117. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Secretary Vance’s Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy

PARTICIPANTS

  • Egypt
  • Foreign Minister Fahmy
  • Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal
  • Mr. Usama El-Baz, Under Secretary
  • Mr. Mohammad al-Baradie
  • Mr. Amre Moussa
  • United States
  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
  • Under Secretary Philip Habib
  • Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
  • Ambassador Hermann Eilts
  • William B. Quandt, National Security Council
  • David A. Korn, Policy Planning Staff

The Secretary said he would like to fill Fahmy in on his two meetings yesterday, with Khaddam and the Jordanians.2 The main subject was how to deal with the questions of Palestinian representation and the organization of the Geneva Conference. On the Palestinian representation question, the Secretary said there are different shades of opinion as to how to define how the Palestinian group at Geneva would be composed. The President had made clear his view to both the Syrians and the Jordanians as to how he thought the problem should be resolved. The Secretary said he wanted to meet with Fahmy alone later, and at that time he would give Fahmy a paper covering the President’s view.

The Secretary said the real problem is how to organize after getting to Geneva. Both the Syrians and the Jordanians are very heavily in favor of the functional approach. We do not share that view, the Secretary said. We believe in bilateral working groups, with the possibility of multilateral discussions on some issues such as Palestinian issues. The Secretary emphasized that there was a real difference of view between the Syrians and Jordanians and us on this matter. He said we have [Page 622] asked them to convey our views to their heads of state for consideration. But right now there are real differences.

Fahmy said this is very strange really, because when the Egyptians and the Jordanians were in Geneva before everyone was speaking on his own behalf. The Syrians were ready to participate within the Egyptian delegation. When the Syrians signed the Golan agreement3 they insisted on doing so under Egyptian aegis. Fahmy asked rhetorically why do they want a new procedure when there is an established procedure? How can Geneva function that way? It can’t, he said, answering his own question.

The Secretary said that is what he told them. It would be a total waste of time to talk about demilitarized zones in Sinai with all the other parties sitting around the room. It doesn’t make sense, the Secretary said. Fahmy said the reason is that they (presumably by this he meant the Syrians) want to block any progress. They fear Egypt may be able to go ahead and make an agreement. That is why they want one delegation. As far as Jordan is concerned, it wants functional working groups because that is the only way it feels it can ensure its own participation. The Secretary said we would prefer a formula in which some working groups are bilateral and some multilateral. Fahmy again observed that multilateral working groups for the territorial issues did not make sense; how could he speak concerning Golan? The Secretary said that the West Bank would be a mixture of territorial and political matters.

Fahmy said he had met the day before yesterday with PLO representatives who came to New York. It was a long meeting and there was a hot debate over what the PLO should do. “One or two of them were fighting against their own brothers.” The Secretary asked whether Egypt should be included along with the Palestinians when Gaza is discussed. Fahmy replied that for discussions of Gaza it should be Egypt and the PLO. The Secretary and Mr. Habib remarked that Fahmy said “the PLO”, not the Palestinians. Fahmy said don’t believe anybody who says you can go ahead without the PLO. If this subject goes to an Arab Summit Meeting, Fahmy said, the problem will become even more difficult, the position will become even more rigid. The Secretary asked how this problem could be resolved. Fahmy said he did not know. Fahmy then asked about the President’s discussion with Khaddam regarding the Palestinian representation question and the organization of Geneva.4 The Secretary said he had some language to [Page 623] give Fahmy later. What we have said so far is that we have agreed on a united Arab delegation including Palestinians. We are not saying anything more now. That is all I want to say at this point, the Secretary stressed. The Secretary added that he would be meeting again with Khaddam and Sharaf. Fahmy said he expected to receive a reply very soon from President Sadat concerning our suggestion. The Secretary said he would have something for Fahmy to send back to Sadat, including a personal message from the President.

Fahmy asked if the Secretary were still optimistic about Geneva. The Secretary said he still thought it possible but a lot of hard work will be required from all of us. Fahmy said the problem is not whether there will be a united Arab delegation or not. It is not a question of whether we have one delegation or four delegations, Fahmy said. Even if we agree on that problem this doesn’t mean that the PLO would agree. There is the bigger issue of Resolution 242. The main issue is Resolution 242, Fahmy repeated. The Secretary replied that the main question is discussion and resolution of the Palestinian issue, not Resolution 242. Fahmy replied that the PLO will never agree to go to Geneva unless something is done about its problem with Resolution 242. The Secretary pointed out that the Palestinian question is much broader than that. Fahmy asked how can you get the PLO to go to Geneva unless the problem of Resolution 242 is resolved? By making sure that the Palestinian question is an agreed item for discussion in Geneva, Mr. Habib answered. Fahmy reiterated that he thought the PLO would not go to Geneva unless the problem of Resolution 242 is resolved. If you have other information, Fahmy said, put it on the table. But, Fahmy continued, it is wasting time to talk with me or the Syrians or anybody else about this question. You have to talk with the PLO. Fahmy said the PLO asked him in their meeting with him the day before yesterday why the Americans don’t accept the formula of Arafat with Barbara Walters. Fahmy noted that Arafat had been criticized by others in the PLO for what he said to Barbara Walters.5

Fahmy reiterated that the problem is not the format of the delegation at all but the PLO’s problem with Resolution 242. Mr. Atherton made the point that if it were agreed that the Palestinian problem is going to be on the agenda at Geneva, that should take care of the PLO’s concerns. The Secretary said the key formula is that there will be on the agenda at Geneva an item concerning the establishment of a Palestinian entity and self-determination for the Palestinians. The Secretary said we have had some indication from the PLO that this would help them. [Page 624] Fahmy indicated that he remained skeptical. In his meeting with the PLO the day before yesterday, they had even gone back on a formula they had earlier agreed to. “They are fighting each other.” Fahmy said he didn’t want anybody to confuse us regarding the PLO’s thinking. But, he said, if you have a contact with the PLO, please put me in the picture. The Secretary said we are not talking with the PLO.

The Secretary said that was all he had to discuss, except that he would appreciate now having a moment alone with Fahmy.6 At this point other members of the group departed.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Korn on September 30. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel.
  2. See Documents 115 and 116.
  3. A reference to the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement signed in May 1974. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Documents 8890.
  4. See Document 114.
  5. ABC News correspondent Barbara Walters interviewed Arafat in Beirut on September 22. See David Binder, “Arafat Hints Easing of P.L.O. Stand,” New York Times, September 25, 1977, p. 10.
  6. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. For the paper Vance gave to Fahmy, see footnote 2, Document 118.