214. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1

2093. White House for Brzezinski. Subj: Shilo Settlement. Ref: State 37092.2

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1. During my private meeting with Begin morning of February 14, I pressed him for further explanation of the Shilo situation,3 as directed by reftel.

2. I reviewed with him the statements by Dayan to effect that no more civilian settlements would be established through October 1978, asked how this jibes with Shilo affair, reminded him of his earlier statement to me that he would make every effort to use “persuasion” to solve the problem, and stressed the fact that the Gush Emunin people on the site continue to say they are determined to establish a permanent settlement.

3. We reviewed at some length the political constraints under which Begin feels he is operating, and he reiterated in no uncertain terms what he had told me previously: that he cannot and will not bring himself to use military force to remove the settlers. He said that persuasion by Arik Sharon had been successful in moving the settlers from privately owned Arab land to state-owned land, and he stressed that not only had the Cabinet not approved this as a settlement but that on his recommendation it had specifically disapproved Shilo as a settlement site. The subsequent decision to give authorization for archeological exploration had been given by the Ministry of Defense and in no way contravened the Cabinet decision to turn down Shilo as an authorized settlement. He admitted that the settlers had different objectives, but he insisted that Shilo was not an authorized settlement and that the Cabinet had no intention of authorizing it. So far as the Israeli Government is concerned it is an archeological exploration and will be treated as such.

4. I pressed him very hard and very frankly to take the difficult decision to remove the settlers by one means or another in order to counteract the major credibility problem which had arisen in Washington over this very unfortunate affair. He said again, sadly, that I should tell the Secretary and the President that he cannot use military force against these fine young people. I then pressed him to use more “persuasion” to get them to leave the site completely and thereby carry out the government’s decision. He said that frankly, between us, he did not believe they could be persuaded to leave except by force.

5. So this is where we are on Shilo. The government is being ridiculed and berated in much of the press over its confused handling of this issue, as well as of other settlements questions in general in recent weeks. The Gush Emunim settlers are there and will be doing something which presumably will be in the nature of site survey and pre-excavation work under some sort of direction of an archeologist. Their own intentions to remain and eventually force the government to legiti[Page 1007]mate Shilo as a settlement are clear. Begin’s reluctance and indeed refusal to use military force to remove them has been stated and restated. So long as some semblance of archeology is going on, and the infrastructure for a full settlement has not been approved, I suppose one can argue as Begin does that the government is carrying out its commitments as Dayan has stated them. A less happy situation would be hard to imagine, nor one which more adversely affects the government’s credibility both with the Israeli public and with us. Although it is difficult to see any tangible benefits to U.S. interests in further pursuit of the Shilo affair with Begin in the near future, any extended period of silence runs the risk of being misinterpreted. Thus, unless otherwise instructed, I intend to remind Begin periodically of our deep concern about this issue.

Lewis
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–2066. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent immediate for information to the White House.
  2. Telegram 37092 has not been found.
  3. See footnote, 2. Document 209.