I believe that one of the most important legacies we can leave to our
successors is some clear advice on the basic strategic issues they will
now have to confront. Our views on these issues should also shape our
own final budget decisions.
To this end, I would like to discuss the attached paper with you at the
next MBB with a view to then providing
a paper to the President. For obvious reasons let me request that you
give the attached no further distribution, and
that no copies be made.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense2
BASIC ISSUES AFFECTING STRATEGY AND
FORCE POSTURE IN THE 80s
I. THE PROBLEMS WE
CONFRONT
A. The “catch-up” problem. The cost of the
Vietnam War ($236B in FY 80 $) and
its aftermath (a 35% cut in real annual defense spending 1969–75)
created a substantial imbalance between a diverted or declining
US effort and steady real
increases in Soviet defense spending. While real US defense spending 1976–80 increased
10%, this increase was least in the investment sector, where
inflation most outran budget predictions of its level. In fact the
differential between US and Soviet
defense investment runs (according to CIA estimates) about $240B over the decade of the 70s,
as measured in FY 1980 dollars.
True, total NATO plus Japanese
defense spending is still comparable to that of the Warsaw Pact,
because fortunately we have rich Allies and the USSR only poor ones. But in the
crucial investment sector the alliance still lags behind—and
alliance investment is only partially additive to ours, because of
overlap, duplication, and inefficiencies. Yet we must confront this
problem squarely in the 80s and address the related strategic
issues.
B. Strategic nuclear parity. Preserving
strategic deterrence naturally takes overriding priority, and will
be more expensive than in the recent past even if we can arrange a
continuation of the SALT II limits
on Soviet forces. We will have to spend a lot more on a strategic
arms race if SALT II fails—and
modernize forces/strengthen C3 even with SALT II. Nonetheless, the chief
strategic consequence of nuclear parity is to compel greater
reliance on much more costly conventional forces. In short, nuclear
parity requires a better (more favorable to us) conventional balance
as well.
C. The Strategic Vacuum in the Persian Gulf.
Since PD–18 was written the
revolution in Iran, invasion of Afghanistan and now Iran/Iraq war
have underlined the vulnerability of the oil-rich PG region to Soviet exploitation.
Moreover, the President has already made the policy decision to
repel such a threat by force if need be.3 This compels us to face
[Page 894]
up to a whole new
requirement—one and two “half-wars” instead of one and
one-half.4
D. The “Simultaneity” Problem. Though DoD is
doing its best to meet an added PG/IO requirement, even currently programmed RDF capabilities cannot cope with a
Soviet threat at levels they could surely
mount. Moreover, the forces, lift, and support we would have to
employ against this PG/IO lift,
and support we would have to employ against this PG/IO threat would be largely at the
expense of our NATO and Far East
capabilities, at least for the next several years. This raises the
question of “simultaneity.” We must prudently
hedge against the possibility that a direct US/Soviet clash in the
PG/IO would escalate into a
global conflict, whether or not we chose to escalate. There is a
real question about the likelihood—or attractiveness to the
Soviets—of mounting simultaneous attacks, as
opposed to threats. If they did attack
however, currently programmed US and
allied resources would not permit adequate defense of three widely
separated theaters simultaneously. We would have to go on the
strategic defensive somewhere and perhaps sacrifice territory, as we
had to do initially in WW II. Thus we must find strategic avenues
for reducing the risks that regional conflict would expand into
global war—at times and under circumstances adverse to our vital
interests.
E. Serious economic constraints, including the
impact of the energy crunch and other inflationary/slow growth
pressures, severely constrict our ability to generate adequate
defense growth—despite growing popular perceptions that such growth
is essential.
