Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

73. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 5, 1978

SUBJECT

• Civil Defense—PRC Minutes

Attached at Tab A are the minutes of the Policy Review Committee meeting on PRM–32, Civil Defense. They are fairly detailed, following the discussion in its several digressions, zigs and zags, but I decided that it is better to error in the direction of completeness because of the contentious nature of the discussions.

Upon review, it is striking how an inchoate consensus favoring an explicit policy on civil defense developed toward the end.

— Brown admitted that “equivalent survivability” is difficult to reject but fears putting it on paper.

— Christopher would follow the Congress if Congress wants a big program; he acknowledges “equivalent survivability” can be attained several ways, not only with big programs, i.e., implicit support for the concept.

— Gelb sees civil defense as part of the strategic equation.

— Tirana explains that Brown’s preferences for “no policy” but a larger program will be implicitly understood by Congress and the public as “equivalent survivability” and a belief that civil defense is effective.

— Your “crisis management” argument stirred strong support from Mitchell of FPA.

— Bill Smith, of course, came down clearly for “equivalent survivability,” the JCS position, by calling for a reduction of the present asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet civil defense.

— Only Spurgeon Keeny was adamant in opposing “equivalent survivability,” but even he admitted a need to give people some increased probability of surviving.

Tab A

Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting²

Washington, August 3, 1978, 3–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Civil Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Leslie Gelb, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)
  • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
  • Lynn E. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs
  • Bardyl R. Tirana, Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

• JCS

  • Lt. General William Y. Smith

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
  • [name not declassified], Office of Strategic Research Analysis

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director
  • Al Lieberman, Chief, Office of Operational Analysis

• OMB

  • Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director for Budget
  • Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

• Federal Preparedness Agency

  • Joseph Mitchell, Director
  • Dalimil Kybal, Assistant Director for Research, Development and Program Coordination

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • Samuel Huntington
  • Reginald Bartholomew
  • Colonel William E. Odom

MINUTES OF MEETING

Harold Brown opened the discussion by observing what we do in civil defense to some extent is driven by what the Soviets do. He then asked Admiral Turner to comment on Soviet programs.

Admiral Turner said the Soviets are investing in a large civil defense effort sheltering all of the leadership and a small portion of the population. The remainder of the population is to be protected by evacuation. A full seven-day evacuation effort would protect about 75 percent and would reduce expected casualties by about 50 percent. If the evacuees dig elementary shelters, casualties could be reduced by another half. In the first six to thirty-six hours of an evacuation, however, a U.S. strike on the Soviet Union could increase the casualties slightly. From the second day on, the number would drop rapidly. Admiral Turner also mentioned two large uncertainties. First, we are not sure how long the Soviets could remain in an evacuated posture. Second, we cannot say what the impact of weather conditions would be on civil defense effectiveness.

Harold Brown asked when and how we would know about Soviet evacuation if it took place. Stating that the evacuation rate would be two million people per hour for the first two days, Turner ventured that satellite and other intelligence systems would detect such movement. Some skepticism was expressed about detection of such a slow rate of evacuation.

Keeney insisted that the Soviets would make a public broadcast if they evacuate. Challenged on his report of the two million per hour evacuation rate, Admiral Turner called on [name not declassified] who verified this figure. Brown, Christopher, and others thought it a very small number for a very large country.

Harold Brown moved the discussion to potential effectiveness of civil defense and related uncertainties. Would civil defense make a difference in the outcome of a nuclear exchange? What effect would it have on society’s survivability? Keeny responded by challenging the paper’s³ estimates of survivors and condemned it for omitting attention to the long-term consequences. Soviet civil defense evacuation, he added, would give us added strategic warning. Harold Brown agreed about the warning, observing that we could generate high alert levels in 48 hours. Keeny suggested [4 lines not declassified].

Keeny challenged the paper’s assertion that only a ten percent spontaneous U.S. evacuation would occur. Harold Brown observed that a large spontaneous evacuation without a reception plan would adversely affect longer-term survivability. Keeny insisted that the paper overstates Soviet opportunities to use civil defense and omits [3 lines not declassified].

Admiral Turner observed that U.S. suburban and rural areas are better prepared for a spontaneous reception than would be the case in the Soviet Union. Cutter agreed and emphasized the U.S. advantage in roads and family automobiles.

