Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

220. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, December 17, 1980, 1–2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Basic Strategy Issues

PARTICIPANT

• The President
• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • General David Jones, Chairman

• Central Intelligence Agency

  • Stansfield Turner, Director

• Office of Management & Budget

  • James McIntyre, Director

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• National Security Council

  • BGeneral William E. Odom

MINUTES OF MEETING

The President opened the meeting by explaining that he has read Brown’s paper² as well as the comments by Muskie and Turner.³ He set them as a point of departure in order not to use the meeting simply for repeating old points. He said he would like to hear stated what different is being recommended for our strategy. He also noted that there are sharp differences between State and Defense. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski proposed that Brown should begin with a brief summary of his paper followed by comments from Muskie and Turner. (C)

The Vice President asked what the final purpose of the paper and the meeting would be. The President answered that he wanted to leave a record of what our defense strategy should be. A Presidential Directive could do this. As he understands the paper, it is obvious that we are doing most of the things that it suggests, i.e. encouraging Japanese rearmament; shifting our military resources emphasis from Europe to the Persian Gulf. The discussion today should be aimed at stating changes that we might want. (S)

The President went on to say that President Ford and President Nixon had signed many more NSDMs than he has signed PDs. Many of the NSDMs carried over into this administration’s policy. We did not rescind them without a considerable review. Therefore, a Presidential Directive might well have a significant policy impact on the next administration. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski further explained that the process of reviewing the NSDMs led to retention of many NSDMs and considerable parts of others. (C)

The President said that he has a responsibility to look at the larger economic requirements above and beyond those mentioned in Brown’s paper. He said he has come to believe that the Defense appetite for a larger budget is insatiable. Reagan will be constrained by economic limits when he tries to increase defense spending. The President went on to explain his disapproval of the tendency of our military leaders to castigate ourselves for military weakness. When the Secretaries of the Services and the Chiefs of the Services denigrate our military strength, it creates a generally persuasive conviction by the public, domestic and foreign, that we are weak. The President said that he is not convinced, but the average American certainly believes our defense is weak. When the Chief of Staff of the Army says in testimony to the Congress that the Army is hollow, that has a devastating impact. It hurts us with our allies as well as with the American public. Why should our allies do more if we insist that we are so weak? I know from a closer look at some of these statements that there is balance to them which was not pointed out by the press, but the press won’t emphasize the balance, only what is said about our weakness. In town meetings again and again I ran into this belief among the public. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the discussion should address two points. First, the threat that we will face in the 1980s, and second, how we will defend the three strategic zones to which we are now committed. (S)

Harold Brown began his summary, noting that resources are limited, that we have not only traditionally prioritized them in the budget but also prioritized them geographically. The paper assumes that we recognize our interests lie beyond the continental United States—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. There is a natural tendency to prepare to meet military contingencies in all three areas simultaneously. The Soviets, of course, probably will not initiate actions in all zones at once, but the question is left for us to decide where to put the priority. (S)

We have been shifting towards Southwest Asia. A Soviet attack in Europe risks nuclear war. That is well known and generally understood. A Soviet attack in Southwest Asia would less likely risk nuclear war, but the Soviets might gain a hold on both Europe and East Asia if they could achieve control of the oil resources in the Persian Gulf region. Therefore, this region would be more attractive for a Soviet offensive. Thus it makes sense for us to give it higher priority in building a deterrent capability. (S)

One way to pressure the Europeans and the Japanese to do more for defense is to make our emphasis on Southwest Asia explicit to them and tell them that they must fill the gap we are leaving by shifting the priority on our reserves for deployment abroad. If they don’t build up to replace our reserves, then they create greater risks for themselves. (S)

The President said that is a key point—how firmly to push our allies. We could inform them that we reserve the right to move our forces from Europe to the Persian Gulf, make that explicit to them. (S)

Brown replied that this is further than his paper goes. (C)

The President continued that although legally he can pull U.S. forces from Europe, threatening the allies with a greater risk of Soviet aggression, we have not yet succeeded in getting them to do more to defend themselves. Perhaps it would be more proper for the U.S. to say that these troops are subject to call to the Persian Gulf. Therefore, you must do more for your own defense. (S)

Brown said that is very strong, if it is believable, but how believable it is, he doesn’t know. If they do not see it as a credible threat, we would be worse off. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had made an important point but not one he is sure he agrees with. If our purpose is to defend the Persian Gulf, the Europeans may let us do that while they pursue detente with the Soviet Union in Europe at the expense of defense of Europe. Dr. Brzezinski said that he prefers that Europe be included in helping us defend the Persian Gulf, thereby denying the allies the option to do less in Europe. (S)

