Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

128. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 1, 1979

SUBJECT

• Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA–78)

We believe CNA–78² is a useful effort to review overall East-West trends and changes since the earlier PRM–10 exercise. The paper correctly confirms most of the broad lines of existing Administration policy in PD–18.³ It also identifies several important issues which deserve and are receiving continuing attention, including:

— US clear-cut non-military advantages and the need to exploit them fully in the on-going competition with Moscow;

— destabilizing Soviet military programs and the need to counter them through military modernization and arms control;

— the changing situation in the Persian Gulf (and oil prices) and the need for an effective US strategy; and

— the US–USSR–PRC relationship and the need to consider how relations with China aid and damage our relations with Moscow.

We have some problems with the CNA methodology, which appears to be based on zero-sum assumptions. Scorecards of US/Soviet “gains” and “losses” are inherently difficult to evaluate and the CNA criteria seem unclear and incomplete; the study discerns two US defeats but it is not apparent what they (or the gains) were. Moreover, “popularity” is a questionable indicator of power. The focus on political and military trends is potentially misleading without the perspective of existing absolute balances.

We believe that the treatment of the substantive issues is far too broad to allow any policy decisions to be made. Instead, we should continue to use the SCC and PRC for high-level decision-making, as we now are doing (for example) with MX, strategic targeting and numerous regional issues.

We have some specific concerns about the military, political-diplomatic and economic areas of the US/Soviet balance as assessed by CNA–78.

Military Balance—CNA appraisals of strategic and power projection force trends are too somber, the positive NATO trends may be somewhat overstated and theater nuclear forces are discussed only eliptically.

—Strategic Forces. We agree that the Minuteman survivability problem will be with us earlier than anticipated but the paper conveys undue alarm.

• This year’s CG shows a substantial increase in US capability, whether or not we deploy MX, and a US advantage over the Soviets after 1986. If MX is not deployed, we will almost certainly advance the Trident II and CMC IOCs and accelerate production of missiles, submarines, CMCs and cruise missiles.

• The report does not address the survivability of each side’s forces. For example, only 20% of our warheads, but 70% of theirs, are in ICBMs. Both sides’ ICBMs can become vulnerable, placing the Soviets in a worse situation.

• The statement that adverse strategic trends result from US program trends is not sound. In fact, we are in the midst of a major strategic forces modernization drive—with ALCM, Trident SSBNs, Trident I missiles and MK–12A all coming on line soon.

• The CNA recommendation for greater emphasis on limited nuclear options (LNO) is a highly contentious one which would require detailed interagency study.

• The paper does not consider the capability of US forces to meet their basic deterrent tasks.

—European balance. As far as we can tell, the CNA judgments are not based on any rigorous analysis of changes in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces (e.g. ratio of Armored Division Equivalents or of tactical aircraft). We agree that NATO has begun to improve the military situation but the CNA may be too optimistic given Western economic constraints. This year’s CG shows that no significant change in the balance can yet be measured and that we need to pursue the LTDP and maintain our European emphasis through the 1980s to have an important impact on the balance.

—Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF). CNA–78 expresses concern over the evident political problems but does not analyze the complex military issues involved and exaggerates the implications for Germany. It also fails to note encouraging allied progress toward a dual modernization/arms control strategy and the real possibility that these two policy instruments may be able to resolve our TNF problem.

—Power Projection. The paper offers no evidence to support the judgment that the trend has favored the Soviets during the last two years. The Soviets have demonstrated their capacity to supply troubled allies or friends but not to carry out these actions if opposed nor to wage distant wars themselves. This remains an area of large overall US advantage.

In sum, the document appears to downplay an emphasis on NATO vis-a-vis strategic and power projection forces. We do not find the arguments persuasive and strongly favor continuation of DOD’s current European emphases as stated in PD–18.

