Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

191. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 13, 1978

SUBJECT

• Your Discussion with Prime Minister Begin on Sinai Proposal

The attached cable² conveys Prime Minister Begin’s strong disagreement over the interpretation we have given to portions of your discussions with him on December 16th and 17th³ concerning his proposal for Sinai. You can compare his version of the conversations with our own records from the excerpts quoted below. You will note that your own comments, while supportive, did contain qualifications which are missing in the Israeli version. I think that we should correct the record so that Prime Minister Begin will not interpret our silence as acceptance of his interpretation of our position.⁴

December 16, 1977

Israeli Version. (Prime Minister speaking) “In the North we have the problem of the area between Rafah and El-Arish. The Israeli settlements are there (and he points at the map). We suggest they stay. We will also have there UN forces and there should also be included a small Israeli defense contingent.” (Prime Minister points out where settlements are.) “This is the outline of what we decided to do to establish peace with Egypt. It is a great change and from our point of view a great risk.”

U.S. Version. “In the North, we have a problem of the area between Rafah and Al Arish. We are suggesting that Israeli settlements stay even after Egyptian sovereignty has returned. There will be Jews living in Egypt just as there are Arabs living in Israel. We will ask for security to be provided by a UN force. There should also be some small Israeli defense forces at selected points to protect our people. In no way do we think this will infringe on what President Sadat requires. We are offering a great change in our position and there are great risks, but we will take them for peace.”

Israeli Version. (President speaking) “I wish first to say that in my opinion there is nothing in this proposal that Sadat could not accept. It is very reasonable. The time schedule should be expedited.”

U.S. Version. “In my opinion, there is nothing in your proposals that Sadat could not accept. It seems very reasonable. Maybe you could expedite the time schedule. Perhaps I don’t understand all of the details yet.”

December 17, 1977

Israeli Version. (President speaking) “What I am concerned about is that the public reaction to your proposal on Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will not prove to be harmful to Sadat. We believe that the Sinai proposal will be well received by him.”

U.S. Version. “I am concerned that the public discussion of your plans for a settlement of the West Bank issue not be harmful to Sadat. I think the Sinai proposal will be well received. There may be a few minor matters of concern still to be solved.”

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume II [I]. Top Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. The date is handwritten.
2. Telegram 8857 from Tel Aviv is attached but not printed.
3. See Documents 177 and 178.
4. At the end of the first paragraph is a handwritten note in the margin by Carter that reads, “ok. J.”