Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

95. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 11, 1978

SUBJECT

• Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978

The assessment update of PRM–10 is now complete and available for whatever use you choose to make of it. Fritz Ermarth has reviewed it and has several ideas which he is working out. In the interim, however, I believe it would be most useful if you read the Overview (attached at Tab A) which was prepared largely by Sam Huntington with some assistance by Putnam and me. It will give you a good sense for what is in the much larger supporting papers. It is a rather concise statement of “how we have been doing vis-a-vis the Soviets” over the past two years. It provides a significant amount of graphic information to facilitate interpretation. Finally, in the section on implications, it specifies what needs to be done on the East-West front. I personally think that the Overview and selected papers from assessment would make excellent pre-summit reading for the President.

Fritz has some objections to the present form of the Overview. The charts do not enamour him. He believes that it treats the “objective” and “subjective” factors in the East-West relationship on an equal basis, giving insufficient emphasis to the objective factors. Sam believes that some of the upbeat aspects of the diplomatic balance must be kept in the forefront in order to get the President to take the objective factors more seriously. Fritz proposes to resolve this difference of opinion by preparing an “overview” of the Overview, much shorter, which lends the emphasis he prefers.

When you have read the Overview, it would be most helpful if Fritz and I could speak with you about how to proceed.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT 1978

Overview

I. Introduction

The principal purposes of Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA 78) are to assess:

1. The changes that have occurred since January 1977 in:

(a) the military, political, economic, diplomatic, and technological capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR;

(b) the projections of future trends in those capabilities; and

(c) our perceptions of those capabilities and trends;

2. The causes of these changes;

3. The implications of these changes for U.S. strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The starting point for CNA 78 is the PRM–10 Comprehensive Net Assessment completed in June 1977, with most of its data referring to the winter of 1976–77.³ Unlike the PRM–10 net assessment, however, CNA 78 is not the result of an elaborate interagency process, but is instead a product of the NSC staff, drawing upon the information and expertise available from other agencies of government. This procedure was adopted, first, because PRM–10 already provided a solid foundation for subsequent analysis, and, second, because of the need for both frankness and confidentiality in an assessment by this Administration of changes that have occurred since it came into office. CNA 78 is, thus, in considerable measure an exercise in self-assessment. Basic reports were drafted on the following eight topics.

1. The strategic balance

2. The NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance

3. Power projection

4. The diplomatic balance

5. The political-ideological balance

6. The economic and technological balance

7. Europe

8. East Asia

This overview report summarizes the conclusions of these basic reports and attempts to spell out some of the implications of those conclusions for U.S. strategy.

II. Capabilities and Trends

No radical changes in the overall global balance of power have occurred during the past 18 months, and the broad conclusions of the PRM–10 net assessment remain valid today:

1. A rough asymmetrical equivalence in military capabilities exists between the U.S. and the USSR.

2. The U.S. holds significant advantages in economic, technology, diplomatic access and support, and political appeal;

3. The Soviet-American relationship is a mixed one, involving elements of both cooperation and competition.

In none of the central elements of the global balance of power did either superpower lose to the other an advantage in capabilities between January 1977 (Table 1) and July 1978 (Table 2). In a majority of categories, however, trends in the balance either changed direction or were intensified between these two dates (Tables 1, 2, 3). The pro-Soviet trend in the strategic balance which existed in January 1977 has now intensified so as possibly to call into question the future of essential equivalence. With this notable exception, all the other trend changes were in a pro-U.S. direction. As a result, the trends in almost all non-military components of national power (except technology and covert action) now favor the U.S. The trends in the military components of national power, on the other hand, all favor the Soviet Union, except for a mixed trend in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance.

The last eighteen months have thus seen a heightening of the incongruence in capabilities noted in PRM–10. With the notable exception of technology, the U.S. is pulling further ahead in the principal non-military areas where it already had the advantage. In the military areas, the capabilities are more even, and the trends more generally favor the Soviet Union. This pattern of incongruent trends gives renewed urgency to three key questions:

1. How can the U.S. more effectively capitalize on its non-military advantages in dealing with the Soviet Union?

2. How can the U.S. slow down and reverse the trends in military capabilities favoring the Soviet Union (as it has, in some measure, already done with respect to the European military balance)?

3. How are the Soviets most likely to attempt to use their growing military strength for political and diplomatic purposes and how can the U.S. best deter or counter such use?

Six of the specific trend changes between January 1977 and July 1978 appear to be particularly noteworthy.

