264. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
17126. Subject: Sadat’s Account of his Talks in Vienna and Related Matters.
Summary: Sadat related how Kreisky arranged for recent Sadat/Peres meeting.2 Said his talks with Peres dealt with future of Jerusalem and West Bank borders. Claimed Peres proposed acceptable language on borders to satisfy both Palestinian aspirations and Israeli security, but this language not included in final SI document. Language which was included on borders not acceptable to GOE. Added that he also told Peres economic cooperation possible, but not as “condition” of peace. Sadat lauded Peres and claims “100 percent” agreement between them. In meeting with Goldmann, latter said he opposed Begin and Israeli settlement activities. Goldmann insisted Begin in bad health and that some constitutional way should be found to get rid of him. Goldmann quoted Ehrlich saying that if USG put pressure on Begin, anti-Begin forces could work to remove the PriMin. Austrian Jewish financier Kahan had taken generally similar line, claiming that not only Israel, but Jews everywhere are threatened by Begin’s hard line policy. Goldmann and Kahan said Weizman is today most pop-ular man in Israel. Sadat expressed hope that President Carter will soon begin to “pressure” Begin by presenting a U.S. proposal. End summary.
[Page 1182]1. Met with Sadat for two hours today in Alexandria. Vice President Mubarak and FonMin Kamel were also present. Sadat looked tired and acknowledged that his Vienna talks had tired him. He was nevertheless in good form in relating his several meetings there, asking only that President Carter and the Secretary hold this information very closely. He then gave long, sometimes disjointed account of his several meetings. It was clear that Mubarak and Kamel, even though latter had been along, were hearing Sadat’s comments for the first time.
Socialist International meeting with Kreisky, Brandt and Peres:
2. Sadat first recalled that it was Kreisky who had arranged for his contacts with Peres. He called Kreisky a “sincere friend.” Kreisky had defied Begin last February, when Begin ordered European Jewish financiers not to meet with Sadat, by arranging a meeting in Paris with Israel’s principal European Jewish financiers. Kreisky had informed him that Peres would like another meeting and had asked if Sadat would receive Peres in either Cairo or Alexandria. Sadat had welcomed the opportunity for another meeting with Peres and said he preferred to combine it with a brief visit to Tyrol, which is his favorite vacation area. Kreisky had also brought Brandt as the Chairman of the SI (Socialist International).
3. At his first meeting with Kreisky, Sadat noted, it was clear that their views on ME problem were similar. On following day, when quadrilateral meeting took place, they had come to an understanding on the SI paper. Kreisky and Brandt had indicated they would send the paper with Peres during first meeting between Sadat and Peres.
Meeting with Peres:
4. In his first meeting with Peres, Sadat had asked the question, “What do you want?” If it is peace, security and good neighborliness, with everything that the latter entails, Israel could have them. If it is land and sovereignty, this is unacceptable. It was clear from Begin’s attitude that what Israel wants is land.
5. During a later 2-hour meeting with Peres, the latter had asked about two points. First, Sadat’s view on the future of Jerusalem, and second, Sadat’s views on West Bank borders. On Jerusalem, Sadat had told Peres that he believes the city should not again be divided. However, an approximately one square mile area of Old Jerusalem, Sadat had suggested, should be put under an Arab or Islamic flag and have an Arab administration. The Israelis could retain all of the rest of Jerusalem. A combined Arab/Israeli council could be established to assume responsibility for all of the city. The city should be free and have free access to all religions. Peres, according to Sadat, did not oppose this idea and even thought it might be feasible.
