216. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Meeting Between President Carter and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan of Israel
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The President
- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Assistant Secretary of State Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
- Israel
- Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
- Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
The President asked Secretary Vance what had been covered in his meeting with Dayan,2 and the Secretary said he had told Dayan about the Sadat visit. The President asked jokingly if Dayan had found all of Sadat’s positions acceptable.
Dayan said “not all.” Continuing, Dayan said Israel would like King Hussein and the Palestinian Arabs to join the negotiations since a peace agreement cannot be reached without them. It is unacceptable, however, to have preconditions for those negotiations. Israel could not commit itself to things it does not agree to. Jordan and the Palestinians can put forward their proposal in the negotiations, but Israel should not have to agree beforehand to withdrawal from the West Bank and to self-determination. Dayan added that he was not saying Israel would agree to these things in the negotiations.
The President asked whether Israel has direct contacts with King Hussein. Dayan said “not now.” When he had last seen Hussein, the King had made clear he does not feel he can speak for the Palestinians.
The President continued that the principles Israel had described to us in general terms during Prime Minister Begin’s December visit were reasonable as a beginning for negotiations. It has been our understanding that Israel objects to an independent Palestinian state or to actions which would lead to that result. In fact, the President said, we find no one who is proposing such an independent state—not even President Assad. Our view, the President continued, is that the Palestinians, [Page 1015] including the residents of the West Bank, should have a voice in determining their future. We are seeking a general basis for negotiations without encroaching on Israel’s historical positions.
Dayan said he felt we were close to agreement on this point in the Jerusalem talks, specifically to agreement on the right of the Palestinian Arabs to participate, together with Egypt, Israel and Jordan, in determining their future.
The President asked if Israel wanted Egypt to be involved. Dayan said he did not know, but the Egyptians had proposed this because of their former position in Gaza. The Secretary said we see four elements participating—Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestinian representatives.
The President said this was fine with him. In his view, we were now down to questions of semantics, although he recognized that certain words have particular connotations. He had tried in Aswan3 to find the words Israel wanted. Dayan interjected that this had given Israel “lots of work.” The President said we felt that if we could get this language, it would help Hussein join the negotiations although we had no commitment from him. So far as Syria is concerned, Sadat had never mentioned the need for agreement on the Golan Heights. Dayan replied that the Golan had been mentioned in the first Egyptian draft, but said that perhaps they will drop this.
Secretary Vance said that Sadat had told him at the end of his visit he needed agreement on principles which Hussein would accept as a framework to join the talks. Then Sadat would be prepared to go ahead and negotiate on the Sinai and to participate in West Bank negotiations. Sadat said he cannot do this without Hussein.
With respect to Sinai, the President said, the problems for Sadat are the airdromes, the placement of Egyptian troops (Sadat had said he would not send his main forces east of the passes), and settlements. So far as he knew, the President said, there was close to agreement on the Sinai.
The other things Sadat wants, the President continued, are that the Palestinians should have a voice in the negotiations and that Resolution 242 should apply to the West Bank. Sadat wants to know that there will be withdrawal but is not insisting on complete withdrawal from the West Bank.
Dayan said “here there is a problem.” “A problem?” the President asked. Dayan said Israel’s position is that it does not want to rule the Palestinian Arabs but wants to keep its military installations and settlements. This is Israel’s position; Jordan and the Palestinians can put forward their position. Israel is prepared to discuss these positions but [Page 1016] not to commit itself to withdrawal as a precondition to get Hussein into the negotiations. Israel will not sign such a commitment before negotiations.
When Begin was here, the President said, we understood Israel was willing to withdraw its forces to cantonments. We had asked if this meant along the Jordan River, and Begin had said there were also some positions in the hills. It was not our interpretation that Israel was not willing to accept this as a basis for negotiations. Dayan replied “not as a precondition.”
The President asked what we can do now. We can talk about words and lose the chance for peace. The President asked what words bothered Dayan—was it “withdrawal?” Dayan said he had no mandate from the Cabinet to speak to this.