Keeny argued that evacuation in the context of this analysis certainly helps but it does not take into account the longer term effects. Huntington added that the Working Group had discussed the long-term effects but happily we do not have nuclear war experience to give us sufficient data to answer Keeny’s question.

Brzezinski emphasized the effect that any U.S. civil defense has on the Soviet leaders. First, since the Soviets apparently believe in the efficacy of their own civil defense, it is bad for [2 lines not declassified]. Second, the crisis management role of civil defense on both sides is critical. A superpower confrontation in the coming decade is not to be discounted. In a situation where the Soviets implement a controlled civil defense evacuation and the U.S. responds with a chaotic spontaneous evacuation, the President’s diplomatic bargaining position would be seriously undercut.

Harold Brown tried to defer this discussion of “perceptions” to later discussion of policy choices. Brzezinski rejected that suggestion, insisting that talk of civil defense effectiveness requires discussion of mutual perceptions of civil defense effectiveness.

Secretary Brown then proceeded around the table soliciting agency positions on the five program options, adding that he thought civil defense and continuity of government are separate in this case.

Christopher led off for State by arguing that we cannot compartmentalize the discussion. Suppose civil defense is part of the strategic balance and we frighten the public and allies by saying so. If we cannot then get the Congressional support for the programs, we would be worse off than if we had done nothing.

Christopher added that he preferred to consult with Congress before making a program choice but that he leans towards Option 2b.⁴

Harold Brown said that Congress’ view is unstructured. Congress probably would follow the Administration on any program choice between Options 2a and 3. Lower and higher level programs might get support but that is more dubious. Harold Brown rejected Christopher’s request for Congressional consultations first, insisting that it had to be the other way around: we must choose a program and then go to the Congress.

Keeny, speaking for ACDA, favored program Option 2b, and expressed a fear of tying our civil defense to Soviet activities.

Cutter, speaking for OMB, chose program Option 2b with reservations about civil defense effectiveness.

Mitchell, speaking for the Federal Preparedness Agency, concluded that our real choices lie between 2a and 3, but that in view of Brzezinski’s comments, perceptions are key in assessing civil defense effectiveness. Presently, what we know about perceptions indicates that we need a policy, program emphasis, and some movement.

Admiral Turner, speaking for CIA, responded to Brown’s question, what is the effect of U.S. civil defense on Soviet perceptions? Turner said there are two schools of thought. One argues that the Soviets only care about our offensive programs. The other argues that they care about both offensive and defensive programs. An improved new U.S. program would, therefore, only have a mild effect on Soviet perceptions.

Lt. General Smith, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed that we seem to believe that we must do more. The question is how much. The JCS favors Option 3.

Harold Brown then asked DCPA Director Bardyl Tirana whether we could achieve enhanced evacuation by diverting funds within the present civil defense budget from other elements of the program. Tirana answered that all but $40 million of the present budget is required to buy into the state and local civil defense organizations. The remaining $40 million is largely allocated for evacuation planning. It is politically impossible to divert the other money from state and local organizations because they would withdraw, leaving the Federal Government to build a replacement organization which would cost at least twice as much in the absence of local matched funds.

[2 paragraps (21 lines) not declassified]

Mitchell stated that he had been appalled at the neglected state of affairs when he became Director of FPA. We cannot defer the budget issue for long if we are serious about continuity of government. The “Washington arc” of hard sites goes back to the Eisenhower Administration. Little improvement has occurred since that time.

Brzezinski asked if we could postpone the decision for two weeks and use the time to get a sufficient understanding of the “continuity of [41 lines not declassified].

Huntington observed that perhaps Brown had in mind “assurance” rather than “insurance.”

[7 lines not declassified]

Brzezinski rejoined that “equivalent survivability” makes it less likely that we would need to evacuate in a crisis because both sides would realize the other has an equivalent response.

Keeny insisted that evacuation would make no difference for a crisis, a point that Brown challenged.

Brzezinski went on to argue that “equivalent survivability” might not mean an equivalent civil defense program. [1 lines not declassified] In SALT III we must eliminate both civil defense and air defense on both sides.