F. Differing perceptions of the “threat” also
create serious difficulties for us. Most of our friends simply don’t
see the magnitude of the threat as we do, or if they do, quail at
confronting it. The political consensus in most of them for greater
defense efforts and a more assertive policy is weaker than in the
US, particularly-among the rising generation. Moreover, much of the
world seems to think we’re still as strong as ever, but questions
US leadership, while many others
think we’ve sunk to second place. In both cases we confront a
pervasive “image of the US” problem.5
What about the longer term? If we can deter
conflict and restrict Soviet expansionism for another decade or so,
there is reason to believe that internal Soviet contradictions will
progressively limit Soviet ability to keep building up military
power. Hence we probably do not face an unending arms race; rather
our problem is how to get through a
[Page 895]
dangerous decade with our vital interests
intact. During this period we must of course continue our efforts to
constrain Soviet power and enhance stability via the SALT process, MBFR and other forms of arms
control.6
II. BASIC ISSUES OF
GRAND STRATEGY
In DoD’s view the sheer magnitude of these problems makes clear that
a further major evolution of present policies and programs is
required, despite the real accomplishments of the last few years.
The accelerated DoD programs we believe essential will be presented
to a PRC. This paper addresses
corollary strategic and policy issues which also bear directly on
our national security needs. Indeed there are clear tradeoffs
here.7 To the extent that the
policy initiatives DoD proposes are infeasible or prove
unsuccessful, even larger US defense
budgets than DoD is proposing will almost certainly be
required.8
This is because what our friends and allies do for the common defense
is fully as important as what we do ourselves. Indeed our own vital
interests can only be adequately served, at a cost we can afford, by
a “coalition” strategy and posture. Among other things, we cannot
successfully defend in WE, SWA, or the FE without extensive participation and cooperation of
friends and allies. Thus rational burden-sharing is the sine qua non of credible
deterrence/defense.
Nor can we afford to address our security needs purely in terms of
defense programs. A better dovetailing of US defense, economic, and foreign policies is equally
essential, which raises a related set of issues.9
We have selected eight key issues for SCC debate and recommendation to the President. What we
decide on each of them will affect the others, as well as the size
of future US defense programs.
Therefore, after considering each issue on its own, we ought to
think about the overall situation to see whether our conclusions add
up to a viable overall strategy for the 80s, which in turn should
drive our security policies as well as programs.
Issue #1—Do the 80s pose a significantly greater
danger of major regional or global conflict? This is
essentially a matter of subjective judgment. But volatility and
change in the so-called Third World (and the opportunities this
offers for Soviet or surrogate exploitation), together with growing
stresses in Eastern Europe (especially Poland) and post-Tito risks
in Yugoslavia, do seem to create greater likelihood of conflicts
affecting
[Page 896]
coalition
interests in the 80s. Some also argue that there is a “window” of
vulnerability—not just nuclear—which Moscow might be tempted to
exploit before this gap can be closed. For example, the USSR might feel impelled to create a
diversion from its problems in Eastern Europe by pressing forward in
Southwest Asia.
Moreover, the threat to vital Free World oil access in the volatile
PG/IO region could lead to direct US/USSR
confrontation—if the Soviets were tempted to intervene
forcibly and only the US has much
capability for deterring or halting Soviet intervention.
Thus DoD does see a greater likelihood of conflict, which impacts
directly on both the size of coalition deterrence/defense effort
needed and on relative emphases within it. For example, it bears on
the relative weight we give to readiness vs. modernization if
resources remain so constrained.
Issue #2—If for several years to come defending our
vital interests in the widely separated NATO, Persian Gulf and Far East
theaters simultaneously is beyond our capabilities, which should
receive priority? And—a different question—where should the
greatest resource increment be applied? These
issues have grave political as well as military implications. Our
strategy has long been based on the premise that holding on to
Western Europe, a developed power complex now fully as rich as our
own, was first priority. We see no reason to change this
judgment.
But the security and economic health of Western Europe (and Japan for
that matter) depend on assured access to PG oil. Thus in a real sense defense of the PG/IO is directly linked to that of
both other areas of vital interest to us. Moreover, the
vulnerability and volatility of the PG region suggest that the risks of conflict may be
greatest in this area, where we are currently least well-prepared.