A. Intensified deterioration in strategic balance trends. The trend in strategic forces has favored the Soviet Union since the mid-1960s. Since January 1977, however, this trend has become significantly more pronounced. The 1976 projections in the key indicators of the strategic balance generally showed adverse trends for the U.S. into the early 1980s and then, on most key indicators, a reversal in favor of the U.S. by 1985 (Chart 1). Current projections generally show a steady decline on almost all key indicators into the 1990s (Chart 2). These projections assume a SALT treaty along the lines agreed to as of May 1978, current U.S. programs for the ALCM and Trident II, and no new Soviet programs. In terms of equivalent countermilitary potential (the central indicator for counter force capability), the basic trend, if M–X is not built, will be unfavorable until 1987, when it will level off at a very substantial Soviet advantage. If M–X is built, the adverse trend will level off in the mid-1980s, and a favorable balance will emerge in the early 1990s (Chart 3). In either event, unless other corrective actions are taken, the Minuteman force will be highly vulnerable to Soviet attack during the early 1980s. With respect to equivalent megatonnage (the central indicator for countervalue capability), if M–X is not built, the adverse trend will continue into the 1990s; if M–X is built, the decline will level off in the mid-1980s at a 2:1 Soviet advantage (Chart 4).

In terms of dynamic indicators, current projections show that after a nuclear exchange in the 1980s (Soviet counterforce first-strike; U.S. counterforce second-strike), the U.S. would be very inferior in equivalent megatonnage, in a somewhat disadvantageous position regarding throw-weight, and slightly behind in warheads.

The vulnerability of U.S. C3 compared to that of the Soviets remains and PRM–32 analysis has shown that full implementation of current Soviet and U.S. civil defense programs would leave 10–20 percent of the Soviet population and 35–65 percent of the U.S. population dead in an all-out nuclear exchange.⁴

B. Improvement in European military balance trends. The PRM–10 assessment noted a sustained trend in the European military balance favoring the Warsaw Pact. It indicated that while the Warsaw Pact forces were generally superior quantitatively and were making significant qualitative improvements, nonetheless neither side could be sure that it could achieve its objectives in a war. In the past 18 months, the efforts by the U.S. to strengthen its early combat capability in Europe plus other collective measures to strengthen the NATO forces have slowed and perhaps halted the pro-Pact trend, though in absolute terms the West still remains at a disadvantage. Full implementation of the Long-Term Defense Program will reverse the pro-Pact trend and create a military balance in Europe more favorable to the Allies. At present, however, NATO disadvantages in chemical warfare, C3, and radio-electronic combat remain, with little effort being made to correct them.

C. More active anti-Soviet, pro-West role of the PRC. In 1976–77 it was appropriate to speak of a triangular relationship among the PRC, the USSR, and the U.S. During the past year, however, the PRC has turned outward and assumed a more active role in countering Soviet influence in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. It has also decided to promote its economic and military strength through the import from the West of technology, equipment, and weapons. In pursuit of these goals, it has moderated its position on normalization.

As a result of these developments, the relations between the USSR and the PRC have deteriorated, and the relations of the PRC with the U.S., as well as with the European countries and Japan, have improved. Given the additional strains which have developed in U.S.–USSR relations in the past year, the triangle is now clearly no longer equilateral.

D. Reversal of unfavorable trends in diplomatic relations and political appeal. Between 1960 and 1977, changes in U.S. relations with other countries were more likely to be in an unfavorable than a favorable direction. This was particularly notable during the Nixon and Ford Administrations; between 1970 and 1977, for instance, the U.S. suffered 51 diplomatic “losses” and scored 36 diplomatic “gains.” During these same years, the opposite was true for the Soviet Union. Between 1970 and 1977, Soviet gains (50) exceeded losses (27) by a margin of almost two to one. While the past 18 months are too brief to arrive at any conclusive judgment about the longer term, they have, nonetheless, seen a significant shift in past trends. Changes in U.S. diplomatic relations were positive with 30 countries, negative with 21. Changes in Soviet diplomatic relations, on the other hand, were positive with only 11 countries and negative with 25. Improvements in U.S. diplomatic relations were particularly notable with Third World countries (especially India, and in Africa and Latin America) and in Eastern Europe. The deterioration in Soviet diplomatic relations was most marked in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. As a result, the overall U.S. lead in the diplomatic balance has improved (Table 4).