The President said that these two points are not incompatible. Europe has been getting worse, not better in the defense area. We have reached the limit with our allies. We have also reached the limit in the forces we can hold for contingency purposes for East Asia and the Persian Gulf as well as in Europe. It is easy for us to tell the Europeans not to slacken their efforts, but it may not have any effect. (S)

The President continued that our primary goal is not to force the Europeans to do more but to defend the Persian Gulf within the resources of this country. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed but insisted that we must also get them to do more. He said he did not know how specifically, but it is essential. (S)

Brown argued that it may be easy for the allies to do more to defend themselves than to contribute more to the defense of the Persian Gulf. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski disagreed. He fears that would lead to more detente, not more defense in Europe. (S)

The President said that he wanted to underscore a second major point. In his State of the Union Message he said that an attack on the Persian Gulf would be met by all means including U.S. military force.⁴ It is obvious that we do not have adequate forces to respond and defeat a Soviet attack in the Persian Gulf. The press was quick to point that out. He said he has made some statements and also authorized Dr. Brzezinski and Harold Brown to make some, pointing out that we would not confine our response to the Persian Gulf alone. We would look for other areas as well. There is no way to defeat the Soviets in the Persian Gulf with conventional forces. We have not made it clear to the world that a Soviet attack there would necessarily lead to a wide conflict, that we would not confine our responses to that region alone. (S)

Brown said that it is hard to find other places to threaten the Soviets where the costs would be as great to them as the loss of Persian Gulf oil would be to us. (S)

The President admitted that it is hard, but the Soviets have vulnerabilities with their allies and with access to the seas. (S)

Brown argued that this is not a credible deterrent unless the threat is of an equal loss. (S)

The President said that this may be so, but that the Soviets will be confronting a broader response. Turner’s comments about an economic strategy are good. We have tried that to a degree, not all the way to economic warfare. The President noted that he is not constrained legally in taking economic sanctions. At least this was the case in post-Afghanistan and in connection with Iran. The law gives the President very great power in the economic area. (S)

What has been spelled out as the “Carter Doctrine,” the President continued, disavowing any enthusiasm for that label but noting that it has some currency, has not been understood fully in all its ramifications. The press rightly pointed out that we cannot meet the Soviets with conventional forces and match them successfully in the Persian Gulf. (S)

David Aaron asked Brown why he believed nuclear weapons would not be a credible deterrence in the Persian Gulf but would be credible in Europe. (S)

Brown responded that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and our force organization in Europe would make resort to their use almost automatic. In the Persian Gulf, where no such infrastructure exists and where no such threat of nuclear weapons use has been made, the threshold is much higher. (S)

Aaron responded that we should make it seem more likely that we would use them in the Persian Gulf. Six and a half divisions are certainly not enough to defend the region. (S)

Brown said that we have about the same force ratio against the Soviets with that many divisions in Iran as we had for a long time in Europe. (S)

The President said that he would make a point entirely for the privacy of this meeting. It is hopeless to believe that we can match the Soviets with conventional forces in Iran. We simply cannot do it. We cannot defend them without the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Brown argued that short of the use of nuclear weapons we might stabilize a conflict in Iran with limited conventional forces. We get oil from Saudi Arabia which might not necessarily be invaded. We could escalate either vertically or horizontally. (S)

The President agreed that we should be prepared for both horizontal and vertical escalation as well as economic sanctions. We must convince the Soviets that we will do more on all fronts, that they will face a worldwide response, that they cannot narrow the conflict to the military front in Iran. (S)

Brown said that the more conventional forces we deploy there, the more credible that worldwide response will be to the Soviets. The President responded by saying that he hates to consider the conventional defense of Iran. He recalled the military options which were planned against Iran last winter—how much air power it took and the operational difficulties [less than 1 line not declassified]—the more familiar he became with the military operational difficulties and realities, the more he became convinced that a conventional defense there is beyond our capabilities even if we expanded our forces considerably. (S)

General Jones reviewed for the President briefly a recent JCS discussion of⁵ [14 lines not declassified]

General Jones continued that one of the most helpful things we could do would be to have NATO look into an operational buildup in East Turkey. If NATO provides the umbrella for this effort, it might possibly succeed. The President asked if the Turks would permit this. Jones answered that with NATO behind the effort, the Turks are more likely to agree to it. The Turks need the confidence that all of NATO is with them. They do not want to risk war with the Soviets outside of NATO in support of our Southwest Asian operations. (S)