The DoD judgment is that the Soviets would see much less risk and
almost as great gain in seeking control of Southwest Asia and its
resources by combined military action and political pressure than in
seeking control of Western Europe by those means. Therefore, DoD
believes that Southwest Asia should have priority in our FY 82–86 buildup, (though not
necessarily in wartime allocation of our forces).10
In turn Europe and Japan must be pressed to assume a greater share of
the burden of their own defense under a “division of labor” concept
(see Issue #4). Moreover, in the Far East theater improving
US/PRC/Japan relations offer
new strategic options to protect our vital interests and create
added constraints on Soviet behavior at little cost to the US (see Issue #4).
[Page 897]
Issue #3—How can we best fill the PG/IO power vacuum? If this
is our top priority need through the mid-80s, we must develop a more
credible surge capability. Given the political and military
constraints on deployable Allied power, this has to be primarily a
US task—with only modest help
from our European or FE Allies.
But within current budget guidelines we could not deploy sufficient
force rapidly enough, and support it adequately, to offer much
confidence of credible defense if deterrence failed. For example,
even under present program guidelines the 3⅓ division, 4 tacair
wing, RDF currently programmed will
still lack important elements, especially sufficient lift, support,
and munitions—and the basing structure programmed would be marginal.
Moreover, DoD believes an adequately supported force of at least 6⅓
divisions plus seven air wings is needed to pose a credible US ability to counter Soviet
intervention should it in fact take place.11 There is also a critical lack of the fast air and
sealift needed to surge to the PG in
timely enough fashion to maximize deterrence or minimize Soviet
gains. Are we willing to pay this price?
Moreover, even if we develop such capabilities, they cannot be used
effectively without forward bases in the area. This is the weakest
single element of our emerging PG/IO strategy. Because the area countries are so
strongly opposed to US bases, we are
compelled to build ungarrisoned facilities which they presumably
would allow us to use once they perceived an imminent threat.12 Saudi Arabia is key in
this respect—both as the largest oil producer and the geographic
locale from which we could most effectively deter or defend against
a Soviet move into Iran/Iraq. Since the Gulf states may not let us
deploy until the last moment, we also need staging bases in the
region (which can serve as less vulnerable rear logistic bases too).
Egypt looks like the best bet.13
But this uncomfortable dependence on PG/IO states with whom we lack a firm alliance
relationship dictates a major effort to improve our relations with
them. Here the lack of an Arab-Israeli settlement makes our task
more difficult. Israel’s efforts to strengthen her own security
position risk exacerbating the Arab/Israeli dispute at the very time
when we seek to get the Arab states to focus on the Soviet threat.
DoD believes it may be necessary to provide such firm security
assurances (and sufficient aid) to Israel as to calm her legitimate
fears (and
[Page 898]
make even
clearer to the Arabs our commitment to Israel’s security).14 Such assurances (and aid) may also be
indispensable to successful completion of the Camp David process, in
terms of autonomy and territory. They would in turn enable us to
meet the insistent demand of Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) for “equal
treatment” with Israel. DoD sees a resolution of this issue as
indispensable to the kind of security relationship without which we
simply cannot execute a viable PG/IO strategy.15
The energy squeeze poses another serious obstacle to closer
relationships with key PG oil
producers. Their price increase and production policies create
economic difficulties which in turn impede our defense efforts, thus
adversely affecting the very East/West military balance which in the
last analysis protects their security too. Since continuation of
such policies could make major defense budget increases impossible,
DoD believes it vital for us to attempt to develop a policy which
explicitly trades our security umbrella for their granting sure
access at reasonable prices to PG
oil.
