Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

217. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, December 2, 1980

SUBJECT

• Defense Strategy Paper

I agree with the central arguments of Harold Brown’s paper on U.S. strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union.² My understanding of these arguments is that:

— the danger of conflict is increasing;

— the U.S. must intensify its defense effort;

— the Allies must do more; and

— our economic, energy, and foreign policies should be geared to support our increasingly difficult national security requirements.

However, I believe that in a number of areas these points are carried to far-reaching conclusions unsupported by the analysis.

Before addressing the specific issues Harold raises, here are three broad questions which should be raised:

First, a question of process. I do not believe that Harold’s paper contains sufficiently detailed analysis to justify making decisions involving basic security issues and billions of dollars.

Second, the budgetary implications. What is the analytical basis for arriving at a figure of $250 billion? Where would these funds come from: In an increased deficit? In reductions of domestic programs or foreign assistance? What would be the inflationary impact? The positive as well as negative affects on our industrial base and civilian R&D?

And third, I would like to see closer examination of the view that we may be faced with the prospect of simultaneously fighting one and two half wars. I join with Harold in hoping that any conflict or conflicts with the Soviets could avoid the use of nuclear weapons. We should by all means provide the President with sufficient options to enable him to avoid that dreadful decision. But what is the prospect that three simultaneous wars with the Soviets in different parts of the world could under almost any foreseeable circumstances not lead to a general nuclear war? And if this is so, what are the implications for the force buildup and dispositions Harold suggests?

I have the following comments on the eight issues discussed in the paper:

Issue #1

I generally agree with Harold’s assessment, and would add that nuclear parity could ease Soviet fears regarding the risks of military adventures and even of engaging U.S. forces.

We should also consider the question Harold raises as to whether readiness should take priority over modernization. I take it from Harold’s concerns about increased dangers of war that DOD would favor stressing readiness, but I read elsewhere in the paper that the investment sector is crucial and that we should make every effort to take advantage of our greatest strength: technological innovation and modernization.

Should we be more aggressive in exploring ways of seeking savings in strategic arms for the sake of building up our conventional strength? My sense is that once our new strategic programs begin coming on line in the mid-1980s, including ALCM carriers in the early part of the decade, our strategic position will start improving rather significantly, with the Soviets increasingly at a disadvantage if they cannot or do not do anything about their vulnerable ICBMs.

Issue #2

I agree that we need to continue to strengthen our abilities to react swiftly to a Soviet thrust into the PG/IO areas. I’m less inclined than Harold, however, to think that the Soviets see the stakes for themselves as high in Southwest Asia as in Europe. In the former, they may have an interest in denying us our vital interests; in the latter they see their own interests as vital—interests which go first to perserving the status quo in Eastern Europe and then to strengthening their position vis-a-vis NATO. In setting priorities for the next five years, let’s bear in mind that our concerns may well shift back to Europe if we experience further crises there, as well we may.

Moreover, we should consider more closely whether Soviet doctrine and experience would incline them to strike in force against Southwest Asia in order to cut the lifeline of the industrial states. Soviet experience in Afghanistan against a weak but determined enemy in a hostile environment may have given Moscow pause in considering a far larger venture in the same region. Would Soviet diversion of substantial forces from their strategic reserve into Southwest Asia lead them to be concerned about their vulnerability on other fronts—except under general war conditions? The threat may for some time continue to be more from weakness and political flux in Iran, and thus Soviet opportunity—at little cost and with no direct aggression—to fundamentally improve its strategic position and influence in the region. This challenge is difficult for us to meet. Even a major increase in U.S. force capability in the region may not ultimately enable us to meet it.

Issue #3

Facilities may be the weakest link in our strategy for filling the PG/IO vacuum—but we should not discount the fact that men, lift, prepositioned stocks may also be in short supply. Even if facilities are the main problem, we should stick to our strategy of diversification. It makes political—and I would think strategic—sense to do so. If our military doctrines place a premium on large, individual base complexes, we should review those doctrines, or at least their application in this part of the world. Also, the way to get to the modern staging bases that we need is through a policy of gradually increasing our presence and rights throughout the area, rather than a make-or-break effort for a few super-bases.

