Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

79. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 18, 1978, 2–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Civil Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Jerome Kahan, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)
  • David E. McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
  • Bardyl R. Tirana, Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

• JCS

  • Lt. General William Y. Smith

• CIA

  • Robert Bowie, Deputy to the Director for International Foreign Assessment Center
  • [name not declassified], Office of Strategic Research Analysis

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director
  • Al Lieberman, Chief, Office of Operational Analysis

• OMB

  • Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

• Federal Preparedness Agency

  • Joseph Mitchell, Director
  • Dalimil Kybal, Assistant Director for Research, Development and Program Coordination

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • William E. Odom

MINUTES OF MEETING

Harold Brown opened the meeting with the first of the two agenda points, a proposed civil defense policy statement. He introduced a new State version juxtaposed with the proposed Defense version for discussion.²

Keeny began the debate by declaring that there is no meaning in the sentence, “Perception of the overall balance should not be marked by major asymmetries.”

Harold Brown defended this Defense language, arguing that it means we must either reduce the asymmetries or change the perceptions.

Brzezinski asked why the State version spoke of saving “population” but omitted reference to “leadership”?

Harold Brown suggested adding “government continuity,” not “leadership” which has political overtones raising a question of which leaders will be saved.

Christopher objected to “coerce us in time of crisis.” He prefers the term “crisis management” as a broader term. Harold Brown agreed, but Dr. Brzezinski did not. He suggested inserting “to stable crisis management” in the policy statement directly before the phrase “coerce us . . .”

Dr. Brzezinski then observed that the public declaratory policy statement should be changed by replacing the words “modest improvements” with “continuing improvements” because the word “modest” could invite public and Congressional criticism.

Harold Brown expressed the fear that this would be an open ended commitment.

Brzezinski replied that “continuing” or “gradual” are quite good words in the declaratory policy for avoiding an open ended interpretation. Dr. Brzezinski also proposed that “to some degree” be removed from the public declaratory policy statement. Upon Brown’s objection to that change, Dr. Brzezinski offered “in part” in place of “to some degree.”

Harold Brown then proposed wording along the lines of “Although civil defense has only a limited effect on the overall strategic balance and crisis stability, the program should also contribute in these regards.

General Smith objected to State’s version, insisting that “survivability” would depend upon a number of factors as the last part of the DOD proposed statement indicates. “Among other factors” is omitted from the State version. General Smith wanted it included. Harold Brown agreed.

Brown then asked Keeny if ACDA would drop its alternative proposal?³

Keeny answered no. A real policy issue is being side stepped, he argued. Are we tying our policy to insurance, or are we, as is the case of the Defense and State version, tying civil defense to the strategic balance? This is not a small issue. The President should realize that it is not. Furthermore, how will we explain to the public if we decide to tie it to the strategic balance?

Brown answered that the dollar figure for a program will make the tie and inform the public. The danger is to say that civil defense is important and then do nothing.

Keeny agreed. He added that the Soviets are pushing civil defense; we do not want to create pressure on this Administration by talking about civil defense. Keeny added that he did not object to the declaratory policy but only to the internal policy statement which ties civil defense to the strategic balance. The second paragraph is particularly troublesome. It can be construed to require a civil defense buildup.

Brown replied that ACDA’s paragraph four, as an expression of this concern, is the thought in the DOD version.

McGiffert suggested omitting Defense’s paragraph two and Keeny agreed. Keeny added that there is so little promise in the public declaratory statement that policies inspired by the internal statement would not be explainable.

Harold Brown asked Keeny if he would agree that in principle there could be differences in U.S. and Soviet casualty figures that would affect the strategic balance.

Keeny agreed that there are.

Brown then said that the statement is valid. Civil defense does contribute to the overall balance.

Brzezinski questioned whether we must reach a full agreement on the statement.

Brown said it would be a good idea to spare the President extra decisions.

General Smith said the Congress, the public, and others are concerned about civil defense being part of the balance and that we cannot side step the issue as Keeny suggests.

Tirana then explained that the public must know why we have a program and cited a recent TV program taping (60 Minutes) as an example. State and local officials cannot be encouraged to contribute without Federal guidance and policy rationale.

Keeny argued that this is why he is concerned. The declaratory policy statement offers little, but the internal policy rationale promises a lot.

Harold Brown said that we will send both policy alternatives to the President.

Keeny refused to accept the Defense modified version even if the words “in addition” were omitted. Keeny said that civil defense will become a major issue, and that the President will want to be aware that we are tying civil defense to the strategic balance.

Brown rebuttaled, “haven’t we already done so by talking to the Russians about including civil defense in SALT III?”

Keeny said yes, but for this change to be effective, there must be public debate. Tirana said it would cause less stir to accept the latest modified Defense statement than to create debate by submitting two statements for a Presidential choice.

Brown said he would include both. He also agreed with State to include a reference to “dual-use” in both the internal and declaratory statements.

Dr. Brzezinski said that is a good idea.

Jayne asked if all civil defense has “dual-use”?

General Smith said perhaps we could say “can have” “dual-use.”

Brown then turned to the continuity of government issue. Brown, Brzezinski, Mitchell, Christopher, and others agreed that the paper was inadequate for choosing a program to improve the present continuity of government posture. Brown agreed that the paper convinces him that the present fixed posture is not enough. He then explained the kinds of analysis that might help resolve a choice of how to enhance it.

Keeny, Mitchell, and others commented that indeed they agreed with Brown.

Brown then said we agree on the following things:

1. We need continuity of government.

2. The fixed site program is insufficient.

3. We need cost studies on how to improve the program.

Mitchell admitted that his paper was only an exploration.

Brown said that the paper convinced him it is not foolish to improve “continuity of government.”

Mitchell and Tirana then discussed how to get the study funds for an outside analysis.

Brzezinski insisted that we must decide what kind of study should be done, although Brown believed that was not for the PRC to decide. Dr. Brzezinski said we should have a working group look into what kind of analysis is needed and then commission it.

Tirana offered to fund a study in the 1978 time period with DCPA funds.

Christopher then raised a question about what program option had been chosen at the last PRC.⁴ Did it involve buying a one-year surge capability or a one to two-week surge capability?

Tirana and Smith believed that one to two weeks was the conclusion.

Keeny and Christopher thought otherwise.

Harold Brown acknowledged the ambiguity but insisted that it did not change our decision previously made. We will eventually move to the one to two-week posture, but the time was left open.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 70, PRC 070, 8/18/78, Civil Defense. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions is ibid.
2. The State and Defense versions were not found.
3. The ACDA alternative proposal was not found.
4. See Tab A, Document 73.