Harold Brown, responding to Keeny, insisted that an option to evacuate for civil defense is worth $100 million. Keeny replied that he fears an insurance policy will raise expectations which are illusory.

Tirana insisted that an explicit civil defense policy is very important for explaining anything we do to the public and Congress. If we have no public policy rationale as we increase the program, we encourage the public to believe that civil defense will be effective. Silence on a policy rationale, therefore, encourages the public to believe we have “equivalent survivability.”

Harold Brown admitted that it is difficult to reject the “equivalent survivability” but he fears putting it down on paper. He does not worry about Soviet civil defense being effective. If he did, he would support a civil defense policy. There are genuine differences among us on this point, he added.

Christopher observed that the policy choices as stated in the paper are loaded. There are other ways to achieve “equivalent survivability.”

Brown agreed and noted that “equivalent survivability” might be achieved on civil defense the way cruise missiles were substituted by the B–1.

Brzezinski said that “insurance” may be all right as a policy but its substance and definition should be that as stated in the paper for “equivalent survivability.” We will need both the policy and the program for SALT III, where civil defense should play the same role that the ABM played in SALT I. If the Soviets will not cut back their civil defense, that is a sure sign of their seriousness about their war fighting doctrine and program efforts.

Brown rejected Brzezinski’s assertions on this point. Brzezinski once again emphasized the crisis control problem in which we could find ourselves between the two unhappy choices of war or surrender.

Brown then tried to express the spirit of the policy. It should be “equivalent effectiveness of civil defense when added to our strategic forces.” Tirana reasserted the need for a policy rationale for state and local leaders. Cutter insisted that the local leadership will not understand “equivalent survivability.” Keeny added that they can understand “insurance.”

Brown remarked that civil defense is part of the strategic balance. Keeny agreed that the option for evacuation may be useful but expressed fears that the costs are understated.

Brzezinski observed that if we initiate civil defense talks now, the Soviets probably would not respond, but with a U.S. program enhancement, they probably will respond in a year or two.

Brown, answering Keeny, insisted that the cost figures for Option 3 would provide some real evacuation capability.

Keeny insisted that the Soviets have never practiced evacuation. [name not declassified] supplied the intelligence information that in fact a major civil defense exercise was held in Moscow last April and that urban exercises for parts of cities are frequent. Keeny still insisted that Soviet civil defense is wholly ineffective.

Harold Brown said that we are in a position to recommend program Option 2c with a question about how much to add for “continuity of government” which should be left to be answered by a short study. On the policy question, he added, we want something like “insurance of the strategic balance.”

Brzezinski insisted that the rationale of “equivalent survivability” with some policy word like “insurance” is what we need.

General Smith observed that we need to reduce the asymmetries between Soviet and U.S. civil defense postures and, therefore, a policy must rationalize such a reduction.

Brzezinski added that “equivalent survivability” as it is defined in the paper is more clear about our purposes.

Gelb stated that civil defense is part of the overall strategic balance; equality of civil defense programs is not what we are after in a policy.

Brzezinski insisted that we will need a short follow-up meeting on continuity of government and a new policy statement.

Harold Brown expressed hope that it would be a very short meeting, if a meeting at all.

Harold Brown then noted some other things which are not on the agenda for this PRC but relate to the new civil defense organizational location in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):

1. The effect on civil defense and strategy of the organizational changes in the U.S. civil defense set-up.

2. The long-term effects of a nuclear strike, after two months, three months, six months, etc.

3. The feasibility and difficulties in sustaining a civil defense posture where the population has been relocated from urban centers.

After the meeting had officially ended, a number of remarks about procedures and positions were expressed.

Keeny said that the PRM does not adequately reflect ACDA’s positions. It should not be considered a final document.

Christopher observed that the PRM does not include a full representation of agency views.

Huntington responded that the views of agencies are so diverse that every agency can make the same complaint as Christopher. There is no practical way in a single document to represent fully this diversity.

Christopher explained that his concern is more about the document falling into the hands of the New York Times.

Tirana observed that the best way to prevent that is to preempt it with an unclassified statement on a civil defense policy decision.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Civil Defense: Policy Review Committee: 9/77–8/13/78. Secret.
2. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
3. See the attachment to Document 72.
4. The five options are in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Civil Defense: Policy Review Committee: 9/77–8/13/78.