked what should come next. Sadat had told him that if there are satisfactory answers to the points he had made to Weizman, Weizman should return with a combined team in order to work out arrangements. After the West Bank/Gaza settlement, he would sign a Sinai agreement. Weizman had assured him he would speak to Begin privately and it was Sadat’s understanding that Weizman did so yesterday. Sadat spoke of Weizman coming to Alexandria immediately after the London talks. Weizman had been “relaxed” after their talk. Weizman had also told him that the majority of Israelis are “for the Peace Now” movement.

15. Comment: Sadat, although tired, was clearly elated about his talks with Weizman, Peres, Goldman and Kahan. His distrust of Dayan (and Begin) is as deep as ever. He wants to work through Weizman, not Dayan, and believes this avenue is promising. He is talking about possibility of a Weizman-Peres-Ehrlich-Yadin alignment to replace Begin. Peres allegedly told him he would be willing serve under Weizman. He continues attach great importance to active USG role and still wants USG proposal as a means of pressing Begin. Despite what he told Weizman about not renewing UNEF in October if nothing has happened by then, I believe this is still an open question for him. Much will depend upon what we are willing to do. He says that, admitting all of the difficulties (including Begin), he is convinced that something positive will come out of his initiative and remains an optimist. He will continue his contacts with Weizman, Peres, Goldmann and Jewish leaders abroad. He says Kahan told him in confidence that latter and Edmond Rothschild had recently told Begin that they refuse hypothecate a $1 billion loan unless Begin shows more flexibility. I have not for some time seen Sadat as upbeat as he was today.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1905. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.
2. Weizman and Sadat met on July 13 in Salzburg.
3. See footnote 2, Document 259.
4. Bairam refers to two different Muslim festivals. Greater Bairam is held at the end of the Islamic year and Lesser Bairam is held at the end of Ramadan.
5. The Peace Now movement formed in Israel after Israeli army officers published an open letter in March criticizing the Begin government’s conduct of the peace negotiations. By April, thousands of Israeli citizens were participating in rallies and marches.
6. See footnote 2, Document 253.
7. The Melize (or Meliz) airbase is located in the Sinai, about 56 miles east of the Suez Canal.