Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 17, 1978, 2112Z

42823. Subject: Meeting Between Secretary and Dayan—Febru-ary 16.

1. Summary: Dayan reiterated the importance Israel attaches to the U.S. role in the peace negotiations and said the GOI is looking forward to Atherton’s visit. He repeatedly expressed concern, however, over what he viewed as dissymmetry between the Military Committee and the Political Committee negotiations, indicating that the continuation of the former in Cairo while the latter is pursued through shuttle diplomacy puts Israel in a situation of inferiority. Dayan said Atherton will be welcome but steps should be taken soon to put the negotiations “on an equal footing,” adding that “otherwise there might be problems.” He at least raised question mark about whether Israel is prepared to pursue work on declaration of principles before Political Committee convenes or to continue meeting in Military Committee while Political Committee is suspended. Dayan also raised question of F–15s for Saudi Arabia and their stationing at Tabuk.² He said Weizman would take this up in more detail when he comes to Washington but made point that F–15 sale to Saudis has a bearing on Israeli willingness to give up airbase in Sinai near Eilat and thus has implications for Egyptian-Israeli Sinai negotiations. There was lengthy discussion of the applicability of Resolution 242’s language on withdrawal to all fronts. Secretary made clear that while we agree that 242 does not call for withdrawal from all the territories, we have always considered that it applies to territories on all three fronts and thought that was the Israeli Government position too. Secretary asked whether GOI considers that 242 does not apply to all fronts? Dayan evaded direct answer saying he could only speak to position of present Israeli Government, which is that question of sovereignty on the West Bank should be open but that Israeli forces and settlements must remain there. After further questioning by the Secretary, Dayan said he is sure that Israel, prior to negotiations, will not accept any language that would mean it agrees to withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank but he did not rule out that Israel could do so in negotiations. End summary.

2. The Secretary first met privately with Dayan for about one-half hour and then together with aides for about one hour before lunch. After lunch Secretary and Dayan departed for a meeting with the President at the White House.³ Present at the meeting and lunch at the Department on the Israeli side were Dinitz, Bar-On, Ciechanover, Lavie, Rubenstein, and Bentsur. On the U.S. side were Habib, Atherton, Saunders, Sterner, Quandt and Korn.

3. The Secretary said he would summarize Sadat’s position as we understand it. Sadat’s first goal is a declaration along the lines of the declaration that we have been negotiating. The declaration must at a minimum embody the President’s Aswan language on the Palestinian problem.⁴ Sadat hopes that if achieved the declaration will bring Hussein and representative Palestinians into the negotiations. If a declaration is agreed upon but Hussein does not find it sufficient to enter the negotiations, this would pose a serious problem for Sadat. The Secretary said Sadat has not indicated specifically what he would do in such case. We have asked him but have not had a clear response from him. But, the Secretary said, we have no evidence that Sadat would require an Israeli-Syrian agreement as a prerequisite to agreement between Israel and Egypt. Our judgment is that Sadat would be unwilling to give Syria such a veto. A further point, the Secretary said, is that Sadat is not likely to agree to renew the formal Political Committee meetings until a declaration of principles has been achieved. In this regard, the Secretary said, we believe that the differences between the parties over the language of the declaration of principles are not merely semantic but substantive. To resolve them, it may be necessary to go into the second item on the Political Committee agenda so as to give more context to the declaration. The Secretary said he would stop there and listen to any comments that Dayan might have.

4. Dayan said he wanted first to mention three positive aspects of the situation. First, Dayan said, we are in the midst of active negotiations for a peace agreement and should constantly keep the obstacles we encounter in this perspective. Secondly, while Israel wants face-to-face negotiations, it must be clear that a peace agreement cannot be reached without the participation of the United States. The experience of recent negotiations has amply demonstrated this, Dayan said. Egypt and Israel could not even agree on an agenda for the Political Committee until the U.S. stepped in, both as mediator and contributor. Without the U.S., Dayan said, it will be impossible to get agreement. Dayan said we are looking forward to Roy Atherton’s return to the area.

5. Dayan commented that having made these positive points, there were also a few negative points of concern that he had to raise. A first and very important one, Dayan said, is that we do not think it proper for one committee to work in Cairo while the work of the other is suspended and the declaration of principles is negotiated through shuttle diplomacy. The two committees must be on an equal footing. Sadat cannot have it all his way. Dayan urged that the U.S. give thought to how this can be done. He reiterated that one party could not have negotiations going on in its capital while the other had nothing and thus appeared “second rate.”

