Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

226. Telegram From the Consulate in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, March 8, 1978, 0902Z

692. From Atherton. U.S. Del No. 76. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister Begin March 7.

1. Summary: My last meeting with the Prime Minister before heading home featured another long discussion of the applicability of the principles of withdrawal to the West Bank and Gaza. I had the feeling we were going through a dress rehearsal for Begin’s visit to Washington. Begin, supported by his advisors, were at their legalistic best. They advanced a number of ingenious—if not particularly convincing—arguments in support of their thesis that Israel could both accept Resolution 242 and at the same time maintain that it did not require application of withdrawal to the West Bank/Gaza. The main argument put forward was that each side is entitled to its own interpretations of 242: the Arabs claim it requires total withdrawal; the Israelis claim it doesn’t have to apply to all fronts. The U.S. might have its own interpretation too, but it was unfair, added Yadin, for the U.S. to admonish only Israel when it equally disagreed with the Arab interpretation. Dayan supplemented this with another thesis: it really wasn’t a legal question at all and never has been. Under the former Israeli Government, there was the Allon Plan and now we had the Begin Plan.² They were quite different but either was consistent with 242 if the Arabs were to accept it.

2. This was a well-orchestrated performance with no discordant themes voiced by any of Begin’s entourage. There was no visible sign of give in Begin’s fundamental position on this issue. He said bluntly at one point in the conversation that Israel would not agree to a demand that it accept the applicability of withdrawal to all fronts. He said he sees his Washington visit as the opportunity to recapture the support from the U.S. for Israel’s peace proposals he believes he had in December but lost as a result of Sadat’s visit. He is coming armed to the teeth with legal and historical justifications. We can best meet him by coming back repeatedly to the simple theme that if Begin persists in his position on this issue it will bring the peace process to a halt, and since the U.S. cannot support Israel in such a course, it would pose a most serious issue in U.S.–Israeli relations. End summary.

3. I met with Prime Minister Begin for an hour and a half in his Knesset offices evening of March 7. Present on the Israeli side were Yadin, Dayan, Barak, Avner, and Rosenne. Accompanying me were Ambassador Lewis, Sterner, Korn, and Sherman.

4. I told the Prime Minister I did not have much to report on this occasion as nothing of great consequence had happened of a concrete nature on my recent stops in Amman and Cairo. I then proceeded to give him a somewhat abbreviated version of the briefing of my talks in Amman and Cairo that I had given the Foreign Minister in the morning (septel).³ Begin intervened only once during my presentation—to ask whether, when King Hussein specified total withdrawal, he was including Jerusalem. I said that although he had not specified this explicitly on this occasion, it was my impression that he would include East Jerusalem within the purview of his definition of total withdrawal. Begin also asked at the end of my presentation whether in my judgment there was still the possibility that after his visit to Washington the Egyptians would produce a counterproposal on the declaration of principles. I said it was my definite impression that they would, but possibly only after I returned to the area.

5. Begin said that he thought my mission had achieved definite results. Egypt and Israel were back in communication again. He, in fact, hoped that this renewed communication would lead to a personal meeting between himself and Sadat. There was much that a heart-to-heart personal talk could accomplish. He and Sadat needed to talk things over. Begin said that if letters were to remain the only form of communication between them, Sadat would continue to term all his explanations “the same old argument.” (I had described to the Prime Minister in my briefing that this was Sadat’s only comment after reading his letter.) Sometimes, said the Prime Minister, old arguments are more valid than new ones. Perhaps after his visit to Washington, there would be an opening for a personal meeting between him and Sadat.

6. Begin said that he was giving thought to conveying a message to Sadat after his Washington visit to let the two committees resume their work. The Prime Minister said it was possible for negotiations to be conducted in other forms, but it was much better to sit around the table and have direct communication.

7. Begin said that in summation, the results of the Atherton mission were not sensational but nevertheless important. A link had been restored which gave hope for the future. “We are grateful to you.” Begin said he was looking forward to his Washington visit. Maybe there would be sensational results in this case. Anyway, the meeting would be between friends.

8. I told the Prime Minister I appreciated his comment, especially since the press seemed currently to be putting the interpretation on my mission that it had reached an impasse. I thought the mission had been useful in establishing the pattern of continuing negotiations even in circumstances when it was not possible to make significant progress.

9. Dayan said he wanted to make two points, both of them rather theoretical at this stage. Suppose the link that Israel had been asking for between the Political and Military Committees were dropped and Israel were to agree simply to continue the Military Committee meetings on the clear understanding that it was to get down to business? Was there any chance that Sadat could agree to this? The second point he wanted to raise was the question whether there was any chance of Israel concluding a separate peace agreement with Egypt, assuming all the bilateral issues were resolved. If Sadat says no to this proposition, then everyone knows where he stands. On the other hand, if it were possible for Sadat to proceed in this manner, then he was sure Israel and Egypt could find a way to solve all the intervening problems.