[Page 1183]6. On the matter of borders, in response to a question by Sadat, Peres had affirmed that he was asking only about the West Bank. Peres had stated that in the case of Sinai, no one can deny the long-standing international border. Sadat said he reminded Peres that when U.N. Resolution 242 was adopted, all parties (including Arthur Goldberg) agreed to the possibility of minor rectifications on the West Bank. Peres, in discussing SI draft document with Sadat, had included a reference to “changes in the border.” Sadat told Peres that he did not like this language. It would simply give Begin room to maneuver. After further discussion between Peres and Sadat about what might be said, Peres had proposed the following language: “There will be changes on the borders between the West Bank and Israel which satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and satisfy the security of Israel.” Sadat had agreed to this Peres-proposed language, which Peres had indicated would help him in Israel. To Sadat’s surprise, however, when the SI paper was finally written, the border language was different and unacceptable to him. Sadat professed not to know why this change had been made after Peres had himself proposed substitute language, but he assumed that Kreisky and Brandt had agreed to the change for Peres’ sake. Since Peres had already by then departed, he had not been able to discuss the matter with Peres. Nor did he discuss it with Kreisky and Brandt. FonMin Kamel had made a statement, however, objecting to the “border language” in the SI.3
7. In his talk with Peres, Sadat said, he had also alluded to Weizman’s penultimate letter to Gamasy in which future Egyptian/Israeli economic cooperation was raised. He had told Peres that raising this issue now is “lunacy.” The parties have not even agreed on the lines of peace and Israel is already asking for economic cooperation. Such economic cooperation is possible, but must come in due course. He had given Peres the following example: He, Sadat, is prepared to send water from the Nile by pipeline to the Negev. He noted that he will in any case be sending water (through the Suez tunnels) to Sinai and that additional supplies could be sent to the Negev. This, Sadat envisaged as an alternative to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. He would be ready to provide water to the Negev if the Israelis would get out of the West Bank settlements. Weizman had told him that Sharon has already begun to plan new settlements in the Negev. Sadat had cautioned Peres, however, that he was not prepared to do this kind of a thing as a “condition.” If such a thing were put in an agreement, the Egyptian people would refuse. But if, after peace, Israel asks and Al [Page 1184] Arish is the site of a joint Egyptian/Israeli commission, he could then say that since water is being piped to the Sinai, Egypt will also provide it to Negev in return for a charge.
8. According to Sadat, when Peres left there was “100 percent” agreement between them. Peres, Sadat noted with admiration, had spoken against the hard line of Begin, but had never betrayed Begin. Peres, like Weizman, is discreet and understanding. Begin and Dayan, regrettably, know nothing about discretion.
Meeting with Dr. Nahum Goldmann:
9. Sadat then turned to his meeting with Nahum Goldmann. Goldmann, he claimed, is also “100 percent” of his view. He is against Begin and against Israeli settlement activities. He had also told Sadat that Begin is indeed in bad health (Weizman had told Sadat the same thing). Goldman had said some way must be found to get rid of Begin, but in a constitutional manner. Goldmann had met with Ehrlich and had asked why Ehrlich had not begun steps to get rid of Begin. Ehrlich had reportedly said that the USG has not begun pressure for this purpose. If the USG did so, then all of the elements inside and outside the government who are concerned about Begin’s hard line attitude could work to get rid of him. Goldmann, according to Sadat, had praised President Carter and his reliability, but he had also expressed the hope that President Carter will before long begin to put pressure on Begin, especially since most prominent Israelis are waiting for this. Here Sadat interjected that Peres would also welcome pressure on Begin. Goldmann had made it clear that much of the Jewish community in Europe and the U.S. would also welcome such pressure on Begin.
Meeting with Austrian Jewish financier Kahan (FNU):
10. Sadat then recounted a meeting he had had with Austrian Jewish financier Kahan, who was among the Jewish financiers whom he had met last February in Paris. Kahan, according to Sadat, is a close friend of Weizman’s and in constant touch with the latter. According Sadat, Kahan had called Begin a “lunatic who should be removed.” Kahan had emphasized his belief that the present opportunity for Middle East peace should not be lost. He had said that not only Israel, but Jews everywhere, are threatened by Begin’s hard line policy. Kahan had assured Sadat of his willingness to cooperate with the President. Both Kahan and Goldmann, Sadat noted, told him that Weizman is today the most popular man in Israel.
11. Comment: Sadat was pleased with his talks with Peres, Goldmann and Kahan. Their comments have strengthened his view that Begin is unpopular, even among many of the PriMin’s colleagues, and that his recently begun policy of trying to contribute to the internal ferment in Israel by criticizing Begin and working with anti-Begin ele[Page 1185]ments is correct. Sadat expressed the hope that President Carter will soon begin to “pressure” Begin by presenting a U.S. proposal. Peres, Goldmann and Kahan, he claimed, had indicated they would welcome a more active USG role.
12. Account of Sadat’s meeting with Weizman being sent by septel.
13. In view of sensitivity of some of above comments and Sadat’s express request that this information be restricted to President Carter and the Secretary, I leave it to Department to decide whether this message should be repeated to Tel Aviv.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–2157. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.↩
- Sadat and Peres met on July 9 in Vienna.↩
- Kreisky and Brandt released the plan on the Middle East on July 10 in Vienna. (“Sadat Disappointed at Israel’s Rejection of Peace Plan,” New York Times, July 11, 1978, p. A3)↩