218. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
5442. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Message From President Carter to President Sadat. Ref: State 43257.2
1. During my meeting with President Sadat this morning (at which VP Mubarak was also present), I read to him and gave him President [Page 1020] Carter’s letter cited reftel. Sadat listened carefully and replied as follows:
2. On the first point, i.e. that despite a favorable declaration of principles and West Bank/Gaza transitional arrangements, King Hussein still does not consider himself in a position to join the negotiating process, he (Sadat) would be prepared to proceed with negotiations “to the end.” Whenever a satisfactory and precise declaration of principles has been worked out, Sadat said, it makes no difference to him whether Hussein comes in or not; he will still proceed with the negotiations with a view to successfully concluding them. Sadat noted it would clearly be helpful if Hussein could be brought in, but the important element to him is a satisfactory declaration of principles.
3. On the second point, Sadat said that whenever a declaration of principles is agreed upon and the need to resolve the Palestinian question in all of its aspects is satisfactorily mentioned, he is prepared to proceed to negotiate a treaty with Israelis, even if Syria refuses to participate. In this connection, however, he made the point that his present thinking is that a satisfactory declaration of principles must indicate Israeli readiness to withdraw from territories occupied in 67 provided the parties are prepared to sit down with Israel and negotiate security arrangements and that West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and Golan should be specified as territories from which withdrawal must take place. If this is done, Sadat noted, then it is completely up to the Syrians to decide whether or not to negotiate with Israelis.
4. In connection with the West Bank/Gaza aspect, however, Sadat had a slight caveat. He said that if there is a satisfactory declaration of principles and an Egyptian/Israeli agreement is thereafter worked out, he might go ahead with the first phase of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, but postpone the second phase3 until the issue of the West Bank/Gaza is settled by the Israelis with the representatives of the Palestinians as well as Jordan (for the West Bank) and Egypt (for Gaza). In this connection he said that he had urged Peres in Salzburg4 that Israel should agree to have some moderate PLO elements represented in any West Bank/Gaza talks and had specifically mentioned Khalid el Hassan as a reasonable PLO rep. Peres had not reacted to this suggestion.
5. Sadat hoped that this clarifies his position.
6. Note: Both reftel and this message are being treated as literally eyes only Ambassador.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume II [I]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. A handwritten note in the upper right corner of the page reads, “Still not clear—JC.”↩
- See Document 217.↩
- A handwritten note in the margin by Carter reads, “What is second phase?”↩
- Sadat met with Peres in Salzburg, Austria, on February 11.↩