Dr. Brzezinski asked “you accept Resolution 242, don’t you?” Dayan replied yes, but we object to “on all fronts.”
Secretary Vance said he had discussed this point with Dayan and had made the point that we understand that historically Israel had accepted Resolution 242 as applying on all three fronts. Dayan said he can only speak for the present Government. We had agreed to discuss Resolution 242 and its history in Jerusalem.
The President said he had no preconceived view about where the final lines should be, how many cantonments there should be, or about the airdromes. We are seeking to find a basis for accommodation. The three versions of the declaration of principles are not too different. What we want is for Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to be flexible, to agree on a set of principles, including those governing the West Bank and Gaza for three to five years. Then there could be negotiations. The Begin Plan could be a basis for negotiations though it is not enough as it stands. In five years there could be a referendum, with the four parties to the negotiations agreeing on the words of the referendum. There could be a link with Jordan, or a link with Israel, or perhaps the people would prefer to continue the interim arrangements. These were just ideas, and there might be others.
Dayan said there are two problems. First, Sadat wants Hussein in the negotiations. Secretary Vance commented that Sadat says Hussein must be in; it is conceivable he could change his mind, but he now says he needs a declaration which Hussein accepts. The President said this was a change from what Sadat told him in Aswan. In any case, one thing is clear; Sadat is flexible.
Dayan said what if Sadat insists on Hussein joining the negotiations and Hussein raises his price; it is hard for Hussein to speak for the Palestinians. The question, Dayan said, is whether Sadat will be satisfied with wording along the lines we have almost agreed upon or whether he will insist upon Hussein joining the negotiations.
[Page 1017]The President said we should not permit Hussein to set the terms if he is not reasonable. It was his impression from his talks with Hussein in Tehran4 that Hussein and Sadat were in agreement. Roy Atherton had talked to Hussein more recently, however. Secretary Vance said Hussein changes his position from time to time and recently it has become tougher.
Dayan said Israel believes that all West Bank and Gaza questions should be negotiated without their accepting our plan or ourselves accepting theirs. There should be no precommitments. It is difficult, Dayan said, for Israel to accept a declaration saying there will be Israeli withdrawal on the West Bank; this may happen, but Israel will not say it in advance.
The President said you must admit that everyone has said they are committed to Resolutions 242 and 338. This was true before he was in office, he said, and had been confirmed to him by Israel.
Dayan said Israel objects to the phrase “on all fronts.” The present Israeli Government does not use this phrase.
The President asked if Israel will use the words of Resolution 242. Secretary Vance said those are the words of the declaration of prin-ciples; the problem underlying them is not raised by the present wording.
Dayan said that with respect to Item 2 of the Political Committee Agenda, Egypt has raised the question of whether they or the Jordanians should negotiate. There is almost agreement, however, on Resolution 242 language without the phrase “on all fronts.”
The President said we will seek clear answers from Sadat before the Begin visit. There is not much doubt that Sadat does not require Syria to join the negotiations. The more difficult question is his position about Hussein joining.
Secretary Vance said he had told Dayan it was his impression that the Aswan language may be acceptable to Sadat. The President said that if this were acceptable, this should be an adequate basis for peace between Egypt and Israel even if Hussein raises his demands. Agreement on basic principles, however, is essential for Sadat; he must have a framework for a comprehensive peace.
Dayan said he believed we were close to agreed language, referring to Resolution 242 without mentioning “on all fronts” and to the right of the Palestinian Arabs to participate in determining their future. The question is what will happen if Sadat insists on Hussein joining, and Hussein rejects the declaration.
[Page 1018]The President said Sadat has some influence on Hussein as do the Saudis; we also have some limited influence. In conclusion, the President said we will try to be prepared for Mr. Begin’s visit.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume I [I]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.↩
- No memorandum of conversation has been found, but see Document 215.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 187.↩
- See Document 182.↩