The President said he did not want to throw cold water on this idea, but his experience in the past four years leaves doubt about our depending on our allies. To predicate the use of Turkish bases for cross-border operations against the Soviet Union is not a safe assumption. The Turks may never have the temerity to permit us to attack their neighbors from their soil. (S)

Brown said that the Turks have some capability to let us operate early, i.e. before the outbreak of hostilities from their bases. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed with the President that the allies will not be dependable except in the event that their vital interests are directly at stake. He went on to argue, however, that the size of the forces, whether they be six and a half divisions or four divisions, may be less critical to convince the Soviets that we are serious than our unwillingness to commit some divisions. The President said he could not agree with this. (S)

Brown explained that more lift is needed, not more divisions. If we had more divisions today we could not get them there in time to make a difference. Added lift is the critical need. (S)

The President said then that he wanted to think out loud and to clear up in his own mind the strategic challenges to be met. He said that because he does not work with these questions daily, he does not have it as firmly in his control as the other members of the NSC who devote more time to the details. He believes we should proceed with the assumption that we will get little help from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The allies won’t help much either, even if the Persian Gulf region is attacked. [2 lines not declassified]

Brown said that lift from Europe requires about the same as lift is required for forces from the United States. If we draw from our forces in Europe for Southwest Asia, it should be a second and later deployment. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said why not say to the Europeans that X plus Y forces are needed for the Persian Gulf. We are providing X and you, therefore, should provide Y for that contingency. If you do not, we will have to take Y from Europe. (S)

Brown said that he feels assured that we might have some French and British ground forces in the Persian Gulf contingency, but we will get nothing from the Germans. If we say we are unwilling to put our ground forces in Southwest Asia without German forces as well, this would not work. (S)

The President asked about including Israeli forces. Brown said maybe, but is it worth the political liability? Israeli forces would not help much against the Soviets. (S)

General Jones said that we don’t plan to remove divisions from Europe in any event. They are not trained for it nor are they equipped for it. Our contingency plans and military strategy since World War II have been concerned with war in regions; Europe being the primary region, Korea the second region. Now we have a third region in Southwest Asia. The strategic lift is the same for all three regions. We might take a calculated risk by removing things like bombs and some support equipment from Europe, but not divisions. It is doubtful that that kind of shift from Europe would put much pressure on the allies. (S)

The Vice President asked if General Jones agrees that we will build no more divisions in the United States. Jones answered that there are no plans now to do so. Even if we did, we could not deploy them because of the lack of lift. Another major constraint, he added, is our industrial mobilization weakness. It would require about three years to gear up for increased aircraft production. Tanks, artillery, and aircraft would not be produced in significant numbers for several years. Therefore, the size of our forces could not go up if you gave us all the money we want. (S)

The President said that he does not see from this discussion what we would do differently from what we are now doing in our military strategy. (S)

Jones said that one difference would be to take a global look and plan for contingencies in both Korea and the Persian Gulf, but only one at a time, not both simultaneously. (S)

David Aaron mentioned another difference as preparation for horizontal escalation. General Jones replied that other than some limited naval operations, there is little promise in such an effort. Brown repeated that we cannot find an even swap in horizontal escalation with Iran. (S)

Brown continued that we might make our strategy first priority for Europe, second priority for Asia, and as a third priority, deal with the Far East through building up our relationship with China to include military cooperation. (S)

Turner, noting that the President had asked what he would put in a Presidential Directive that we are not now doing, agreed with Harold Brown and General Jones that lift is the most important thing to emphasize and also an increased priority for Southwest Asia. In a Presidential Directive the President could direct that a new acquisition of forces and training, the emphasis should be on third world contingency. The President asked at the expense of what? (S)

Turner responded, Central Europe. You do not have the option to deal militarily with the Persian Gulf and other non-European areas because of 30 years of tradition of preparing for the defense of Europe. We need to reverse this basic concept in our strategy. We have assumed that if we build heavy forces for Europe, they will meet any third world contingency. But this has not been a sound assumption. We should instead build lighter and more flexible forces. They would have a major impact. We are putting so much emphasis on Southwest Asia, that I believe that you will want your successor’s successor to have the capability to deal with Mozambique, Nicaragua, and any other such contingency, not just reinforcement of Europe. We need to get off the kick that Europe is first priority. (S)

Brown asked Turner what he meant by mobility. Do you mean mobility to get there? Or after they get there? Turner replied that he meant both. Easy lift to the third world but also good mobility after forces arrive. Because we have built the wrong kind of aircraft carriers, that is, large nuclear powered ships, we cannot afford to risk one of them in the Persian Gulf. To lose one there will be a catastrophe. If we had built small carriers, we could put them there. We need smaller and more mobile forces. Brown replied that our forces must be prepared to fight against Soviet forces and, therefore, not simply in Mozambique. (S)