10. Without giving me a chance to respond to these remarks which had been framed in terms of questions, Begin said he had two remarks to make. Because of the impact of nomenclature, he would like to get away from the phrase “separate peace.” If he recalled correctly, in 1949, when the general armistice agreements were being negotiated, the Arab parties signed sequentially and with quite a bit of time separating these agreements. Yadin confirmed this from personal experience, saying that Egypt had been the first to sign, then Jordan and Lebanon, and finally Syria eight months after the first agreement had been signed. Begin said that he thought this was an important and relevant precedent. These were serious agreements, with much of the undertakings in them that would eventually be in peace treaties. Syria, he recalled, had been very angry at Egypt for proceeding on its own. But ultimately Syria also signed the same agreement. Begin said he thought this precedent should be kept in mind in relation to present proceedings. Let’s talk about a “first peace treaty” instead of “separate peace.”

12. The second remark the Prime Minister wanted to make was that perhaps the two committees could be merged into one. Perhaps, using American parlance, we could call it a Political-Military Committee. Then it could hold alternate sessions in Cairo and Jerusalem. When it was judged that the subject to be taken up was primarily military, the Defense Ministers could preside. When the subject was political, the Foreign Ministers would take over.

13. With respect to the latter point, I commented that if and when the Prime Minister decided he wished to put this forward as a formal proposal, I would be happy to convey it. But I thought the present circumstances would make such a proposal premature.

14. Yadin said he wanted to talk about the argument that had opened up about the principle of withdrawal in Resolution 242. He wondered where this all really came from. It seemed to him to be a diverstion from the real issues. Wasn’t it getting into an argument about theoretical matters? Israel endorsed 242 as a basis for negotiations, but like the Arabs, it had its own interpretation of the provisions in that resolution. Begin said he fully agreed with these remarks.

15. I said I would try to recollect as well as I could how this matter had become an issue. Begin and Yadin would recall that when Secretary Vance was here in August he presented his proposal of five principles.⁴ One of those paragraphs included the phrase “withdrawal on all fronts,” and the Prime Minister himself had indicated this paragraph could only be acceptable to Israel with the deletion of that phrase. This position, of course, had made the Arabs all the more determined to keep it in. At the time we felt inclusion of that phrase was entirely consistent not only with the position that we had held over the years, but also with our understanding of what Israel’s interpretation had been during the same period. This was putting a different interpretation on this provision of the resolution. The problem faded away because the “five principles” didn’t go anywhere and everybody turned to try to reach agreement on the Geneva working paper.

16. The next concern when this issue arose, as far as I could recollect, was when Sadat came to Washington and discussions took place about Israel’s self-rule plan with its provision that Israel would put aside, but not relinquish, its claim to sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. This raised a question mark in Sadat’s mind about a solution of the West Bank/Gaza problem on the basis of 242, and we included the phrase “withdrawal on all fronts” in the United States statement on Sadat’s departure to make our position clear.⁵ The Prime Minister had subsequently taken issue with this formulation. Looking back on it, one could say that the issue had remained latent for many months but had now been brought to the surface because of its fundamental import in the background of negotiations on the declaration of principles and to the beginning of discussions on West Bank and Gaza arrangements.

17. Begin said he had only one correction to make. This question had its origin as early as July of last year when he had visited Washington and had conversations with both the President and Secretary. At that time, the Secretary outlined for him the five points and when the Secretary came to the phrase “withdrawal on all fronts,” Begin had said he would have to talk to the President about this. He in fact had that talk that evening, at which he outlined the Israeli position, as approved by the Cabinet, that Israel would not repeat not be willing to place these territories under foreign sovereignty.⁶ At this point, Begin read from his record of conversation of that meeting. Begin said the President neither accepted nor rejected this position but I (he Begin) told him that this was the position Israel had decided to take. Later in August, when Secretary Vance had come to Israel, he had told the Secretary that the U.S. could take the position that SC 242 withdrawal applied to all fronts but that this was not Israel’s position.

18. Begin said that Secretary Vance had acknowledged that it is not clear who has sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. If it is not clear, said Begin, anybody could make his claim. Begin said that during his forthcoming visit to Washington, he was going to try to renew the support for Israel’s position, which Israel once had, but which now seemed to have gone into abeyance ever since Sadat’s visit. Back in December, everybody in Washington—the President, Senators, and others in Washington—had given their support to Israel’s peace proposals.

19. Begin said he now had an important point to convey. We would recall that as originally discussed the Begin Plan included the provision that after five years the provisions of the plan “may be reviewed.” Secretary Vance had suggested that the word “may” be replaced with the word “will.” The Cabinet had authorized this change. He thought this was very important. Under the self-rule plan, there would be a local administrative council and with this change, the elected Palestinian representatives would be in a position to demand that anything and everything in the plan be changed at the end of five years.

