217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
43257. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Message From President Carter to President Sadat.
1. Please convey the following letter from President Carter to President Sadat.
2. Begin text:
Dear Mr. President:
As we discussed during our talks at Camp David,2 I have invited Prime Minister Begin to Washington and we have agreed on the dates of March 14 and 15 for a visit here.
I am beginning now to prepare myself for the crucial discussions I will have with Mr. Begin. As I reflect upon my talks with you, there are two points on which I will have to be absolutely clear in my own mind, both having to do with how you envisage proceeding in the negotiations once there is agreement on a declaration of principles.
The first point is the most difficult. I know the importance you attach, and which we share, to having King Hussein and if possible moderate Palestinian representatives join the negotiations. As you and I agreed, we should both make every effort to encourage their participation. Let us assume that we were able to achieve agreement between Egypt and Israel on the text of a declaration of principles along the lines of the draft Secretary Vance gave you when he visited Cairo on January 203 including my Aswan formulation, and West Bank/Gaza transitional arrangements along the lines I discussed with you at Camp David. Let us also assume that King Hussein concluded even then that [Page 1019] he was not in a position to join the negotiating process. In these circumstances how far would you be prepared to go in negotiating your own peace treaty with Israel?
Second, it is my understanding that should agreement be reached on a declaration and on a West Bank/Gaza negotiating framework, as described above, you would proceed to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel even if these were not accepted by Syria as a basis for its own participation in negotiations. I would appreciate hearing from you whether my understanding in this respect is correct.
I recognize that these are extremely sensitive questions of central importance to your negotiating strategy. I am sure that you will understand, however, how important it is for me to have a clear understanding of your position if I am to be able to play the important role we both agree must be assumed by the U.S. in order for there to be tangible and early progress in the negotiating process. I would understand if you prefer to convey your comments on these two points orally to Ambassador Eilts for him to convey to me in absolute privacy.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter
End text.
3. This message is being given no distribution within Department, and should be treated by you as literally eyes only.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume I [I]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Brzezinski and Tarnoff, and approved by Secretary Vance.↩
- See Document 211.↩
- See Document 205. The draft is quoted in Document 203.↩