PRM–10 pointed out that while the U.S. was the most powerful country in the world and the USSR was second, of the next five strongest countries, four were allies of the U.S. and one (the PRC) was the enemy of the Soviet Union. The significance of U.S. allies in the global balance is underlined in Table 5. Although in three of these four power resources, the USSR is ahead of the U.S., in all four the U.S. together with its allies and friends (not including the PRC) is ahead of the USSR and its associates, often by a substantial margin.

The PRM–10 assessment suggested that the initiative in terms of political and ideological appeal might be shifting to the U.S. Newly analyzed evidence on trends in world opinion supports this hypothesis. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the favorable gap between Soviet and U.S. standing narrowed dramatically, with U.S. popularity being eroded by Vietnam, racial strife, and Watergate, while the unpopularity of the Soviet Union was eroded by detente. Since 1976, however, scattered evidence suggests that these trends have been reversed. American popularity is clearly on the rise, though it still remains well below the highs of the early 1960s. Soviet standing in world opinion, in contrast, has plummeted to depths unequalled since the late 1950s. These preliminary findings will be tested and hopefully confirmed by more comprehensive ICA polling in November 1978.

E. Intensified contrasting trends in economic and technology. The trend in overall economic resources and productivity is now more clearly favorable to the U.S. than it was 18 months ago. The trend in technology remains strongly favorable to the Soviet Union, although the U.S. still retains a substantial overall advantage. During the past year, the U.S. has attempted to increase its potential gains from U.S.-Soviet economic interaction.

It now appears that during 1976–79, for the first four-year period since World War II, the real U.S. economic growth rate (4.6%) will exceed both the Soviet economic growth rate (3.5–4.0%) and the average growth rate of the other OECD states (3.5%). Soviet industry grew at its lowest rate since World War II in 1976 and its second lowest rate in 1977. The problems of coordinating U.S. economic policies with our allies have, however, become more apparent than they were two years ago, and overall international economic prospects seem gloomier than they did then. Nonetheless, at present, the energy picture for the U.S. is less threatening than it was previously, due to slower world economic recovery, increased conservation, and the short-term effects of North Sea and North Slope supplies. During 1977, on the other hand, Soviet oil production grew by its lowest rate in 30 years, and this past year the Soviets launched various measures to attempt quickly to increase production in their West Siberian fields. These measures also increase the likelihood of a longer-term fall-off in production, and an absolute decline in overall Soviet oil production seems very likely in the early 1980s.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, total U.S. R&D expenditures declined steadily while Soviet expenditures steadily increased. During the past two years R&D expenditures have stabilized at about 3.0% of GNP for the Soviet Union and 2.3% for the U.S. In terms of military R&D, real Soviet spending during the past decade has increased at an annual rate of 6.6%, while real U.S. spending has declined at a rate of −2.2%. For 1977, both overall Soviet military investment expenditures and Soviet RDT&E expenditures were about 75% greater than U.S. expenditures. In terms of technological output, it is clear that the U.S. is still superior to the Soviet Union in many areas, particularly as a result of its superior ability to translate basic scientific knowledge into sophisticated and usable end-products. The question thus remains whether the superior resources which the Soviets are devoting to research and development, both generally and in the military area, will, at some point, enable them to equal the U.S. in qualitative output.

PRM–10 indicated that the Soviets benefitted substantially from their economic interaction with the U.S. and the West. PD–18 directed that the U.S. should capitalize on its economic and technological advantages to counter the spread of adverse Soviet influence and to induce the Soviets to be more cooperative in achieving solutions to global problems. During the past year, further studies have underlined Soviet dependence on the U.S. for energy-related equipment (including submersible pumps, high-quality drill bits, blow-out preventers, gas-lift equipment; advanced computers; large-scale credits; and, less certainly, grain (particularly feed-grain). During the past six months, the U.S. has begun to attempt to exploit these advantages by reforming administrative procedures on technology transfers and by placing oil equipment and technology on the Commodity Control List.

F. Specific Soviet gains and increased polarization in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Africa. The PRM–10 net assessment concluded that the Middle East-Persian Gulf area was the most important region of the Third World for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. PD–18 linked this region with Western Europe and East Asia as an area of critical interest to the United States. In addition, the net assessment argued that “From their viewpoint the Soviets would be hard-pressed to find a better spot than Iran for a crisis-confrontation with the U.S.” During the past 18 months, the Soviets have gained two new and important bridgeheads in this area, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, while losing a less important one in Somalia. These new gains bracket the major sources of oil for the U.S. and its allies.