6. Dayan said the second point he wanted to raise concerned arms. He did not want to get into a detailed discussion of this subject; Ezer Weizman would deal with it when he comes to Washington. But, Dayan said, when asked publicly he would have to express concern along the lines of what Prime Minister Begin had said in the Knesset.⁵ There was just one question he wanted to raise in the present discussion and that was the sale of jets to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi air base at Tabuk, close to Eilat. Dayan said this combination would make it more difficult to close the Israeli military airfields in Sinai. The main enemy forces for Israel would be in Syria, but the F–15s would be able to carry out strike missions from Tabuk. The F–15 sale to Saudi Arabia therefore has implications for the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Dayan stressed that this question is of great concern to the GOI, and Weizman will want to discuss it when he comes to Washington.

7. Dayan said his final point was the question of the language of Resolution 242 on withdrawal and whether this means all fronts including the West Bank. Dayan explained that when the GOI had discussed the declaration of principles it had thought it could use language which did not mean that the principle of withdrawal applies to the West Bank. Israel had not wanted to mislead others or to be vague but it had definitely not intended to use language which would require withdrawal on all fronts. Dayan said he saw absolutely no objection to other parties—Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians—putting forward proposals of their own which called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Begin and Sadat had agreed at Ismailia that each side should be free to present its own proposals, and Israel recognizes that there are conflicting claims. If the Arabs want to claim sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza after three or five years Israel could do the same, but, Dayan said, we propose to leave that question open. It is one thing for each party to state its views but quite another, Dayan said, for Israel to be asked beforehand to commit itself to withdrawal from the West Bank. He (Dayan) would strongly recommend against doing so. Dayan asked how Israel could issue a declaration of principles in which it agreed to withdrawal on the West Bank and to the right of others to sovereignty over that area. Israel would make no commitment of this sort, not even an indirect one. Dayan said he had raised this point because he wanted it to be clear; it is a sensitive matter and he did not want misunderstandings about it.

8. The Secretary said he would comment on the points made by Dayan. First of all we agree that it is important that the parties are negotiating for peace and are talking about real peace treaties; that represents progress. It is also significant that the parties agree that it is important to keep the negotiations moving forward. Regarding the U.S. role, we are prepared to do everything we can. Roy Atherton will be leaving for the Middle East on Sunday⁶ and will be holding talks in Jerusalem and Cairo.

9. On the problem raised by Dayan of the continuation of the Military Committee work in Cairo while the Jerusalem Political Committee remains suspended, the Secretary said we must have more time to think about this. Perhaps future talks in both committees could be moved to Sinai. But for the moment, the Secretary said, he wanted to make it clear that we think that negotiations should continue through Atherton moving between Jerusalem and Cairo and Amman and other capitals as necessary. The Secretary asked if Dayan agreed. Dayan said he would report Secretary’s views; in any case Atherton will be more than welcome in Jerusalem. But Dayan reiterated that he did not think it proper for the Military Committee to continue to meet in Cairo while the Political Committee negotiations were being conducted in a different way. There must be equality. The earlier agreement can be reached on procedures and a place for the Political Committee negotiations, the better. Dayan said Israel is not against the Military Committee continuing in Cairo. Israel does not want to stop those meetings. What it wants is that both committees should function in parallel fashion. Otherwise, Dayan said, “there might be a problem.”

10. Regarding the arms issue, the Secretary said he wanted to get a clearer idea of what Dayan intended when he raised the question of the Tabuk base. Was Dayan saying that if the sale of F–15s to Saudi Arabia goes through and the Saudis station those planes at Tabuk in 1981–82, this would affect Israel’s views regarding its Sinai proposal? Dayan said he was certain the stationing of F–15s at Tabuk would affect security considerations in the negotiations. The prime target of F–15s at Tabuk would be Eilat. Therefore Israel would have to be ready to destroy the Saudi planes before they got to Israeli territory. Dayan said he did not want to go into detail on this; Weizman would explain Israel’s view. But clearly the arms question will affect Israel’s total concept of defensive borders. The Secretary asked if Dayan was suggesting that if the F–15s are based somewhere other than Tabuk this would affect Israel’s position on the sale? Dayan said he was not in a position to say that, but he noted that Weizman had told Lewis that if the Saudis are worried about Iraq, their planes should be stationed on the other side of the Peninsula. However, Dayan said, in case of war Saudis would move the planes wherever they wished, no matter where they were based. Dayan pointed out that the Saudis took part in the 1973 War along side the Syrians, and Saudi forces had recently held joint war games with the Syrians. The Secretary said he did not think the Saudis had made up their minds at all about the stationing of F–15s at Tabuk.

11. Concerning the question of Resolution 242 and the principle of withdrawal on all fronts, the Secretary noted that there has never been any reference to 242 in paragraph 4 of the draft declaration, the paragraph on the Palestinian issue. But he wanted to ask if it is the Israeli position that the principle of withdrawal stated in Resolution 242 does not apply on all fronts? Dayan said he believed 242 does not call on Israel to go back all the way to the 1967 lines; the position should be different on each front. Israel’s position regarding the West Bank is very clear. It will not make an agreement on the basis of withdrawal from the West Bank but on the basis of self-rule and the continued presence of Israeli forces. Israel recognizes the sovereignty of Egypt over the entire Sinai and is ready to withdraw fully from Sinai, but this is not because 242 requires it. Dayan said he preferred to leave the matter there and not argue legal positions. The Secretary replied that it is very important that we have a clear understanding of Israel’s position on this point. We agree that Resolution 242 does not call for withdrawal from all the territories but speaks only of “territories.” But it has always been our understanding that Resolution 242 does apply to territories on all three fronts. We had thought that was the Israeli position as well.

