Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 18, 1978

SUBJECT

• Civil Defense Program Funding (U)

In view of the confusion created by press reports of a $2 billion civil defense program, I want to clarify several points to help you deal with the Defense budget decisions and to answer future press queries.² (U)

The policy decision. Two Policy Review Committee meetings were held on PRM–32, Civil Defense.³ One dealt only with a policy statement, not program choices. Upon reviewing and commenting on its results, you signed PD–41, which specified the rationale for our civil defense effort but not its funding level.⁴ (C)

The program options. At the other Policy Review Committee meeting, several program options were offered, ranging from “minimal” to “major.” The table at Tab A displays this range.⁵ The Policy Review Committee expressed preferences for something between program 2b and 3. A “2c” choice was suggested by Harold Brown, which includes “civil defense” from option 3 but leaves out the “continuity of government” element pending further analysis. No annual program rate was discussed for moving toward the 5-year goal of a one-to-two week “surge” objective. (C)

In line with this five-year program scheme, Harold Brown has planned to ask for about $40 million above the FY 1979 level of $96.5 million. At no time have you committed yourself to a particular funding level. You will, of course, make a decision on annual funding in the regular budget cycle. (C)

For a look at the program elements and a suggested annual rate of moving to the five-year goal, see Tab B.⁶ The five-year total would be $1.26 billion. If we add nothing to our present “minimal” funding level, the total would still be over $500 million for five years. ($96.5 million annually plus inflation.) By subtracting that amount from the $1.26 billion figure (Tab B), it is clear that the real increase is about $700 million spread over five years. This is a far cry from the $2 billion annual increase suggested by press reports. (C)

How much civil defense to buy in FY 1980? Since 1975 we have been buying a skeletal staff capacity for about $96.5 million. A few pilot areas have inchoate plans. Most cities have nothing. Defense proposed to upgrade our effort in various program categories as indicated under the FY 1980 column in Tab B, eventually achieving a nation-wide one-to-two-week relocation capability. The program can be stretched out, or it can be left at $96.5 million. (C)

I encourage you to add no less than $20 million for FY 1980 for two reasons: (C)

— The step up to roughly $140 million is a small one, but it moves us from doing virtually nothing to doing something in an area which is part of the overall strategic balance. (C)

— If you feel you must cut back, some increase is politically important for giving substance to the civil defense policy as it is perceived, both domestically and by the Soviets. (C)

What is CRP? You have raised questions about the substance of crisis relocation planning. I am attaching (Tab C) a short description of the general concept.⁷ In judging the efficacy of such planning, it is important to remember that no plan will work smoothly. It can only reduce the level of chaos attendant to spontaneous evacuation. In the 1962 Cuban crisis, about 10 million people evacuated spontaneously. The future choice will be whether or not to facilitate it. The occasion could arise far short of war—from a nuclear power plant accident or a nuclear terrorist threat. (C)

Given some of the hostile press reaction, I thought you also might like to review the item at Tab D on public attitudes.⁸ The editorial opinions of the New York Times and the Washington Post do not, apparently, reflect the broader public attitude.⁹ (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 81, Civil Defense: 1977–78. Confidential. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.
2. See, for example, Richard Burt, “Carter Uncommitted on Money For Plan to Bolster Civil Defense,” New York Times, December 2, 1978, p. 21.
3. For PRM–32, see Document 37. For the meetings, see Documents 73 and 79.
4. See Document 91.
5. Attached but not printed is an undated table listing alternative U.S. civil defense programs.
6. Attached but not printed is an undated table summarizing prime costs for FY 79–84.
7. Attached but not printed is a December 8 paper entitled “Developing Crisis Relocation Plans and Capabilities.”
8. Attached but not printed is a December 6 paper entitled “Public Support for Moderate-Level U.S. Civil Defense Programs.”
9. See “Mr. Carter’s Fallout Biscuits,” New York Times, November 14, 1978, p. A26; and “No to Civil Defense,” Washington Post, December 15, 1978, p. A22.