DOD’s idea of trading U.S. security assurances and new assistance to Israel for progress toward a comprehensive peace is worth considering.

But I am doubtful about seeking an explicit security-for-oil bargain with the Saudis. It’s been implicit in our policies for some time. But we can’t be so sure that the Saudis would so value an explicit security commitment that they would commit themselves to permit sure access to oil at reasonable prices. For they know that we are pursuing our own security interests, and that we will probably act to protect those interests whether or not we make a commitment. They also could doubt the strength of our security assurances if we threaten to go slow on security measures unless oil is guaranteed—with consequent damage to our security position in the area.

Issue #4

I agree with Harold’s argument here and throughout the paper that we should (a) force the Soviets in peace and war to spread their defense effort and deployments against all three fronts (Europe, Southwest Asia and East Asia) so that they cannot concentrate against any one (e.g. redeploy from the Chinese border to Europe, and (b) discourage the Soviets from expanding a conflict beginning in one of these areas to the other two. But this strategy raises major problems if it means expanding the geographical scope of Japan’s military role and our direct contribution to China’s military capabilities.

[2 paragraphs (34 lines) not declassified].

On China, it has been my understanding that they are so far behind the Soviets that the provision of “certain carefully calculated defensive weaponry” would not make an appreciable difference. The Chinese currently tie down about one-fourth of Soviet armed forces and about the same proportion of their new SS–20 capability. But the major Soviet concern is probably that of being entrapped in the masses of Chinese in the event of war. This is what forces the Soviets to maintain its heavy dispositions in the region. Thus, what we ought to be addressing is whether it is helpful or harmful to worry the Soviets further about the U.S.-Chinese military relationship.

Issue #5

I feel as strongly as Harold does about this. It’s crucial for our international security posture, and it’s crucial for maintaining domestic support for our foreign policy and defense efforts. I happen not to think it makes sense to raise the NATO spending goal to, say, five percent. Doing so, while the Allies are still at or worse than three percent would tend to show that these goals aren’t real. We also face the real problems that the Socialists and other “left” electorate in Europe remain strong. We must press our Allies as firmly as we can but calibrate our pressure carefully so we do not end up with Governments in European capitals even less sympathetic to our objectives. Our interest is to strengthen Europe and our ties with it, and to get the Allies to do what is feasible; we will defeat all our objectives if the focus of foreign policy tension becomes U.S.–European rather than Allied-Soviet.

I’m also beginning to think we should look for some concept other than the “division of labor.” It tends to accentuate European views that Europe is or can be an “island of detente” insulated from U.S.–Soviet competition in Southwest Asia. Moreover, I’m not sure the American public will be satisfied—and supportive of our efforts—if the Allies aren’t bearing more of the burden and running the same risks as we in the Persian Gulf. I agree that we want the Europeans to fill the gap in NATO, but we have to involve them more in Southwest Asia.

Finally, we are unlikely to revive Saudi aid to Egypt absent significant progress on Palestinian issues or an unwelcome Egyptian move back toward the Saudi positions on Jerusalem, etc.

Issue #6

I agree fully both that we make every effort to keep our technological edge and that we tighten up on technology transfer.

Issue #7

I would add here only that for their own reasons, our Allies are likely increasingly to point to the absence of an American draft as undercutting our case that the security situation is getting more acute and requires more sacrifices from everyone.

Issue #8

As Harold notes, we are working on a joint plan on security assistance. Needless to say, State has always sought higher assistance levels than have been approved. Beyond this, while we have sometimes differed with DOD over how to get other governments to act in our interest, State must continue to make every effort to ensure that our foreign policy helps meet our military needs.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Official Working Papers of S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–January 1981, Lot 82D298, Sensitive Dec. 80. Secret. Sent via Alpha Channel. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: “TS + RB drafters. S/P did final.”
2. See Document 214.