Political/Diplomatic Balance

—Great power triangular relations are treated primarily in terms of the costs and benefits of using our relations with Beijing either to induce Soviet cooperation or to constrain Soviet expansion. We agree that these two elements are important factors to be considered in our relations with the Soviet Union and China but the discussion oversimplifies the range and significance of our relationships with both countries. There are prospective interests and activities we may wish to consider vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which may have a minimal impact on China, and a comparable set of relationships with China that may neither work to constrain the Soviets nor induce their cooperation. Our overall objective should be to strengthen and improve our relations with both China and the Soviet Union in ways which enhance global US security and influence.

—We believe more weight should be accorded to Europe and Japan in the political/diplomatic balance. The strength of the industrial democracies is a fundamental factor in our international position. This is in contrast to the significant problems faced by the USSR in a potentially unstable Eastern Europe.

—The paper’s speculation concerning a Soviet “German card” is highly misleading and could lead to policy judgments and conclusions which would be potentially destructive of US/FRG relations.

—US/Soviet competition in the Third World significantly complicates our bilateral and overall East-West relations. As the CNA acknowledges, however, it is far from clear that the turbulence in the Third World translates into durable Soviet gains. Perhaps because of the time at which the CNA was written, it does not take account of (a) the Egyptian-Israeli treaty;⁴ (b) the Baghdad Summit and shift of conservative Arab governments;⁵ (c) the current anti-Soviet unrest in Afghanistan;⁶ or (d) the shift in US policy from arms control to increased military presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area.⁷ These recent events underscore the difficulty of drawing balances in a time of significant and rapid political flux and the dubiousness of weighting all countries the same.

—While we have an overall advantage in international political and diplomatic standing compared with Moscow, the picture is far more complex than that depicted in CNA–78. There was no pro-Soviet trend in 1977 as the CNA states. On the other hand, we have clearly had our share of problems and reversals in the last two years. In fact, some of the policies which have improved our overall standing have at least temporarily worsened our relations with some important governments. The balance between our global policies and some of our bilateral objectives has on occasion been hard to maintain. It is difficult to mesh these factors with the trends described in CNA–78 other than to emphasize the complexity of the issues and the difficulties of defining the world in terms of US-Soviet relations.

The CNA recommendations on specific countries and on covert action are addressed more appropriately when we deal with specific issues relating to US security presence in the Middle East and to our relationships with Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

Economic/Technological Balance. CNA–78 states that the “trend in technology remains strongly favorable to the Soviet Union” since Soviet R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP are higher than the US. In real terms, however, the US has a major technological advantage over the USSR which the Russians are most unlikely to overcome. This technological advantage is still greater when comparing East and West as a whole. Indeed, given the West’s technological base, the East may well feel further behind the West, regardless of their relatively greater R&D investment.

The paper also contends that the US should exploit its economic and technological advantage as a lever to affect Soviet behavior. Such leverage has proven difficult to apply (e.g. Jackson-Vanik Amendment;⁸ oil drilling equipment). Support for “national liberation struggles” remains a basic tenet of Soviet foreign policy, which Moscow is unlikely to alter in order to obtain Western economic favors. Moreover, US economic leverage is weakened by domestic political pressures from US producers (especially farmers) and the clear unwillingness of our OECD partners to adopt a common stance on this issue with Moscow.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel: Miscellaneous: 5/79. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 95.
3. See Document 31.
4. Reference is to the Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, which was signed by President Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on the North Lawn of the White House on the afternoon of March 26, 1979. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, Document 239.
5. Reference is to either the November 1978 Arab League summit meeting in Baghdad or the Conference of Foreign Ministers from 18 Arab states and the PLO that convened in Baghdad March 27–31, 1979, which resulted in the temporary suspension of Egypt’s membership in that organization. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980. vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, Document 242.
6. Reference is to armed insurgencies opposing the Soviet-supported regime of Nur Muhammad Taraki. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 39.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 99–129.
8. Reference is to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act (P.L. 93–618; 88 Stat. 1978), which President Ford signed into law on January 3, 1975. The amendment denied most-favored-nation trade status to nations with non-market economies that restricted emigration.