190. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- The Approaching Moment of Truth
I see the Jerusalem talks as the beginning of a process that will take us down one of three possible roads:
—A broadening of negotiations to include the issues of the future of the West Bank-Gaza and the Palestinians.
—Stalemate on the Palestinian issue, but progress toward a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
—Stalemate across the board, with mounting tensions, and threats by Sadat to resign or revert to more intransigent policies.
We will no doubt aim for the first of these outcomes, in the knowledge that we may have to settle for the second, at least for now. But I also fear that by misjudging the situation, we may only be confronted by the latter two possibilities.
The minimum requirements for opening the way to serious negotiation on the West Bank-Gaza-Palestinian issues are the following:
—Agreement between Egypt and Israel on the concept of an interim, or transitional, period of self-government for the West Bank and Gaza, with some token international presence alongside Israeli security forces. (This would require some significant modifications in Begin’s “self-rule” proposals.)
—Israeli agreement that during the interim period, negotiations leading to final peace treaties would begin, and that Israel will declare that the withdrawal provision of UN Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank and Gaza. Israel can insist on security arrangements, border modifications, staged withdrawal, a residual presence, protection for settlements, and so forth, but the concept of withdrawal, which is totally lacking in the Begin plan, must be part of a final peace agreement. This is essential for Sadat, Hussein and the Saudis. It is the hardest issue for Begin to face, but it is also the one on which he is on the weakest ground. I would rather see us argue hard for the principle of withdrawal, which has some tangible meaning, than for the vague notion of self-determination. Self-determination without withdrawal means nothing; the reverse is not the case.
[Page 927]—Some agreement on a process, or guidelines, for negotiating the future status of the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat should be able to call the process self-determination, and Begin may simply agree to call it negotiations. We could talk of a process which would allow Palestinians to participate in determining their own future and in defining their legitimate rights. In brief, we might not all use the same words, but we would agree on the process involved.
I do not underestimate how difficult it will be to meet these minimal requirements. I see no sign that Begin is ready to accept the principle of withdrawal, to say nothing of the principle of self-determination. He might agree to the vague language of the President’s Aswan statement,2 but that would not represent any real change in policy and would not be enough to bring King Hussein into the negotiations. At best it could serve as a very thin fig leaf behind which Sadat might try to conclude a separate deal with Israel.
If we could get agreement on the minimum requirements that I have outlined, Sadat might still end up negotiating a separate deal, but he would be less vulnerable in the Arab world. Hussein might not join the negotiations, but the burden of choice would be on him and moderate Palestinians. They would at least be tempted.
To get Begin to accept the principle of eventual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza will be extremely difficult, since it goes against both his ideological beliefs and his views on security. We cannot ease his concern on the former, but we can on the latter.
There are two ways of limiting the security risk in negotiations over the West Bank-Gaza and the Palestinian issue:
—A pre-defined limitation on the exercise of self-determination. This approach, which the President has alluded to, would try to establish an interim regime, with some international presence, and would define self-determination as a choice between such a regime and affiliation with Jordan. If we begin to promote this concept of self-determination, we can anticipate endless difficulties. Some will claim that this makes a mockery of the concept; others will argue that it leaves the hard issues of borders and security unanswered; and Palestinians themselves will be acutely aware of their limited role in shaping their own future, and might very well boycott the process. Israel would realize that eventual withdrawal is implied by this approach, and thus Begin will be inclined to reject it. The Labor opposition, by contrast, would be inclined to accept, but would argue hard for major border changes.
—A pre-defined process of negotiations tied to the principle of self-determination by means of a referendum. This approach would seek to establish an interim regime and a negotiating process that would include Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinian representatives. To launch the process, mutual commitment to the concepts of peace, security and withdrawal, as embodied in UN Resolution 242, would be required, but [Page 928] no effort need be made at the outset to define the end result of negotiations (state, homeland, entity, federation, confederation, and so forth). The only other commitment that would have to be made prior to the onset of serious negotiations would be that the results of the negotiations, as embodied in a peace treaty, would be ratified by means of a referendum in which Palestinians would vote. There would be an element of choice, but it would be limited to saying yes or no to the terms of a treaty. Israel would not have to accept in advance any outcome to which it is not prepared to agree. The risk, of course, is that Israel could block progress in the negotiations indefinitely, but this is a risk in any event.
The advantage of this approach is that it commits Israel to a process and a principle, withdrawal, not a specific outcome, whereas for the Arabs it also has the attractiveness of appearing to be open-ended (anything the parties can agree to) and would offer self-determination to the Palestinians by means of participation in the negotiations and in ratifying the peace treaty. Whereas the limited-choice referendum would probably have to be confined to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, this approach could include all Palestinians in the referendum, since they would have an overwhelming incentive to vote yes on the peace treaty as the way of ending the interim regime and Israel’s military presence.
The Palestinian negotiators will be much freer to participate in negotiations if the results are presented to all Palestinians. The legitimacy bestowed by a referendum open to all Palestinians will also be much greater than by one limited to only the one-third of the Palestinian community living in the West Bank and Gaza.
In summary, I would maintain that the key to broadening the scope of negotiations lies in getting Begin to change his position on the principle of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. He presently excludes these areas from the withdrawal provision of 242, a position that no one in the international community accepts. To make his acceptance easier, we also need an understanding of how the negotiations concerning the West Bank and Gaza will proceed in a way that provides safeguards for Israel and, at the same time, is sufficiently attractive and open-ended to gain the participation of Jordan and moderate Palestinians.
This cannot be achieved in a few days in Jerusalem. I think Secretary Vance should make the case for this approach, but should not immediately back down and settle for less, such as an Aswan-like statement. If necessary, he should leave Jerusalem without having reached any agreement, then he should talk to Sadat about next steps. At the risk of being a bit Machiavellian, he could urge Sadat to make a firm public statement of his position, perhaps even a bit tougher than his real position, at which point we could intervene with an initiative to break the deadlock, which he would then accept. At that point, the President might consider his fireside chat to the American people.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Chronological File, Box 134, Quandt, 1/78 (2). Secret. Outside System. Sent for information.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 187.↩