Issue #4—What Far East strategic posture will best
relieve Soviet pressure on Europe and the PG/IO, while limiting risks of
simultaneous global war? If we must give strategic priority
to Europe and now the PG/IO, we
face again the old WW II problem of what to do about our Pacific
flank. Though neither China, Japan, nor for that matter the US can pose a major offensive threat to
the USSR, Moscow exhibits live
concern over its own FE flank and is
steadily strengthening its forces there. Fortunately Japan’s rapid
economic development and the growing parallelism of US/PRC strategic interests (China’s
concern over the Soviet threat is even greater than our own), offer
a strategic option for (1) enhancing Soviet concern over a two-front
threat; yet (2) forestalling the need for major US defense increases directed
specifically at this third theater.
Given our acute need to limit Soviet capabilities against NATO and the PG/IO, and our inability to deal with
all three fronts simultaneously, DoD believes that the clearest way
to accomplish goals (1) and (2) above is to insist on greater
Japanese rearmament and provide China certain carefully calculated
defensive weaponry.16 Something of this sort is probably necessary to
improve China’s defensibility in any case. Absent this approach we
would almost certainly need to carry out a massive US force buildup in the Western
Pacific. We also urge that Japan should be pressed to finance more
of the US/Japanese defense capability and (indirectly through trade)
some of the PRC arms
[Page 899]
modernization. This would
be in Japan’s own strategic interest and would relieve the burden on
the US. Moreover, we see little risk that a reluctant Japan will go
so far in rearming as to pose again a threat to US strategic interests. Instead they
are in the same boat as we are now.
Since it would be difficult for the US to defend South Korea if we were fully engaged
elsewhere, [6 lines not declassified] A third
part of this strategy would be to use the leverage of our aid to
press China to deter any NK attack.17
DoD stresses a Far East “threat-in-being” concept because both Japan
and China probably would prefer to remain neutral as long as
possible in any NATO/WP or US/USSR conflict. Nor could we pose a major offensive
threat to the USSR in the FE so long as they did so—and maybe
even if they joined us. Moreover, Moscow too might prefer to refuse
its FE flank until it had won in
Europe and/or the PG (which would
give it a stranglehold on Japan’s oil).
For all these reasons DoD believes that the US must face up to the need for (1) accelerated
Japanese rearmament; (2) [1 line not
declassified] and (3) the sale of limited defensive arms to
China, [less than 1 line not declassified]
The chief risk we see is that of provoking the USSR to pre-emptive action.18 But, we regard this risk as modest so long as
US or European arms sales are
carefully calibrated to be defensive, and so long as the USSR faces major problems in EE and
the PG/IO. We must also weigh
against this risk the likelihood that otherwise US defense outlays would have to be
further increased in order to cope with the “simultaneity”
problem.
Issue #5—How can we best get our friends and Allies
to do more for the common defense? This issue has
bedevilled US policy since the early
50s. But the loss of US strategic
nuclear superiority, increasing Soviet conventional capabilities,
European and Japanese economic growth, and now the US need to fill the security vacuum in
yet a third theater all compel imparting new vigor to this effort.
Even if we wish to do so, we cannot any longer carry so much of the
burden of Western defense. Since we prefer to remain the chief Free
World nuclear defender (a major call on our resources even in a
SALT II regime), it must
become a cardinal aspect of US
political, economic, and military policy in the 80s to get our
Allies—and friends—to contribute a lot more to conventional defense.
Moreover, their failure to do so at a time when US defense
[Page 900]
efforts are expanding will set loose divisive
US domestic debate which could
seriously fray our alliances.19
This will be an uphill fight. Under pressure of economic
difficulties, but in large measure because of political disarray,
our European Allies are falling short of even 3% real defense
growth. Japan is inching forward only under US pressure.20 Both
they, and even more those LDCs of great strategic importance to us
(like Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Korea), are weakened by the energy
squeeze. Our developed Allies also fail to perceive the threat of
growing Soviet capabilities as we do, or quail at confronting
it.21
An all-out effort to counter these perceptions and galvanize Allied
efforts must become a central purpose of the next presidential term.