More generally, Cuban military personnel in Africa approximately doubled during this period. Overall Soviet arms flows to Third World countries in 1977 were one-third more than in 1976. Soviet support for the Ethiopians and the transport to Ethiopia of both equipment and Cuban troops demonstrated the effectiveness of Soviet power projection capabilities in a benign environment and the ability of the Soviets to secure the necessary overflight rights in the Middle East. The Soviets and Cubans also increased their involvement in the black nationalist struggles in southern Africa. Soviet-Cuban actions in the Horn, the invasion of Shaba, and the coup in Afghanistan, all generated responses on the part of both affected local countries and of concerned outside powers. They contributed to a decline in Soviet diplomatic relations with many African countries (particularly Francophone ones), stimulated criticism of Soviet intervention at the OAU, and encouraged opposition to Cuba by key states in the Non-Aligned Movement.

III. General Cause of These Changes

In Afghanistan and in Africa, the Soviets and Cubans promptly took advantage of opportunities to expand their presence and influence. Virtually all the other major changes in the global balances in 1977 and 1978 did not, however, derive from Soviet initiatives. Overall Soviet policy, particularly with respect to its military programs, was characterized by substantial continuity. In general, both positive and negative changes in the global balance during the last 18 months have been due less to what the Soviets have done than to what we and others have done.

The intensification of the adverse trends in the strategic balance was, in part, a result of changed perceptions stemming from new intelligence on the accuracy of Soviet missiles. In much larger degree, however, it was the result of U.S. decisions to cancel the B–1 bomber, to delay full-scale development of the M–X, and to push development of the cruise missiles. The improvement in the trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance in Europe was the result of the U.S. pushing, at the London Summit in 1977 and subsequently, for a three percent increase in real defense spending among the NATO countries, taking some immediate short-term measures to increase early combat capability, and securing approval of the Long-Term Defense Program at the Washington Summit in 1978. The improvements in U.S. diplomatic relations, particularly with Third World countries and Eastern Europe, were the result of the changed priorities, new initiatives, and “new broom” effect of the Carter Administration (paid for, in part, by some deterioration in U.S. relations with more conservative military regimes). The deterioration in Soviet diplomatic relations, on the other hand, reflected in large part the reaction of African states to Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn. The upswing in U.S. popularity among foreign publics, as well as the drastic decline in Soviet popularity, were principally the result of the Administration’s new explicit emphasis on human rights. Similarly, the improvement in the trend in the economic interaction balance reflected the Administration’s new willingness, stemming from PD–18, to attempt to capitalize on U.S. economic advantages. The significant change in the role of the PRC was primarily the result of the decisions of Hua-Teng leadership to which the U.S. and other Western powers responded favorably.

Overall, the U.S. thus played a central role in effecting changes in the global balance during the last 18 months. The predominance of U.S. initiatives in its competition with the Soviets parallels the predominance of U.S. initiatives in the conduct of ongoing arms control negotiations (SALT II) and in proposing new arms control negotiations (CAT, ASAT). Contrary to some views, the tides of history clearly do not condemn the U.S. to simply a defensive and responsive role. This pattern of the past 18 months, however, may reflect in large part the fact that the Carter Administration was new to office while the Brezhnev regime was well along in its second decade. Five or six years from now, the roles could be reversed, with a new Soviet leadership attempting to seize the initiative and a second Carter Administration remaining committed to its earlier policies.

IV. Implications for U.S. Strategy

PD/NSC–18 set forth three broad purposes of national strategy:

1. to maintain an overall military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at least as favorable as that which currently existed, the achievement of this goal, in the light of the continuing Soviet build-up, requiring three percent annual increases in real defense spending;

2. to take advantage of U.S. non-military advantages to encourage Soviet cooperation in securing balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, resolving regional conflicts, expanding contacts between societies, and promoting cooperative solutions to global problems; and

3. to use U.S. non-military advantages and, if necessary, U.S. military forces to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence adverse to the U.S. in critical areas of the world.

The favorable changes which have occurred in the trends in the global balance in the last 18 months testify to the general validity of this strategy. Certain elements in that strategy have, however, received greater emphasis than others. The developments of the last 18 months also highlight problems and opportunities in some specific areas which could suggest the desirability of certain changes in emphasis within the overall framework of the PD–18 strategy.

A. Military Strategy. In the military area, the PRM–10 assessment indicated that while there was an overall asymmetrical equivalence in military capabilities, the trends were adverse to the U.S. in three critical areas: the strategic balance, the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, and power projection. Developments in the past year in these balances reflect the different emphases which the Administration has given them in implementing PD–18 strategy.

