Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

266. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Kent, England, July 17, 1978, 9:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Talks—Middle East Peace Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
• Secretary of State Vance
• Ambassador Lewis
• Israel
• Foreign Minister Dayan
• Attorney General Barak

The Secretary began his first bilateral meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan by saying that he wishes to do everything possible to bring the parties together, help bridge gaps and so forth—but above all would prefer to be able to get the two parties to deal directly with each other. We hope after these meetings at Leeds to move on to other meetings in the Middle East, and we intend to continue to be active. But one of the problems here is to see how best we can play our role in the next phase. He then asked Dayan how best the time at Leeds Castle could be employed.

Dayan then talked at some length about what he believes can be the solution to the problem, leaving aside for the moment negotiating modalities. He stressed that he had not talked to Begin, and that if the Egyptian Government were not interested in his approach he would make no effort to sell it to his own Prime Minister.

Dayan said he thought a five-year transitional agreement for the West Bank and Gaza can be achieved, but he did not know whether the Egyptians would be ready to sign a formal treaty for these territories if Hussein will not join. “Our two proposals meet at a number of points; for example, the Israeli plan specifies a five-year period during which the Palestinian Arabs take over authority. We propose abolishing the military government. We propose talks among four parties to reach agreement. We propose a full review after five years, while they say that the final stage for the Palestinians to take over the territories occurs after five years and so forth.” Dayan admitted that there were a number of divergencies of a major sort. The most important one is that the Egyptians want a pre-commitment to withdrawal now; Israelis wish to have a permanent right to purchase land and to continue settling in areas of the West Bank, and they wish to leave the sovereignty question open to later review. This he said is the major difference: the concept of total withdrawal on the one hand vs. the concept of “living together” on the other. Dayan then stressed that with the present Israeli government there is no chance of obtaining a pre-commitment to withdrawal or a statement which clearly opens the way to eventual Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank. The most that can be obtained from Begin is what has been achieved: a commitment to leave the sovereignty issue aside for at least the next five years.

Dayan then said he wanted to make one thing very clear so there would be no misunderstanding in the meetings. The Israeli government cannot accept the proposition that agreements on various kinds of security arrangements could make it possible to give the kind of withdrawal commitment the Arabs are asking. Security measures cannot substitute for some form of Israeli presence in the territories, at least for this government, and he believed the same would be true for any other government. If someone proposed a territorial compromise “he would want to see the precise lines they are proposing” but he didn’t think any real territorial compromise is in the minds of the Egyptians, and “minor border modifications” plus security guarantees would not be sufficient to assure that the Israeli security problem had been met.

Dayan said that the Begin Government’s proposal amounted to a five-year transitional period—with sovereignty left open and with agreement about decisions to be taken at the end of five years about a number of the relationships between the people of the territories and their neighbors. If the Egyptian government would agree, he thought the meetings at Leeds Castle should concentrate on discussing the details of the regime during the five years. He said again that there was no way to convince the Begin Government to make a pre-commitment to withdrawal.

The Secretary said he appreciated this run-down on the Israeli position and that he saw the matter from a slightly different approach. He saw a number of common elements between the Egyptian and Is-raeli proposals: the five-year period, the need to establish real self-government, the need for territorial security arrangements, and although not explicitly in the proposal the Egyptian commitment to seeking agreement on a real presence and real relations, and the anticipated large role for Jordan. He said the key difference between the parties is obviously what happens after five years and, for the Egyptians, all the major issues come back to this point.

Dayan inquired whether there was even the slightest chance of leaving the question of what happens after five years to be decided after five years, not now. The Secretary said “I can’t rule it out.” Dayan said he did not think we were too far apart on the five-year period itself; if they would agree to leave the subsequent decisions to that point then there would be a chance for a real breakthrough. On the other hand if they wanted a pre-commitment now to the outcome, and the transition period is just a period of implementation of decisions “then,” he said, “we’re in trouble.” The Secretary said he agreed and he had no adequate answer.

Dayan then restated the question he has stated frequently over the past months to us: whether if agreement could be reached on the West Bank and Gaza Sadat would go ahead and sign it, even if Hussein hangs back. The Secretary said he thought the answer was: that if agreement could be reached they would go ahead to settle without Jordan if necessary, including even the deployment of Egyptian forces to assist in the security role of the West Bank.

Dayan, commenting on a point by Attorney General Barak, said again that the present Israeli Government will never make a pre-commitment to the ultimate status to be decided after five years, but, he said, the Government could agree on the nature of the transitional regime for five years and there was a good chance to agree to the “Aswan Formula”, so long as it is clear that a Palestinian state is excluded.² He again urged upon the Secretary the importance of trying to use the five-year period to “learn to live together” and to see what attitudes would be on both sides at the end of that period before making ultimate decisions. Moreover, if decisions are insisted on now, he saw no way to make such progress.