As the leader of the Free World coalition, we must set clear goals
and press unremittingly for their achievement, accepting the
inevitable Allied recriminations but keeping them from becoming
seriously counterproductive. Perhaps the best way to get our NATO Allies to accept 3% real growth
for starters is to press them for 5%.22 We must also bring home to them the need
for a genuine “division of labor” by actually shifting more US forces now committed to NATO to meet PG/IO commitments.23
As to Japan, no goal short of 1.5% to 2% of GNP for defense in the 80s offers much prospect of
really meeting urgent common needs.24 We have asked
Japan for so little for so long that modest incrementalism is all it
offers. This will not suffice for the 80s (as was laid out in Issue
#4) unless the US is prepared to
spend a great deal more.25
Since greater effort by our Allies will be so hard to come by,
indirect as well as direct contributions must be sought (the latter
are often more palatable). For example, maximum host nation support
of all kinds will significantly reduce US defense costs for which we must otherwise program,
while involving (in the case of wartime rather than peacetime HNS)
only contingent Allied allocation of wartime resources—largely
[Page 901]
civil. We have
accomplished much along these lines in the past few years, but
tapped only a portion of the potential.26
POL is a good case in point; we must
insist that our Allies meet at least our initial wartime POL needs to the fullest extent
possible out of their civil stockpiles (just as they plan to meet
their own wartime needs). We must also get them to meet as much as
possible of the local construction and support needs of our deployed
peacetime forces. (Congress will increasingly insist on this).27
Greater European/Japanese military and economic aid to other
threatened countries is another indirect way to get more rational
burdensharing, which must be geared more directly to collective
security concerns.28 The FRG’s special relationship with Turkey must be
exploited to fill a gap we are unable to fill. To the extent
economic aid is fungible,29
it can be used to permit recipients to buy US military equipment (Japanese loans to S. Korea and
China could be used for this purpose).
Our oil-rich friends in the PG area
must be called on to finance as much as feasible of the security
umbrella which only we can provide them. To this end, we should seek
direct contributions from them to finance the security needs of less
wealthy Allies (e.g. revive Saudi aid to Egypt). We must ask them to
finance the facilities we need and stockpile POL for us. Indirectly, they can help
us by moderating oil price increases and keeping production high
(e.g. Turkey’s likely 1980 oil import bill of $4B will dwarf total
OECD aid of $1.6B).30
Issue #6—How can we best maintain both adequate
modernization and a perceived technological edge? In Issue
#1 we argued that greater risk of conflict in the 80s dictated
greater emphasis on readiness. But over the last three decades our
perceived technological superiority, manifest not only in our
strategic forces, has probably exerted even greater deterrent impact
on Soviet thinking—an advantage we must not lightly cast away.
Moreover, defense investment today is what creates usable power
tomorrow.31
DoD’s current guidelines deliberately place R&D and modernization investment behind readiness.
But we also must reduce the growing “defense investment gap” between
the US and USSR. Instead, during the last three years (FY 79–81) our procurement budget each
year has
[Page 902]
had on the
average 5% less purchasing power than the FY 77 budget (even FY
78 had only about 1% real growth). This is basically because we have
consistently underestimated inflation, especially with respect to
major defense procurement—which has run well above the general
inflation index.
Hence the issue is whether the US is
prepared to make a significant modernization effort or to keep
falling behind. DoD does not propose matching Soviet procurements
(which we couldn’t afford even at 7–8% real annual defense budget
growth). What we do propose is exploiting our superior technology in
selected key areas such as ASW,
antitank weaponry, and other PGMs,
Stealth vehicles, and cruise missiles of various kinds. We can also
exploit our greater efficiency in defense investment (for example,
we see no need to design and build four new ICBMs when one will do the job).32
We must press our Allies hard along similar lines. By enlightened
rationalization/standardization/interoperability policies, and
accepting more of a two-way street, we can make Allied defense
investment more efficient too.33
But an indispensable corollary to exploiting our own technology more
vigorously is to accelerate our efforts to prevent it from leaking
its details to the USSR (which
makes enormous efforts to secure those details).34 DoD sees this too as
a key element in any viable security strategy for the 80s.
