114. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of the President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
- Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
- Mr. David Aaron
- Ambassador Richard Murphy
- Mr. William B. Quandt
- Mr. Hamilton Jordan
- Mr. Jody Powell
- Mr. Robert Lipshutz
- Mr. Stuart Eizenstat
- Mr. Isa Sabbagh
- His Excellency ’Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syrian Arab Republic
- His Excellency Sabah Qabbani, Ambassador of Syrian Arab Republic
- Mr. Abdassalam Aqil, Private Secretary to Deputy Prime Minister
- Mr. Samih Abu Fares, Interpreter
President: I am very pleased to welcome the Foreign Minister and his colleagues and I apologize for the delay in beginning the full meeting. We had a thorough discussion about the arrangements for convening the Geneva Conference2 and I would like to outline our position at this time. I’ll give my version of our discussion and will welcome any corrections that the Foreign Minister might make. I pointed out that our public and private commitments to the Arab governments and Israel have not changed. I am completely dedicated to getting a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem and our approach is based on the principles that we have explained and which we support very strongly. I pointed out that we are carrying out several simultaneous negotiations: the United States and Israel; the United States with each of the Arab countries; the United States with the Soviet Union; and we are trying to bring about agreement not only between the Arabs and [Page 597] Israel, but among the Arabs themselves. Without flexibility, there is obviously no hope for progress. I think that the Foreign Minister would agree that Syria is not famous for flexibility (Laughter), and neither are the Israelis. But President Assad has taken a very constructive view in calling for a unified Arab delegation and by saying that Palestinian rights matter more than who represents the Palestinians at Geneva. Although we do not yet have Israel’s agreement, the proposal that we make has in our view the best chance of succeeding and I would like to outline our views.
Geneva should be convened this year with a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian representatives, and will include PLO members. The only caveat is that the PLO representatives should not be well known or famous persons.
I know that Foreign Minister Khaddam prefers to have three committees at Geneva, to deal with peace, withdrawal, and the Palestinian question, and that these will each be made up of members of the unified Arab delegation. He feels that this is an important principle. I replied that in our view there should be an arrangement whereby the subcommittees would be formed as follows: Egypt and Israel to discuss Sinai; Syria and Israel to discuss the Golan Heights; Jordan and Israel on specific topics of a bilateral nature; and in the discussions on the West Bank, the Palestinian entity, and the rights of the Palestinians, this would be between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, including members of the PLO. If desirable, there could be a separate group on the refugee problem, including Palestinians from several countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and even Iraq, but for the refugee question, there might be a separate discussion. This is not necessary, but might be a possibility. In order to accommodate the Syrian position on the three committees, the Arab nations and the Palestinians could consult constantly with one another and could approve agreements with Israel only if they are satisfied with the agreements on all of the other fronts. No one would need to sign an agreement with Israel unless he were satisfied with the other agreements as well.
My guess is that a detailed discussion on the Sinai, including the question of outposts, security forces, drawing of maps, would be done by technicians and subcommittees, but the final agreement would be made by heads of state. My belief is that unless this proposal proves to be acceptable, the chances for a Geneva Conference will be damaged very badly. We have committed ourselves to consistent involvement and we are trying to treat all of the parties fairly, including the Palestinians. I described to the Foreign Minister the text of an invitation that we would issue with the Soviets that is now in its final stages of preparation. The Secretary of State has pointed out that the text is not yet final, but the principles for reconvening a conference are in their final [Page 598] stages of preparation. In my opinion, once the principles have been agreed upon, then the invitation can be issued without much further difficulty. The Foreign Minister expressed a keen interest in how the parties would be addressed when the invitation is actually extended.
Secretary Vance: We are not yet there.
President [to Secretary Vance]: You and Foreign Minister Khaddam can work on this.
Secretary Vance: We haven’t yet discussed this with the Soviets. We are not that far.
President: The other question covered was PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist. We have a signed agreement committing our nation’s word of honor that we will not meet directly with the PLO until this is done. I expressed my doubt that Syria had fully agreed with our proposal, and I stated our hope that Syria and President Assad would help to get the PLO to accept Resolution 242.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: It would be unfortunate if the United States remained committed forever to Henry Kissinger’s promises!
President: I have reconfirmed this commitment in my own words. We would like to begin discussions with the PLO directly and this would help us to understand their special needs and to arrange for their representation at the Geneva discussions.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: If you permit, I would like to make a comment. As for Palestinian representation, our view is that we prefer that the PLO be present on all matters of interest to the Palestinians. This is the case whether the questions are touching on the West Bank or Gaza, or on those questions outside that area. There is a simple reason. No one can claim to represent the Palestinians except the PLO. If I may repeat the imagery I used with the President, when you talk about normalizing relations with Cuba, it makes no sense for you to talk with the Cuban refugees in Florida. Likewise, there is no point in dealing with Palestinians who are not part of the PLO. This would be like Secretary Vance discussing SALT with the White Russian emigrants in Europe. It is also true that no Palestinian would claim the right to speak for the Palestinians other than the PLO.
On Resolution 242, we sent a text to Secretary Vance.3 It is the maximum that we have managed to get from the Palestinians. Resolution 242 addresses itself only to the refugee problem and the issues of the 1967 war, and it is not up to date. I frankly think that the United States role should transcend the commitments of Henry Kissinger. The PLO is now an observer at the United Nations. There are twice as many states that recognize the PLO as recognize Israel. The United States in the past [Page 599] did vote for UN Resolution 181 in 1947,4 which proposed the creation of two states, one Jewish and one Arab. This was a historic commitment. The United States at the UN has voted for all the Resolutions calling for the right of return of all the Palestinian refugees. That also is a historic commitment.