During the past year, the Administration has given top priority to the needs of NATO and, as a result, it is now possible to project a mixed trend in the European military balance. Continued improvement in this balance depends upon the full and expeditious implementation of the Long-Term Defense Program by the Allies. This, in turn, depends upon the willingness of governments and parliaments to increase real defense spending at roughly 3 percent per year into the mid-1980s. In this connection, it must be noted that while the Administration proposed a roughly three percent increase in military expenditures for FY 1979, it also proposed roughly a two percent increase in new obligational authority. If the three percent spending commitment is to be maintained in the coming years, increases in obligational authority will also have to approach that level. Failure of the U.S. to maintain this level would probably produce a comparable falling off in European efforts and could seriously undermine the Long-Term Defense Program.

Despite the emphasis in PD–18 on the need to enhance U.S. strategic mobility and to develop a quick reaction force, the unfavorable trend in power projection continues. To halt that trend will require, among other things, rapid and coordinated implementation of the PD–18 directive in this area.

PD–18 committed the U.S. to the maintenance of essential equivalence in strategic forces with the Soviet Union. During the past year, however, the unfavorable trend in the strategic balance has intensified. The slowdown and/or reversal of this trend depends upon:

1. prompt actions to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. C3 and Minuteman missiles during the early 1980s;

2. early affirmative decisions to develop the M–X, M–X (MCM), Trident II, or comparable weapons systems; and

3. revision of U.S. nuclear war doctrines to emphasize the importance of C3, limited nuclear options, and sustained nuclear engagements.

In the absence of these actions, U.S. strategic forces are likely to become, in appearance and in fact, inferior to those of the Soviet Union, and essential equivalence in nuclear forces will no longer be maintained.

B. The Role of the PRC. The new role of the PRC has benefits for the U.S. but also could close off certain U.S. options. So long as the U.S. maintained a roughly comparable posture with respect to both the PRC and the USSR, it was in a position in which it could (and did) use actual or prospective improvements in relations with one communist power to induce greater cooperation from the other. As the PRC becomes more aligned with the West, however, the U.S. ability to do this declines, and the Soviet Union, instead of attempting to forestall Sino-American cooperation, reacts negatively to it (as it has done in its global propaganda during the past six months). There is, thus, a trade-off for the U.S. between the gains to be secured by using the PRC to counter Soviet expansion, and those to be secured by using it to induce Soviet cooperation. At present, the balance is shifting from the latter to the former. How far and at what rate it is in the interest of the U.S. for that shift to continue is a central issue for U.S. strategy in relation to the major communist powers.

C. Diplomatic Support and Political Appeal. The improvements in the diplomatic balance and in the attitudes of foreign publics towards the U.S. stem largely from the new policies, new promises, and new style of the Carter Administration. Unlike Soviet gains which, as in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, tend to be concrete and difficult to reverse, these U.S. gains with respect to the attitudes of foreign governments and publics are less deep-rooted and could be much more ephemeral. In some respects, indeed, they result simply from the fact that the Administration is new. Thus, the increased attention which the Administration paid to some countries was a significant factor in the improved relations with those countries. Unless the attention is escalated, however, which is likely to be impossible, the impact of that increased attention will fade over time. Similarly, the Administration’s emphasis on human rights has had an apparently major positive impact on foreign public opinion. Again, that impact seems likely to diminish over time as human rights becomes a familiar element in U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, in order to maintain the favorable trends of the past 18 months, it would seem desirable to explore ways in which improved U.S. relations with key countries could be secured by more institutionalized ties based on common interests.

D. Economics and Technology. The trends in these areas have three major implications for U.S. policy.

First, the U.S. can move much more decisively than it has to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s current and prospective economic weaknesses. In particular, U.S. technology is of central importance to the Soviets in postponing the decline in their oil production and U.S. technology and credits could play a major role in developing Soviet natural gas and oil reserves. This situation is now ripe for exploitation by the U.S. One possibility would be for the U.S. to express its willingness to cooperate with the Soviets in developing their energy (particularly natural gas) resources on a massive scale, through such means as the $6 billion Yakutsk natural gas project, provided the Soviets correspondingly increased their economic dependence on the West in other ways and provided they adopted more accommodating policies in the Middle East and Africa.

Second, increased cooperation on East-West economic relations among the principal OECD countries would enhance each country’s benefits from trade with the Soviet Union. East-West economic relations would be an appropriate item for the U.S. to place on the agenda of the next economic summit.