The President returned to what we would want to do differently. He said he thought we were doing most of what Turner suggests. Brown said yes, this is true. We decided last year to put more priority on non-European contingencies. McIntyre recalled the debate last year about our “heavying up” our divisions. The President said that if we have modified our strategy, we need to write that down. If we have not, we need to write down in a Presidential Directive what we are doing. (S)

Brown said that the JCS proposal to move Europe to second priority and to put the emphasis on the Persian Gulf is new. Dr. Brzezinski added that vertical and horizontal escalation are also new. (S)

The President turned to Muskie for his comments. Muskie had two points. First, the paper shows what we have been attempting to do by putting priority on the threat in the Southwest Asia region. Second, it shows that events could affect us very adversely in that region. Now with the crisis in Poland, we are shifting our attention back to Europe. Against this background we must avoid laying down a policy we have not supported and not followed in the past. It is important to spell out what we are doing. We may also indicate future directions and identify underlying risks that we face. But we should not confuse what we have done with the new directions and the attendant risks, especially if we have not addressed those risks with our actions in the past. A second part of a policy could spell out the responsibilities of the allies, what their share of the burden is. We did that to a considerable extent this past year. The allies are very reluctant to make a defense effort outside of Europe. The President added that they are also reluctant even in Europe. (S)

Brown said that we should avoid a shift in strategy in a new Presidential Directive but that we could codify what we are doing, things we have been doing since 1977. They are fairly clear and straight-forward. First, we have been trying to improve the defense posture in Europe. Second, we have given a higher priority to the Persian Gulf region. Third, we have begun a close relationship with China in an effort to lessen the requirement for U.S. contingency forces earmarked for that region. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski explained to the President that at the SCC meeting on Security Framework yesterday a draft PD had been circulated, one more narrowly focused on the Persian Gulf region.⁶ It sets forth the President’s commitment in the State of the Union Address⁷ and elaborates on a strategy for meeting that commitment. In light of the discussion today we could broaden it to deal with strategic challenges of the 1980s. (S)

The President said there were two other points not addressed in Brown’s paper which he was concerned about and should be addressed in any directive. The first was about our relationship with the Peoples Republic of China as the next administration might deal with it. We have pursued it on an economic, political, and cultural basis. The new administration might even reverse much of that. We need to emphasize to Governor Reagan what is at stake. But to move another step and to sell military equipment, this we cannot resolve even among ourselves. Brown interjected that we have gone further in that direction than the President suggests. We have not discouraged the French and the British from direct military sales to the Chinese. The President said that indeed we had transferred some computers and dual-use technology which we would not give the Soviet Union. (S)

The second point, the President continued, is to put emphasis on arms control. A point not mentioned in Brown’s paper. He went on to say that he has come to doubt that the⁸ MX missile will ever be developed⁹ although it should be. Too many obstacles—environmentalists’ concerns, design problems—are being voiced by the critics. We may even become inferior in strategic forces to the Soviet Union as a result. The President said he would like to leave office encouraging the next administration to keep both SALT and the MX deployment. He added that he would never forgive General Haig for coming back from NATO and stabbing us in the back by testifying against SALT. Haig admitted in testimony that he had not even read the treaty. (S)

The President said he would like to leave arms control as a policy for the next administration. We simply cannot go on with arms expenditures. We cannot manage them economically. Jim McIntyre will agree. With minimum social security, housing, and other social programs growing to unsupportable levels, I do not see how we will meet more defense. For us to slough over the arms control alternative for the coming decade is a mistake. We must try to contain the defense costs through arms control. (S)

The Vice President noted that the United States has been humiliated several times in the past four years by third rate powers because the President has so little discretionary resources for military and economic assistance. He needs at least one half billion dollars for this purpose. It will give him the latitude necessary to handle emergencies rapidly. (S)

Brown returned to the President’s comments about arms control and emphasized that the paper assumes SALT II limits. The President admitted that he had missed that point. He then reemphasized the two points: our relationship with China and arms control. We have so many advantages with SALT. If we could establish strategic equality with the Soviet Union, we could whip them badly economically, politically, and culturally. They have so many problems which we need to exploit. (S)

Brown said yes, this is true, but as long as they pursue an arms buildup we must keep up with them. The President said that point must be put in the Presidential Directive. (S)