The Secretary went back to a point Dayan had made earlier to ask whether there was no way in which security arrangements could substitute for an Israeli presence on the West Bank, no matter how satisfactory they might be. Dayan said that was indeed the case. If one thought that a commitment to full withdrawal could be exchanged for a mix of concrete security arrangements, he was mistaken. Some form of Israeli presence as part of the security arrangements would be necessary.

Dayan then stressed the difficult position Begin faced in his own party for having left the sovereignty option open. To go beyond that politically was impossible for him if he wished to do so. Dayan suggested instead trying to leave agreement on the mechanisms for making a decision after five years. He said he honestly believed that the Palestinians would ask at that time for a much wider link with Jordan combined with some form of economic “common market relationship” with Israel. He could not say how Gaza could be split economically from Israel in any rational fashion. He then reviewed at length his concept of reviewing the relationship among the parties and deciding on them after five years, as distinct from deciding on the ultimate sovereignty of the land.

The Secretary asked whether it would make any difference if Israel had a security treaty of a NATO type, with regard to its ability to decide about the ultimate status. Dayan again said that even such a treaty, if coupled with withdrawal and only minor border modifications, would not be satisfactory. He said he would see great value in a security treaty, in particular if it involved physical presence or peace facilities, but it could not be substituted for near total withdrawal.

The Secretary then asked what would be the factors which could make Israel seriously consider withdrawal. Dayan replied that he could see it only happening if there were serious Arab proposals for territorial compromise in which some significant portion of the West Bank became part of Israel and directly defensible borders were established. He gave the example of Gush Etzion³ which could never be abandoned.

The Secretary asked whether the question is one of security or of philosophy and religious conviction. Dayan replied that he, for example, is not particularly religious, but that he cannot see a solution if Israelis are viewed as foreigners in Judea and Samaria. They must have a right to be able to go there and to stay there, so long as they do not infringe on the rights of the Arabs. It was not purely a religious or purely a security question.

The Secretary then asked “but what then is the yardstick for where the border should be?” Dayan replied that in his opinion there is no possible valid border line. “We can’t find it. I’ve tried too long.” What we need instead is a system which permits Jews and Arabs in the West Bank to live together and to move freely back and forth. Both he and former Foreign Minister Allon had tried to negotiate a dividing line without success. If someone wishes to propose one let him do so, but Dayan did not know how division could really be achieved.

There was then some brief discussion of proposals for the meeting the next morning.

At the end of this conversation Dayan said that he would like to review exactly what he believed to be the maximum extent of the Israeli position with regard particularly to the question of what happens after the five-year period. He made a number of statements, then asked Attorney General Barak whether he had exceeded the authority of the Cabinet’s decision. Barak did indeed tell him that he thought he had gone farther than he was authorized to do with regard to what might be decided after five years. He and Dayan recalled to each other some moments of unhappiness on the part of Prime Minister Begin with statements Dayan had made during his last Washington visit. The end result of this discussion was that overnight, Dayan and Barak put on paper a careful statement of Dayan’s position. This “non paper” was handed to Ambassador Lewis on the morning of July 18, strictly as a personal statement of the Foreign Minister. The text of this “non paper” follows:

“1. A proposal for a peace treaty which would be based upon the withdrawal of Israel to the pre-1967 demarcation lines (with minor modifications) and the establishment of Arab sovereignty on the areas will not be acceptable to Israel even if such a proposal is accompanied by a promise for security arrangements. Israel’s opposition to any such arrangement derives from reasons based on security, principle (national) and practical considerations.

“2. Should a proposal for a peace treaty based upon a concrete territorial compromise be submitted, Israel, in accordance with previous statements, would be ready to consider it.

“3. If the Israeli peace proposal (Self Rule) is accepted, Israel will be prepared, as provided in sections 24 and 26 of the proposal, to discuss after five years the question of sovereignty (or permanent status) of the areas. Although these provisions do not call for a decision on the subject, it is the personal view of the Foreign Minister that an agreement on this question is possible.”

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978 Volume II [II]. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis. The meeting took place at Leeds Castle. The talks were originally planned to be held in London, but were moved to Leeds Castle in Kent for security reasons.
2. Carter’s Aswan statement called for Palestinian participation in determining their future. See footnote 5, Document 187.
3. A reference to Jewish settlements south of Jerusalem in the West Bank. Jewish settlers had originally built villages there during the 1920s, but they were destroyed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Jewish settlers returned after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to re-establish the settlements.