248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

127246. For Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Further Instructions For Your Meeting With Dayan May 19.

1. We would agree with reftel that what we know of Begin’s policy cannot make us optimistic about the prospect of receiving positive responses to the questions we posed to Dayan. There are nevertheless cogent reasons for proceeding as outlined in State 1177952 (supplemented by additional comments authorized in this message) and it may perhaps be helpful if we go through our thinking about this at some length.

2. As you will recall when we originally put our two questions to Dayan3 he undertook to get us answers, and subsequently Begin confirmed that the GOI would do this. Neither Dayan nor Begin attached any conditions to this undertaking at the time. Subsequently Dayan asked us to try to get some assurances from Sadat to strengthen his hand in attempting to persuade the Cabinet to respond positively to our questions.4

3. We have no reason to doubt Dayan’s personal sincerity when he says he wants to work for positive responses and that these prior assurances from Sadat would strengthen his hand. From Sadat’s perspective, however, this looks like merely another effort by the Israelis to evade decisions and put the ball back in Egypt’s court. This is a tactic that both sides resort to all the time and it is obviously part of the negotiating process. But it is also incumbent upon the U.S., to the extent we have a stake in moving matters forward, to see that the negotiating process involves something more as well.

4. In this respect the U.S. role is not limited to being a message-carrier but inevitably involves being something of an umpire as well. We asked the Egyptians to produce a counter-proposal to the Begin plan and when they did we in effect said, “It’s not good enough, please [Page 1142] go back to the drawing board.” We must now do the same kind of thing with Dayan’s proposal. We are saying your questions are perfectly legitimate ones but for Sadat to give explicit commitments on them would constitute far-reaching concessions for him and it is just not reasonable to expect Sadat to give them without a firm indication of willingness by Israel to reach decisions of equal import. We are in any case giving Dayan a good reading on Sadat’s thinking on the points Dayan raises which, short of firm commitments, provides the Israelis with clear indication of the extent of his flexibility and willingness to negotiate.

5. With approach you are instructed to make we are thus trying to meet Dayan’s request part-way, and if there is any serious prospect of the Cabinet’s willingness to face up to the decisions we want, they should find it reasonable enough. If they really want negotiations to progress the Israelis cannot indefinitely put off decisions on their side on grounds they have not yet had all the answers from the other side. We would understand, however, if Dayan felt that the immediate aftermath of the Senate’s vote on the aircraft sales5 did not provide the best atmosphere for Cabinet discussion of our questions, and if he therefore wished to postpone consideration of them for a short time. FYI. Our own judgment is that it would be preferable if this subject was not discussed at May 21 Cabinet meeting. End FYI.

6. In conveying the message authorized State 117795 we would also like you to make clear to Dayan that our discussions with Sadat indicate that while he wants to make his replies conditional on an indication of Israel’s willingness to respond positively to our questions, he has given every indication that he understands the importance Dayan attaches to each of his questions and he is willing to address them seriously and constructively. He has also told us that he would be prepared to meet with Dayan, either in Egypt or a third country, but stresses that such a meeting must be well prepared. Our impression is that he is receptive to Dayan’s concept of moving from the specific to the general, but still feels some framework of basic principles is needed. He sees no point in a Dayan meeting unless adequate preliminary understandings can be reached that would hold promise that such a meeting could be productive. We have the strong impression that positive Israeli responses to the questions we have posed, together with Sadat’s answers to Dayan’s questions, would constitute the basis Sadat is looking for to enable him to meet with Dayan.

7. Please also use the occasion of your meeting with Dayan to say that Egyptians have apparently decided to give some further thought [Page 1143] to counter-proposal on West Bank/Gaza, but we have impression they are definitely intending to have a proposal for us in due course.

8. We are repeating to you reports from Cairo on Eilts’ meeting with Sadat May 17 and some new documents Egyptians have submitted to us.6 We will obviously have to do a good deal of thinking about Sadat’s new ideas before deciding how to proceed. Accordingly we will wish to hold contents of these messages closely to ourselves for time being.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–2291. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Quandt, and Stanislaus Valerga (S/S–O); and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Cairo.
  2. See Document 245.
  3. The questions related to how the West Bank and Gaza sovereignty issue would be handled after the 5-year interim period and the role Palestinians would play in their own future. These questions were put to Dayan in the meeting with Vance on April 27 in Washington. See Document 241.
  4. See footnote 2, Document 245.
  5. See footnote 2, Document 247.
  6. A report of Eilts’s meeting with Sadat is in telegram 13091 from Cairo, May 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2294) The documents are not further identified.