245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1
117795. For the Amb fm the Secretary. Subject: Approach to Dayan on Middle East Negotiations.
1. When Dayan gets back you should see him immediately and convey following to him as a message from me.
—Sam Lewis has informed me of his conversation with you2 before your departure abroad. With respect to the questions on which you would like commitments from Sadat, let me first say that I believe we can provide answers to some of them on the basis of the conversations we have had with Sadat. Sadat has in all cases given us these indications of flexibility in terms of their conditionality on a “strong” declaration of principles, by which he means one that contains more explicit language on withdrawal than is contained in Resolution 242.
—Sadat has made it clear to us privately (he has now said the same thing publicly) that the Aswan formula would be acceptable to him.
—Sadat has told us privately that he can accept border modifications in the final settlement for the West Bank (always using the adjective “minor” to qualify these).
He has also now made a public statement along similar lines (October interview of April 2).3
—With respect to his assumption of responsibility for negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza, Sadat has told us that if he can get a “strong” declaration of principles, and if King Hussein refuses to join the negotiations on this basis, he would be prepared to assume responsibility with Israel to negotiate a West Bank/Gaza agreement.
[Page 1137]—On Israeli troop presence in West Bank, Sadat has indicated he could accept this during an interim period but has not said anything concrete to us about the period beyond.
—These are quite legitimate questions and I fully understand the importance you attach to getting firm answers from Sadat on them. At the same time I must tell you frankly that Sadat feels he has gone quite far in giving us important indications of flexibility on West Bank/Gaza issues and I believe the chances are exceedingly slim that he would go further along the lines you seek in the absence of more specific indication of what he would get in return.
—I believe, however, there is a chance that Sadat would be willing to give firm commitments on these points if we could inform him of Israel’s intention to give positive responses to the questions we have put to you. In other words, I think Sadat would consider seriously an arrangement that involved a firm quid pro quo, but he will not be prepared to make further concessions on the basis of Dayan’s “best effort” reassurances alone.
—We would be willing to seek these answers from Sadat, and in addition an assurance from him that he would meet with Dayan, if Dayan could tell him that if Sadat came forward Israel would be prepared to respond to our questions along the following lines:
(1) Israel undertakes to resolve definitively the question of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza at the end of a five-year transitional period.
(2) The mechanism by which this would be accomplished will be through (A) negotiations among the parties during the five-year transitional period leading to a final agreement based on all the principles of UN Resolution 242, with representatives of the Palestinians living in the territories participating in those negotiations; and (B) an appropriate expression of approval of the outcome of these negotiations by the people living in the territories.
—The understanding on each side would be that its commitment would be conditional on the other side coming forward in parallel and simultaneous fashion. It would also have to be understood that the exploration of this exchange would be kept secret until it is concluded and that if either side sought to portray publicly the other as having made unilateral commitments it would be denied by the other side.
—I would like to make one final comment. Although we have received indications of Sadat’s flexibility on these various points as indicated above, most have been given to us in the context of Sadat’s assumption that Israel will be able to make the necessary fundamental decisions to make a peace settlement possible. He will see it as a more far-reaching step for him to commit himself to these positions at this initial stage, and in taking them he will be concerned that he is placing [Page 1138] himself in an even more vulnerable position vis-a-vis the other Arabs. He will undoubtedly see himself as justified seeking, in return, a significant step from Israel to make these concessions plausible in the eyes of Egyptian and Arab public opinion.
2. On explaining to Begin why we are not delivering the Egyptian counterproposals on the West Bank and Gaza, you should say (but not go beyond this) that the Egyptians have decided to reflect further on their draft before giving it to us.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004–1547. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Quandt, and Frank Wisner (S/S); and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Cairo.↩
- In telegram 5951 from Tel Aviv, May 6, Lewis reported on his May 5 meeting with Dayan in which Dayan informed Lewis that he needed answers from Sadat on four questions. First, would Sadat be prepared to “act as surrogate for the Arab parties in West Bank/Gaza negotiations if the Jordanians refuse to come in, and to conclude peace agreement covering the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai if negotiations are successful.” Second, would Sadat “drop insistence on total withdrawal from West Bank/Gaza and accept ‘minor modifications’ language.” Third, would Sadat “accept defense arrangements for West Bank/Gaza which include continuing presence of IDF forces in limited areas at strategic points.” Fourth, would Sadat “accept the Aswan formula in lieu of ‘self-determination’ or insistence on an independent Palestinian state.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2255)↩
- Sadat was interviewed in the Egyptian magazine October.↩