12. Dayan replied that he could speak only about the position of the present Israeli Government. The concept of the present Israeli Government is that the question of sovereignty on the West Bank, where Israel has a claim, should be left open and that Israeli forces and settlements should not be withdrawn from the West Bank. Whether this position is consistent or not with Resolution 242 Dayan could not say. The Secretary again said he thought this question must be clarified. Dayan suggested that discussion of the issue continue in Jerusalem with Atherton. The Secretary agreed but reiterated the U.S. view that Resolution 242 applies on all three fronts. The Secretary stressed that we do not believe that when we said this in our statement the other day we were saying anything new or making any changes in the USG position.⁷ The Secretary reiterated, however, that he was not sure that he had fully understood what Dayan was saying. Dayan replied that Israel would discuss any proposals regarding the West Bank made by the other parties but it would be unacceptable to Israel to say that Israel agrees to withdraw from the West Bank. Dayan pointed out that with Begin’s approval he had said in the Knesset that if the Arabs come up with a plan for partition of the West Bank, the GOI will discuss it. But thus far none of the Arabs has made such a proposal. He did not rule out the right of the Arabs to propose partition or even full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank but “I am sure that what we will not do is prior to any negotiation accept any language that would mean we agree to withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank.” Dayan added: “We can do it in negotiations but no one should expect us to come forward with such a declaration in advance.”

13. The Secretary asked Atherton to explain how he plans to proceed in his negotiations. Atherton recalled that he had told Dayan during their meeting in New York that he had gotten from Kamel in Cairo Egyptian comments on Israeli comments on the draft declaration.⁸ These have not yet been formally conveyed to Israel. Therefore as a first step he would lay out the Egyptian comments. Atherton noted that as he had told Dayan the Egyptian comments in many aspects go in a direction opposite from Israeli views. Atherton said beyond that he thought it would be useful to look ahead to the second point of the Political Committee agenda, concerning the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian problem, and begin to get some idea from the Egyptians about new arrangements they would like to see in that area. Atherton said he would want to see if the Egyptians would put forth their thoughts on the West Bank and Gaza. The Secretary said he had told Dayan that Atherton would plan to visit Amman. Atherton pointed out that it will be useful to get a feeling for what Hussein will need to enter the negotiations. He would not be negotiating a declaration of principles in Amman. The talks there would be simply to get a better feeling for Hussein’s needs.

14. Dayan asked if Sadat had mentioned the question of a UN force at Sharm al-Sheikh. The Secretary said Sadat had, and we believe it is still his view that the UN should hold Sharm al-Sheikh. Dayan asked if this meant exclusively UN forces, no Egyptians? The Secretary said Sadat had spoken only of UN forces and had not mentioned Egyptians. However, the Secretary said, we can raise this question with Sadat if Dayan wishes.

15. As the meeting closed, Dayan reiterated his hope that a solution could be worked out soon regarding the problem of the cur-rent dissymmetry between the Military and Political Committee negotiations.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2232. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Korn, cleared by Atherton and Tarnoff, and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.
2. Tabuk was the location of an airbase in northwestern Saudi Arabia, approximately 120 miles from Israel.
3. See Document 216.
4. See footnote 5, Document 187.
5. On February 15, Begin stated in the Knesset “that Israel had not received all the aircraft it had requested but felt the response was generally positive and he expressed his appreciation to the President for his decision.” Begin noted that Weizman “will visit Washington in the near future and will renew the request for additional aircraft.” Additionally, Begin “requested the President to reconsider his decision to sell planes to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.” Begin feared Saudi Arabia would become “a confrontation state because it would now have aircraft which could reach Eilat in ten minutes.” He also expressed concern that the Saudis could transfer the aircraft to other Arab states. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780069–1030) Secretary Vance announced on February 14 that President Carter had approved the sale of 15 F–15s (in addition to the 25 already sold) and 75 F–16s to Israel, 50 F–5s to Egypt, and 60 F–15s to Saudi Arabia. (Department of State Bulletin, March 1978, p. 37)
6. February 19. The February 5 White House statement issued during Sadat’s visit noted that Carter and Begin agreed that Atherton would return to the Middle East to continue working on the declaration of principles. See Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 279–281.
7. Presumably a reference to the February 8 White House statement. See footnote 11, Document 211.
8. No memoranda of conversation have been found.