20. Begin repeated that there were differing interpretations of the withdrawal provision of 242. The Arabs’ interpretation was that this meant total withdrawal. The U.S. never agreed to this interpretation, but it never insisted that the Arabs give it up. Begin said nobody in Israel would agree to the interpretation of total withdrawal. The Alignment government⁷ did not accept it any more than he did. He said Israel accepts 242 and would stick to that position. But Israel had a different interpretation and Israel believed it was entitled to that interpretation. Israel, for example, had never accepted the interpretation that 242 meant only minor modifications in the 1967 borders. Begin said I would recall that he had asked the President not to use this phrase because Israel could not accept it. When the Alignment was in power, it maintained an interpretation that would have partitioned the West Bank in such a way as to leave Israeli forces permanently along the Jordan River. This doesn’t happen to be the present government’s plan. Begin then read an extensive passage from the record of his December conversation with the President to show that he had spelled out the difference in Israel’s approach on the question of withdrawal on the West Bank and Gaza as opposed to other fronts.⁸

21. I said I wished to make one principal comment to all of this. From the moment of its birth there had been an argument about whether the withdrawal provision of 242 meant that withdrawal had to be to the 1967 lines or not. We had made it clear time and again that we never accepted the Arab interpretation; that is, would require total withdrawal to the 1967 lines. But during the decade after the passing of Resolution 242 there was a common understanding that the principle of withdrawal applied to all fronts. The record showed clearly—and we had gone over this in some detail with the Attorney General the other day⁹—that not only the U.S., but the former government of Israel believed that the withdrawal provision applied to the West Bank and Gaza as well as other fronts.

22. Yadin said it seemed to him there was something unfair about the present U.S. position. Wouldn’t it be more equitable and appropriate for the U.S. to make the point, at the same time it was asserting that withdrawal had to apply to all fronts, that it also did not believe this meant total withdrawal? “Why admonish just one side?” Yadin said if the Arabs were ever to agree that withdrawal might not have to be total, then Israel in turn would be prepared to indicate that its interpretation that it did not have to apply to all fronts would be open to negotiation.

23. Yadin said he thought the fact that we are concentrating on this question of withdrawal was detrimental to the whole peace process. If the point was to get into an argument about the theoretical history of Resolution 242, what are we all doing talking about paragraph three and four in the declaration of principles? Those paragraphs (dealing with the Palestinian/West Bank/Gaza issues clearly go way beyond what 242 has to say. So obviously, we were talking about a new framework for peace negotiations. Why then get bogged down with a debate about “original sins?” This could only be a distraction from what present negotiations required. Begin nodded approvingly at the end of Yadin’s comments and said no one can demand from Israel that it accept withdrawal on all three fronts. It was not mentioned in Resolution 242. It was not mentioned in any of the debates that took place about 242.

24. Ambassador Lewis asked Begin whether it wasn’t true that when he left the government in 1970, his action had been caused by his conviction that the Israel Government at the time had accepted the application of 242 to Judea and Samaria? Begin said the fact of the matter was that for three years Israel didn’t accept Resolution 242. Then, in August 1970, Israel had made a statement on behalf of the government which accepted it.¹⁰ Lewis said, but if you accepted that interpretation then, why was it different now? The Prime Minister said it had always been his interpretation that withdrawal should not apply to the West Bank and Gaza. He had left the government because he did not agree with the Labor Party’s interpretation of 242. I asked whether Begin was not in effect acknowledging that the present Israel Government interpretation differed from that of its predecessors? Begin said yes, he supposed so.

25. Dayan said that both at that time and now the issue depended not on legal interpretation but rather political intentions. The question to ask was: What were the Israeli Cabinet’s plans for the West Bank and Gaza in those days, and what was it now? In those days, it was the Allon Plan. Dayan asked, would the U.S. have accepted the Allon Plan as having been compatible with Resolution 242. He doubted it very much. Now the Begin government had a different plan for the West Bank and Gaza. It was consistent with Resolution 242 in Israel’s opinion provided it would be based on agreement among the parties which was the main feature of Resolution 242. In Dayan’s view, the Begin Plan was what present circumstances called for—it was “getting back to reality.”

26. The meeting ended with the Prime Minister once again thanking me for my efforts and saying that he thought the mission had indeed served a useful purpose.

27. Comment: Extended and orchestrated Israeli presentation at this final meeting on the Resolution 242 withdrawal question contained suggestion of two possible Israeli lines we may hear more of: (A) That USG, not Israel, is responsible for making an issue of this; and (B) if USG persists in insisting Israel agree that principle of withdrawal applies to the West Bank and Gaza, Israel may insist on dropping Palestinian language from declaration of principles and limiting it only to points contained in Resolution 242.

Newlin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2661. Secret, Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.
2. For the Allon Plan, see footnote 2, Document 2. The Begin Plan is attached to Document 177.
3. See Documents 222 and 224.
4. The “Draft Principles for Agreement Prior to Geneva” are printed as an Attachment to Document 54. Vance presented it to Begin on August 9, 1977. See Document 80.
5. See footnote 11, Document 211.
6. See footnote 3, Document 54.
7. The Alignment formed on January 28, 1969, when Israel’s Labor Party aligned with Mapam, the United Workers Party. It held the majority in the Knesset until the 1977 elections when Likud won 43 seats to the Alignment’s 32 seats.
8. For the U.S. record, see Document 177.
9. Not further identified.
10. A reference to the August 4, 1970, Israeli response to a U.S. peace proposal. The text was published in the New York Times, August 5, 1970, p. 3.