As for the Palestinians, Resolution 242 does not address their problems. We could talk with Secretary Vance and come up with a draft which would help the Palestinians to attend Geneva and to participate. We would approach this with an open mind, the drafting of a new resolution. As to the President’s reference that we did not try to influence the Palestinians, I would like to point out that we have tried to. But our concern is that we be able to deal with a Palestinian leadership that is capable of adhering to resolutions. Any leadership which represents nothing would have no importance. There are also certain detailed points which I will discuss with Secretary Vance later.
I would like to repeat our opinion on the formation of committees. I will also convey to President Assad the proposals that you have made. Of course, we see in the US proposal for a unified Arab delegation a positive step in a contribution to peace.
President: The Foreign Minister asked earlier if I foresaw separate agreements and I said “Yes.” But Syria need not sign any agreement unless it is satisfied with all of the other agreements as well.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: We need to look at things clearly. Among the Arab nations, there is a mutual defense agreement. Assume that we reach a separate accord with Israel and that we sign, but that Egypt does not. If war then broke out between Egypt and Israel, we would be involved and our agreement with Israel would mean nothing. That is why I suggest a unified Arab delegation and a single treaty, since this would help keep the peace in the future. I refer to this because we want an agreement to be based on solid ground. This is especially important since we live in a world of such uncertainty. So if the foundations are not solid, the results will not last. Israel’s attitudes also make us look at basic factors. Prime Minister Begin has said that Palestine is only a part of Israel and that Israel considers her boundaries to include some of Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere. Today I saw a translation of an article from Time Magazine on US aid to Israel, and it included remarks by Senator Stone attacking the American Administration in the presence of the Israeli Foreign Minister.
Secretary Vance: Foreign Minister Dayan called after that and apologized. He was deeply upset.
[Page 600]Foreign Minister Khaddam: I would have locked up both Dayan and Stone!
President: I understand the problem you describe, but the example you use of Cuba is not exactly the same. There is no Palestinian nation; there is a Cuban nation.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: But there is a Palestinian people.
President: That’s right. We are trying to include the Palestinian people and PLO representatives. We are working to include the PLO representatives in Geneva, but this remains the most difficult issue for us to get agreement on. We need to have a Geneva conference, so that we can induce Israel to participate.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: If we let ourselves follow this to its logical conclusion, Israel in the end would be telling Jordan, Syria, and others who they should name as their representatives as well.
President: There is nothing I have outlined which is unfair to Syria or to the Palestinians or to any Arab country. I would like your government to endorse and approve the proposals that we have described to you. I would like to ask Secretary Vance to put this in writing so that there will be no mistake. If you could approve, and if we could get Egypt, Jordan, and the Soviets to agree, then I think we can get Israel to agree and go to Geneva, where we can meet the needs of the Palestinians, the need for peace, and the need for withdrawal. Only then can we make progress. We need you to be supportive and not be an obstacle to progress.
I have had a constant awareness of your special concern, and these proposals do not violate any of your principles. But I need you to be accommodating on the details of the arrangements and these may have to be different from those that you prefer. Of course, others will also have to be accommodating.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: I will convey to President Assad exactly what President Carter says.
President: If we could get an early favorable reply, we and the Soviets would be ready to prepare an invitation to consult with you and to get to Geneva before the end of the year. We will be careful not to surprise or embarrass you as we prepare for Geneva. I am just as committed to protecting the legitimate interests of the Palestinians and the refugees as I am to protecting Israel. The crucial thing for me is that I be able to earn and maintain your trust and the confidence of the others as well. If I betray that, the prospects for peace will perhaps be lost. So I want to ask you to be flexible on details, as long as we do not violate your principles.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: I would like to underscore for President Carter the great and deep appreciation that President Assad had for his [Page 601] integrity and his hard work and efforts, as well as those of Secretary Vance. We will spend every effort to get to the goal of a just and lasting peace. President Carter is the first American President who has so consistently followed the path of peace in the Middle East in earnest. Even if we disagree on some things, even profoundly, I must say this. As far as we are concerned, we want to continue and increase the cooperation between our two countries. I will convey to President Assad the substance of the US proposal. I will convey to you his reply. We will conduct some inter-Arab consultations as well. I believe that for the Arabs to agree on certain aspects will be better than for them to disagree.
President: Yes.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: I want to repeat that I appreciate President Carter’s receiving me. When are you coming to Damascus? We have heard of your upcoming trip.
President: I don’t want you to get tired of me.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: On the contrary, we would like to see you and we will let you see the Golan Heights after Israel’s withdrawal. You have seen perhaps the city of Quneitra, and you can see how the Israelis left it.
President: When a peace treaty is signed, perhaps then I will visit.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: We really wish that you would come the day that peace is established, but Israel’s behavior, and the American generosity in aid to Israel, are not encouraging.
President: I know that you will do everything possible to help bring about my visit. I will make a permanent commitment to do all that I can while I am President to bring peace in the Middle East.
Foreign Minister Khaddam: Thank you.
President: Give my best regards to President Assad.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement 1977: Volume I [II]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. Brackets are in the original.↩
- According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Khaddam from 10:32 to 11:35 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this discussion has been found.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 101.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 32.↩