Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

221. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 8, 1981

SUBJECT

• Directives on National Strategy

As you directed after the NSC meeting on basic strategy issues,² I prepared two Presidential Directives and discussed them with Harold Brown and Ed Muskie. Harold and I agree on a common draft. Ed prefers different language and substance in a number of places. I have attached a draft that will allow you to make a choice in each case between the NSC/Defense version and the State preferred changes (Tabs A and B).³ If you want to know Ed Muskie’s reasons for these changes, you will find them elaborated at Tab C.⁴

I am also attaching a memo to you from Ed (Tab D) in which he objects to the idea of Presidential Directives. When you review it, you may want to reconsider your original decision to issue these directives. I believe, however, that for the collective interest of this Administration and for your interest in particular you ought to have clear legacy of strategic purpose and rationale.⁵

Tab A

Draft Presidential Directive⁶

Washington, undated

TO

• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of The Treasury
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Secretary of Commerce
• The Secretary of Energy
• The Director, Office of Management & Budget
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

• Modifications in U.S. National Strategy

I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/NSC–18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary⁷ to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy,⁸ and to elaborate and codify our progress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Greater Readiness Required

Given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involving key U.S. interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to readiness in defense resource allocations.

Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces

Presidential Directive/NSC–18 put the focus for our general purpose forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in [the Horn of Africa and]⁹ Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. [Moreover, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war and the intensifying intra-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the Soviets added opportunities for interference.]¹⁰ At the same time, our success in normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)

Approve State preference (deleting portions underscored in brackets) _____

Approve NSC/Defense preference (no deletions)¹¹ _____

While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program. [East Asia will have third priority for resources and wartime operations.]¹² This priority calls for maintaining improved relations with the People’s Republic of China, accelerated growth of Japan’s defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-Japanese security ties, and improved relations with the ASEAN states. STATE ALTERNATIVE—ADDITION: . . . ASEAN states, “and greater progress in getting our NATO Allies to bear a larger share of the burden of defense in Europe.”

Approve State preferences (deleting portion underscored in brackets and adding portion underscored in quotes)¹³ _____

Approve NSC/Defense preference (no changes) _____

Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba’s assistance over the past two years has created another area of increased security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Directive/NSC–52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stronger military presence in the region by gradual shifts in our military exercise activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)

Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies

Because the Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet military power have increased our strategic requirement, we must make more effort and devise better ways of sharing the economic and military burden with our allies. We must insist that our European Allies take up the slack on the NATO front while we give greater priority to forces and lift for the Persian Gulf. [We must insist that our European Allies undertake the programs and make available the resources needed to make up for the reduction in U.S. force comments¹⁴ caused by our effort oriented toward the Persian Gulf]. At the same time, our NATO allies, particularly the British and French, should contribute forces to the security framework for the Persian Gulf.

Approve State version (sentence underscored in brackets)¹⁵ _____

Approve NSC/Defense version (sentence underscored in tics) _____

Germany, other members of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan should contribute non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most important recipients of this economic aid—as well as of military aid from selected donors—would be Turkey and Pakistan.

Our European and regional Allies should provide overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances.

[Our friends and Allies should be called upon to facilitate overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. We should work to improve the prospects for receiving positive responses to our requests for overflight and refueling clearances.]

Approve State version (paragraph underscored in brackets) _____

Approve NSC/Defense version (paragraph underscored in tics)¹⁶ _____

Arms Control

Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces—strategic and general purpose—and particularly to limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be pursued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Persian Gulf Security Framework

Presidential Directive/NSC-_____ elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region. (C)

Tab D

Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹⁷

Washington, January 7, 1981

SUBJECT

• Draft PDs on “U.S. National Strategy” and on the “Persian Gulf Security Framework”

I have three reasons for urging most strongly that you not issue PDs on “U.S. National Strategy” and the “Persian Gulf Security Framework.”

1. When these directives become public, as I believe they inevitably would, the reaction among reporters, members of Congress and the public would almost certainly be strongly negative. It would cloud your last days in office and detract from your farewell address to the nation.¹⁸

— We would be seen by some as simply having neglected to issue appropriate directives at the outset of the Southwest Asian effort of the past year. And obvious questions would be raised about the issuance of orders to the Departments on long-term issues by a President who had only a few days left in office.

— We could be accused by others of a clumsy attempt to force a set of policies on the incoming Administration.

— Instead of leaving office with much-earned credit for having created the security framework, you and your Administration would end up publicly embarrassed.

2. They could have a negative effect on the new Administration’s policies.

— The incoming Administration would no doubt feel challenged by these directives, and would move to rescind them as soon as the Administration had something to put in their place—if not sooner.

3. The PDs are loosely drafted. When public, they would irritate our relations with, among others, our Allies (especially in the Pacific) and the Saudis. For example:

— We should not single out East Asia as an area where all is well and which can now be made a third priority. This would harm our relations with Japan, China, and other East Asian friends.

— Public reference to Turkey as a potential “threat-in-being” on the flank of Soviet aggression would eliminate what chance there now is of getting the Turks to be more cooperative.

— The formulation “comprehensive, regionwide use of Saudi wealth” would cause us nothing but grief if the Saudis learned of it.

— We would only damage the security framework if it became known that the DCI was organizing a “regional integrated intelligence program.”

I have supplied Zbig with further specific comments on the drafts.

1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Subject File, Box 33, President’s Comments on Memos: Incomplete, 12/21/80–1/13/81. Secret. The date is handwritten. Carter wrote next to the heading: “Zbig—Proceed. Let Harold & Ed check final texts. J.”
2. See Document 220.
3. Tab B, attached but not printed, is a draft of PD/NSC–63, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” the final version of which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 98.
4. Tab C, attached but not printed, is an undated paper entitled “Need Changes in the PDs,” outlining Muskie’s revisions to PD–62 and PD–63.
5. Brzezinski wrote at the end of this sentence: “Harold also feels this way.”
6. Secret. Brackets are in the original.
7. Carter inserted “through a serious of individual directives” after “necessary.”
8. Carter changed the comma after the word “strategy” to a period, struck out “and to,” and began a new sentence with the words “This Directive will.”
9. Carter deleted the brackets around the phrase “the Horn of Africa and,” and wrote “ok” in the left margin next to it.
10. Carter deleted the brackets around this sentence and wrote “ok” in the left margin next to it.
11. Carter approved this option.
12. Carter deleted this sentence.
13. Carter approved this option and wrote in the left margin next to it: “Smooth the Transition.”
14. Carter circled the word “comments.”
15. Carter approved this option
16. Carter approved this option.
17. Secret.
18. Carter delivered his farewell address to the nation on January 14. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 163.