Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

39. Special Analysis Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[paper number not declassified]

Washington, March 23, 1979

AFGHANISTAN: A Regime in Trouble

The insurgencies faced by President Taraki’s government since his leftist faction seized power almost a year ago have now grown into serious threats to the survival of the Soviet-backed regime. The USSR is clearly concerned, and if conditions worsen in Afghanistan the Soviets could face an awkward dilemma. ([classification marking not declassified])

The most damaging recent development has been the spread of fighting to the previously quiet north and west. The causes of the revolt that broke out in Herat last week and smaller outbreaks elsewhere are still unclear, but Islamic opposition to the “godless” government may have been the most important factor.²In his first months in office, Taraki appeared to be dealing successfully with the religious communities by avoiding policies offensive to them. When criticism of the government became more open last fall—perhaps encouraged by events in Iran and by exiled religious leaders in Pakistan—Taraki cracked down.³ The arrest in January and February of a number of clerics apparently exacerbated the situation. ([classification marking not declassified])

Even if the armed forces succeed in suppressing the current rebellions, insurgencies inspired by the Islamic opposition will almost certainly recur, placing further strains on the loyalty of the Muslim soldiers. Rebellion in the tribal areas along the Pakistani border broke out almost as soon as Taraki came to power. The tribes cannot campaign effectively outside their home areas but are holding their own in the mountains. Probably more than half of the Army’s combat units are now in tribal areas, and morale is declining because of casualties, tribal loyalties, and the dim prospects for victory. ([classification marking not declassified])

So far—despite the defection of a large part of the Army garrison in Herat and reports of daily desertions in the tribal areas—the bulk of the military remains loyal to the government. Widespread arrests and dismissals have prevented any successful move against Taraki by disgruntled officers. At the same time, however, the purges clearly reveal the continuing decline in the number of officers the government is willing to trust and, along with the similar removal of suspected opponents in the bureaucracy, have forced the government to rely more and more on inexperienced party members. The few capable senior officials—for example Foreign Minister Amin—seem to have more to do than they can handle. ([classification marking not declassified])

The economic situation is deteriorating. Poor weather has sharply reduced agricultural production, foodgrain import requirements have increased, and Kabul is shopping in world markets for early delivery of at least 400,000 tons of wheat. The government estimates that the shortfall in wheat production this year will be between 700,000 to 800,000 tons. Foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to pay for wheat imports, but Kabul still faces problems in arranging for delivery. The Afghans have asked Pakistan to expedite wheat shipments through the port of Karachi, but Islamabad has not yet responded. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Afghanistan’s relations with its non-Communist neighbors are becoming more difficult. Although the Pakistani Government is not now giving support to tribal dissidents, it is reportedly making little effort to limit the activities of Afghan exiles in Pakistan and may decide at some point to provide material aid. The new Iranian Government apparently is continuing the Shah’s non-interventionist policy, but anti-Afghan statements by Iranian leaders and verbal attacks on Iran from Afghanistan have increased tension. The increasingly Islamic character of the insurgency in Afghanistan could lead to a change in Iranian policy. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Soviet money, arms, and advisers have been an important factor in keeping the Taraki government afloat, and the implicit threat of a Soviet reaction has been a major deterrent against Iranian and Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan.⁴ As his troubles increase, Taraki will need even greater Soviet assistance, and it is even possible that at some point only open Soviet military intervention could save him. ([classification marking not declassified])

The Soviet Role

The USSR’s dispatch of a high-level delegation to Afghanistan and its planned airlift point to Moscow’s willingness to help Taraki meet the challenge. As many as 48 Soviet transport aircraft may be involved in the planned delivery of combat helicopters, which suggests to us the Soviets may also be delivering radar, communications, and other support equipment. The Soviets will probably also initially provide ground crews and pilots. The Soviets may already have delivered additional infantry combat vehicles. Even more noteworthy is Moscow’s willingness to jeopardize its relations with the new government in Iran by charging it with complicity in the Afghan unrest. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan have been helping government forces quell the insurgencies in eastern Afghanistan for several months. There is now an unconfirmed report that Soviet advisers assigned to the Afghan Air Force took part in bombing rebel-held positions in Herat last week. The Soviets reportedly flew bombing missions for North Yemen in the 1960s and for Iraq against the Kurds in the 1970s. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

The Soviet military advisory mission in Afghanistan has more than doubled since the coup last April. It now numbers between 600 and 1,000, but there is still considerable room for further expansion. The Afghans, for example, probably will be unable to handle their logistics problems if the situation worsens, and Soviet military personnel might be dispatched to facilitate the movement of men and materiel to the various combat zones. ([classification marking not declassified])

Moscow will face a dilemma if—despite expanded assistance—the situation deteriorates to the point where only massive Soviet military intervention could save the Afghan Marxists. This could happen if the Islamic insurgency spreads to other urban areas of Afghanistan and if the military withdraws its support from Taraki. Moscow’s decision to publish two authoritative warnings in less than a week about outside interference in Afghanistan is indicative of Soviet concern about a possible replay in Afghanistan of recent developments in Iran. This is also reflected in the current Soviet propaganda effort to portray the current government as respectful of Islam and mindful of the teachings of the Koran. ([classification marking not declassified])

The Soviets would be most reluctant to introduce large numbers of ground forces into Afghanistan to keep in power an Afghan Government that had lost the support of virtually all segments of the population. Not only would the Soviets find themselves in an awkward morass in Afghanistan, but their actions could seriously damage their relations with India, Iran, and—to a lesser degree—Pakistan. As a more likely option, the Soviets probably could seek to re-establish ties with those members of the Afghan opposition with whom Moscow has dealt profitably in the past.⁵ ([classification marking not declassified])

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [text not declassified] and [text not declassified].
2. The uprising in Herat began on March 15 by civilian insurgents, who were joined by resident Afghan Army troops who had mutinied. The revolt ended on March 20 when Afghan Army troops loyal to the Taraki regime entered the city.
3. A reference to the Iranian revolution and the collapse of the Shah’s government in February 1979.
4. An intelligence information cable prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 26, reported on information shared by [text not declassified], who alleged that Brezhnev sent Taraki a letter committing Soviet support to Afghanistan with 10 divisions and 500 aircraft near the Afghan border. According to the cable: “Whether the above information is accurate, it is the commonly held perception of Khalq officers that the Soviet Union is prepared to assist Afghanistan. The leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan may wish to disseminate the substance of this message to its officers to instill a sense of confidence that Afghanistan is backed by a powerful neighbor.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #2)
5. In a likely reaction to this paper, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to Vance, March 28, indicating that in response to Soviet support and possible participation in the Afghan Government’s efforts to destroy the insurgency, “the President stated that we should notify Iran, Pakistan, and India of this and publicize Soviet involvement.” (Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000019, Box 3, Afghanistan, Non-Vector 1980–1985) A status report from Tarnoff to Brzezinski, April 5, described the activities undertaken by the Department of State per Carter’s instructions. These measures included sending cables with talking points to the Embassies in Tehran and Jidda, a proposed letter to Indian Prime Minister Desai, and a message for Ambassador Hummel to communicate to Pakistani officials. Additionally, Tarnoff reported that the Department issued a statement “denying sharply” Soviet accusations of U.S. meddling in Afghanistan. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978) The Department’s public statement attacking the Soviet allegations of U.S. interference in Afghanistan was issued on April 2. (Don Oberdorder, “U.S. Blasts ‘Baseless’ Soviet Charges,” Washington Post, April 3, 1979, p. A12). See also Document 44.