Third, the Soviet advantage in R&D expenditures suggests the desirability of intensified U.S. efforts to increase its R&D investment so as to reduce the likelihood of losing to the Soviets its crucially important leadership role in this area.

E. Soviet Gains in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. The coup in Afghanistan and the Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia open up the possibility of new Soviet threats not only to Iran, but also to the smaller Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen. As the riots in Iran this past summer indicate, all these states are likely subjects for political instability, which could offer the Soviets various opportunities to expand their influence. A comprehensive U.S. strategy to reduce the likelihood of this happening could include:

1. continued efforts to maintain as much access as possible to current regimes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan (as well as Iraq and South Yemen);

2. clarification of U.S. interest in the stability of the area and of the seriousness with which we would view any Soviet efforts to expand their influence in pro-Western countries;

3. arms transfers, technological assistance, and political support designed to strengthen current pro-Western regimes in the area;

4. rapid implementation of the PD–18 provisions concerning a quick reaction force;

5. reconstitution of CIA covert action capabilities in the area.

Attachment 1

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Table 1
U.S.–USSR Global Balance
January 1977

		CAPABILITIES
		U.S. Advantages	Rough Equivalence	USSR Advantage
	PRO U.S.	Economic Resources and Productivity
		Political Institutions/Leadership
		East Asia
TRENDS	MIXED	Political-Ideological Action	Intelligence	East Europe
	PRO USSR	Technology	Overall Military	Covert Action
		Diplomatic Balance	Capabilities	NATO-Warsaw Pact
		Power Projection	Strategic Balance	Military Balance
		West Europe		Economic Interaction
		Third World

Attachment 2

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

Table 2
U.S.–USSR Global Balance
July 1978

		CAPABILITIES
		U.S. Advantages	Rough Equivalence	USSR Advantage
TRENDS	PRO U.S.	Economic Resources and Productivity East Asia		East Europe *
		Political-Ideological Action * Diplomatic Balance * West Europe * Third World *
	MIXED			NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance * Economic Interaction
	PRO USSR	Technology Power Projection	Overall Military Capabilities	Covert Action
			Strategic Balance

Note: Intelligence capabilities and political institutions/leadership were not assessed in July 1978.

* Asterisk indicates change in trend direction.

Underscoring indicates trend intensification.

Attachment 3

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

Table 3
Changes in Trends in Global Balance
January 1977–July 1978

A.	From pro-USSR to pro-U.S.
	Diplomatic balance
	West Europe
	Third World
B.	From pro-USSR to mixed
	NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance
	Economic interaction
C.	From mixed to pro-U.S.
	Political-ideological action
	East Europe
D.	Intensified pro-U.S.
	Economic resources and productivity
	East Asia
E.	Intensified pro-USSR
	Strategic balance
F.	Unchanged pro-USSR
	Overall military capabilities
	Power projection
	Technology
	Covert action

Attachment 4

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

Washington, undated

Table 4
Diplomatic Relations of US and USSR With Other Countries

	US		USSR
	1976	1978	1976	1978
NEGATIVE (Hostile or antagonistic)	21	18	39	46
MIXED (Cool, neutral or sympathetic)	74	74	75	73
POSITIVE (Friendly or allied)	44	47	25	20

Attachment 5

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

Table 5
Shares of Global Power Resources
1978

	U.S.	U.S. Allies & Friends	Total	USSR	USSR Allies & Friends	Total
Population	5.0%	22.5%	27.5%	6.0%	5.9%	11.9%
Gross Economic Product	24.5	40.9	65.4	14.6	5.3	19.9
Military Manpower	8.0	26.2	34.2	17.0	9.9	26.9
Military Expenditures	23.0	25.4	48.4	32.0	5.0	37.0

Attachment 6

Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁰

Washington, undated

CHART 1

Attachment 7

Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹¹

Washington, undated

CHART 2

Attachment 8

Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹²

Washington, undated

CHART 3

Attachment 9

Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹³

Washington, undated

CHART 4

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 14, PD–18 [4]. Top Secret. Outside the System. At the bottom of the page, an unknown hand wrote: “DA has seen.
2. Top Secret.
3. The PRM–10 Comprehensive Net Assessment for 1977 is printed as Document 4.
4. For PRM–32, see Document 37.
5. Top Secret.
6. Top Secret.
7. Top Secret.
8. Top Secret.
9. Top Secret.
10. Secret.
11. Secret.
12. Secret.
13. Secret.