The next administration must understand, the President continued, that the Soviet Union will meet great threats to its own power. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a demonstration of the failure of the Soviet system. As Dr. Brzezinski has pointed out, over a 150 countries in the world have favored our human rights policy. Human rights has placed great strains on the Soviet system. After four, five, or ten years, I don’t know what they will do. They don’t even equal human rights achievements of Egypt.¹⁰ If we can get by the next five years without war, we will win the peaceful competition. This is my view after four years in this office. Governor Reagan needs to understand this. (S)

Brown said that the United States public also needs to understand this. The President went on to say that to compete with the Soviet militarily¹¹ is to get into the brier patch with them. That competition is not good for us. The public won’t support it.¹² In a war, the American public would support a military buildup. But we should seek to push the Soviets into the realm of peaceful competition. (S)

One more point the President added is that the Europeans might not even meet three percent increase for defense. He said he is not even confident that LRTNF will be deployed—in Italy for example.¹³ (S)

Warren Christopher observed that energy is overlooked in Brown’s paper. Unless we do develop energy independence, we will omit a fundamental building block in our overall strategy. Although this is a military strategy paper, Christopher admitted, the energy element needs to be included. (S)

Turner noted that Governor Reagan does not seem to understand the energy issues, judging from briefings CIA has been giving him. He believes we just have to drill more wells in the United States. (S)

The President added one more point about our military strategy that concerns him. That is our presence in the Caribbean. We have this ninety-man JTF headquarters in Key West. We played around with moving the USS Forrestal into the Caribbean. Should we strengthen our forces there? We need to assess that, he added. (S)

Brown said that the JTF was only a headquarters. We have, however, shifted some of our East Coast training further south toward the Caribbean in order to create a growing presence in that region. We should not, however, divert forces from Europe or Southwest Asia. The President added that we should not divert forces. Rather he is more interested in where our forces in the United States are located and the possibility of relocations in the direction of Key West. He said he would like to create quietly a significant military shift which would then be discovered by the New York Times and pointed to as of great significance. It would send a proper signal to Cuba and reassure our friends in the region. (S)

Both Brown and McIntyre commented briefly on the possibility for base consolidation and other CONUS force shifts that might contribute to this effect. The President said he was interested in a symbolic¹⁴ signal, not a major force shift. Claytor pointed out that Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico is a key training area which might be used to contribute to such a signal. The President once again said that he would like the public to know that the United States has quietly moved some of its training to the Caribbean. (S)

The President then summed up his evaluation of Brown’s paper. Overall, it is good. Its thrust is good. Muskie made an important point about a Presidential Directive reaffirming what we should be doing as distinct from what¹⁵ we have done. It is probably not feasible to include Japanese strategic dependency on the PRC. The President said that he did, however, believe he had been right about withdrawing¹⁶ our forces from Korea in¹⁷ 1977. Everyone in the government was against him, and when the President is alone he cannot act. (S)

General Jones told the President that tomorrow he departs for Jordan and Israel where he intends to try to achieve two things. First, he wants to give them greater confidence about our power in the region, and second, he wants them to understand better our Southwest Asian strategy. (S)

The President noted that apparently the Saudis are satisfied with our response on the F–15s. Jones said that this seems to be the case, but Brown noted that the Sultan said that we owe them a letter on the matter, something we should provide because when Haig comes in he may have political ambitions that will make him less sympathetic to the Saudis. The meeting ended with a chuckle over Brown’s comment on Haig. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Subject File, Box 33, President’s Comments on Memos: Incomplete, 12/21/80–1/13/81. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the minutes: “Zbig—This is approximately correct, although many nuances are wrong. We need a clear, definitive & forceful PD on this subject. J.”
2. See the attachment to Document 214.
3. See Documents 217 and 219
4. Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address, delivered on January 23, is in Public Papers: Carter, 1980, pp. 194–200.
5. No minutes of this meeting were found.
6. For the summary of conclusions of the December 16 SCC meeting on the Persian Gulf Security Framework, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 97. PD/NSC–63 “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” January 15, 1981, is ibid, Document 98.
7. See footnote 3, Document 214.
8. Carter inserted the word “mobile” before “MX missile.”
9. Carter crossed out the word “developed” and replaced it with “deployed.”
10. Carter wrote a question mark in the left margin next to this sentence.
11. Carter inserted the word “only” before “militarily.”
12. Carter amended the sentence “The public won’t support it” to read “It will be difficult to sustain public support.”
13. Carter changed the period after “example” to a comma and added “or even Germany.”
14. Carter crossed out the word “symbolic” and replaced it with “clear.”
15. Carter inserted the word “just” before “what.”
16. Carter inserted the word “phased” before “withdrawing.”
17. Carter inserted the word “beginning” before “in.”