Issue #7—Since quality uniformed manpower will be
so tight in the 80s, what relief must we seek? A return to
the draft is an obvious answer, but raises so many thorny problems
that other measures should be taken first. Clearly, we must pay what
is necessary to remain competitive in the labor marketplace, and
above all do whatever is necessary to retain trained manpower in key
skills. It is the worst false economy to have to spend so much to
keep training new people to achieve skills that those leaving
already have (for example, it costs over $600,000 to train an
advanced fighter pilot; paying him even $20,000 more a year to hold
him five more years would be far cheaper than having to train
another one).
Beyond this, DoD simply cannot afford to use scarce uniformed
manpower to do peacetime blue collar jobs which could be done just
as well—and more cheaply—by civilians. Substituting civilians for
military people was successful in the past; we replaced about 90,000
military
[Page 903]
with civilians
during the Vietnam buildup and about 40,000 when we ended the draft.
Yet DoD has cut down civilian employment by about 120,000 since
1974, largely through increased efficiencies. We have now reached
the point where continuing to cut, instead of building up as a
substitute for needed increases in scarce military manpower at a
time when defense needs are expanding, will compromise
readiness—even if defense spending is increased. In fact, increased
readiness and real growth in defense programs require more, not
fewer, civilian employees in industrially funded activities such as
Navy yards, air rework facilities and laboratories. Arbitrary
civilian manpower restraints here are equally counterproductive.
DoD’s special circumstances demand relief from such limitations
(even though they appear politically attractive to both outgoing and
incoming administrations).35
Issue #8—Lastly, how can non-Defense agencies best
complement DoD efforts? The acute security problems we
confront in the 80s dictate a far broader effort than is in DoD’s
purview. In the largest sense, our foreign and economic policies
must take more fully into account national security needs.36 National policies which
reduce inflation and promote investment clearly help defense. So too
do energy policies which promote conservation, accelerate use of
alternate fuels, and hold down energy costs. Such policies will also
assist the defense efforts of crucially needed Allies.
In DoD’s view our coalition defense and overseas force projection
strategy also dictate providing much greater security assistance to
friends and Allies in maintaining adequate defense efforts. Such aid
is often more cost-effective than building up our own forces to
compensate for their weakness. In particular, key countries like
Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt need to be strengthened militarily as a
key aspect of our PG/IO deterrent
strategy. To this end a substantial rise in Security Assistance is
indispensable. Since many important client states are unable to meet
the financial terms required by current FMS policy, or in some
cases, can’t pay at all, more flexible terms plus some element of
grant aid are equally important.37 State/DoD have prepared
proposals for SCC review.38
III. THE DOD
POSITION. DoD recognizes that its proposals on the above
issues add up to a highly ambitious security program for the 80s.
But it goes without saying that deterrence is far more desireable
and far less costly than conflict, even granting that a credible
war-fighting
[Page 904]
capability is
crucial to deterrence. The sheer magnitude of the security problems
we confront is so great that only such far reaching initiatives
offer prudent possibilities of limiting the global risks.
There is no realistic prospect of solving these problems solely
through the application of more funds. Some of the threats are too
immediate for that. Even the longer run concerns cannot be
confidently met by expansion of real US defense efforts at increased but feasible rates.
Therefore, both in the near term (FY
82 budget) and the medium term (FY
82–86 FYDP) some very difficult
choices will have to be made and the non-DoD portions of the program
(security and economic assistance, major increases in Allied
efforts) will be required.
Put another way, the programmatic corollary to this paper is proposed
defense 1982–85 budgets increasing from about $200 billion to about
$250 billion in today’s dollars. But without the measures proposed
herein, even defense outlays of this size would not suffice to
protect our vital security interests adequately. Nor can we
realistically expect that all the measures proposed herein will
achieve the full results desired. Thus simple prudence dictates
energetic pursuit of the full package. Our security demands no
less.
