Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

108. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 18, 1978

SUBJECT

• Sorting out the ICBM Vulnerability Issue (U)

Background

Another year has gone by and we still aren’t ready to resolve the issue of how to deal with the decreasing survivability of the Minuteman force. Harold has pursued MAP—but it hasn’t worked out. Harold therefore proposes to carry out a 90-day final examination of MAP and the air-mobile concept, make a decision on both the missile and its basing mode at the end of that period, and go into full-scale development by means of funding in both the FY 80 budget and the FY 79 supplemental. OMB, on the other hand, proposes to keep both the missile and its basing mode in advanced development until the end of FY 79, make both choices then, and proceed with full-scale development in FY 80. (S)

Both proposals have serious problems—DOD’s because it will seem like a rather hasty decision, given the newness of the air-mobile concept; OMB’s because adequate support for SALT II ratification will require a more solid commitment to solving the ICBM vulnerability problem—before the vote gets taken. (S)

As I see it, you have four basic questions to resolve—

— Should you authorize full-scale development of a new missile before a basing mode has been chosen?²

— When should the basing question be resolved?³

— If the basing modes are to be examined further, which modes deserve attention?

— What should be done to bridge the early ’80s gap when MM will be highly vulnerable but our long-term solution not yet deployed? (C)

Proceeding with a Missile

The virtue of making a separate missile decision now is that it would seem to demonstrate the kind of commitment to modernizing the ICBM force that is probably needed if we want to get the SALT II treaty ratified. There are some very powerful arguments why we shouldn’t make a separate missile decision, however. (C)

First, while the Congress generally supports proceeding with the M–X, it has already made clear that it does not want to put the M–X into the MM silos, and some on the Hill will worry that starting a missile now is a step in that direction. Others will be concerned that by starting a missile now, you may gain enough support to get SALT ratified, but then would not carry through to full deployment in a new basing mode. Neither group would want to say no to the missile, however, and both could be strongly motivated to table SALT II until the basing issue gets resolved. (U)

Second, Harold told the Congress last year that it was unreasonable to proceed with a missile before settling the basing mode issue. This argument would surely be thrown back at us and it has some validity.⁴ If we proceed with MAP, we will want a considerably larger missile than if we proceed with the air-mobile system. While the funds wasted by carrying both designs along for a few months would probably be modest by DOD standards (a few million)—the fact that money is being wasted will be obvious and very easy to criticize in the current budget environment. (U)

Third, proceeding with a missile before you have chosen a basing scheme does not give the appearance of an orderly decision process no matter what the realities—and the value of an orderly process, particularly with as important a decision as this one, is very high. (U)

I therefore believe that you should make these decisions together, if the basing decision can be made fairly soon—but that is the next question. (U)

Timing for the Basing Decision

There are too many uncertainties about the alternatives to MAP to make an immediate decision. The Air Force did some very detailed studies of the air-mobile concept several years ago. However, the cost estimates and SALT impact analysis that were done are out-of-date, and DOD has been re-examining the concept for only a few months. (U)

At the other extreme, delaying the decision until the end of 1979 as proposed by OMB seems virtually impossible without jeopardizing the SALT II ratification vote, or significantly delaying it. (C)

Making both decisions in late March or early April, as Harold now proposes, seems like the only reasonable course of action. The Air Force believes that with a 60–90 day final examination it can reduce the uncertainties about the air-mobile system and MAP systems to the point where making a decision will be appropriate. While so short a period for a final examination may not appear to be the ultimate in orderly decision-making processes, we can make clear that the air-mobile idea has been studied in detail before—and that this relatively short period is enough for an update of these studies plus a careful comparison. (C)

Options to Be Given Further Study

At this point, two systems you are quite familiar with would be in the finals—MAP, and the air-mobile system. Further, some of the arguments given above suggest that introduction of wholly new ideas at this point simply isn’t a good idea. If there is another horse to be entered in the race, the only reasonable candidate in my view would be an off-road mobile system, an idea that also received detailed study by the Air Force some years ago. (C)

This concept would involve deploying 150–200 large transporter/erector/launcher vehicles at perhaps fifteen military bases scattered across the Western part of the US. The vehicles would carry an M–X size missile and be capable of off-road operations without resupply for 60 days. Except for occasional exercises, they would remain at their bases. In a crisis they would disperse throughout the rural areas within 100–150 miles, hiding during the day and changing their positions each night. The total available dispersal area of perhaps 400,000 sq. miles is far too large for the Soviets to barrage. Attached is a table summarizing the main features of the MAP, air-mobile and off-road mobile systems. (S)

In my opinion, the pros and cons of asking DOD to include off-road mobile systems in their final evaluation are as follows: First, you will be under enormous pressure to go forward with one of the options considered in this evaluation. There are many uncertainties about the air-mobile system, particularly its cost. If the system gets disqualified on cost, we will be into MAP for better or worse. Second, if the off-road mobile system’s drawbacks are ultimately acceptable, it might save us a lot of money. (C)

The verification problems posed by this system are uncertain, but probably easier to deal with than those posed by MAP. You should note that the verification [3 lines not declassified] (S)

The most significant of the drawbacks to the system are its need for occasional exercises in the public domain, and the fact that its survivability depends upon getting [7 lines not declassified] (S)

Bridging the Early ’80s Gap

There are three possible alternatives for increasing our strategic forces’ capabilities during the early ’80s when Minuteman will be vulnerable but we won’t yet have deployed its ultimate replacement. The first two would involve initially installing Minuteman on the air-mobile aircraft if we decided to go forward with that option, or installing it on a modification of its current transporter to create a road-mobile system. (C)

The Air Force is very cool on both of these possibilities. They feel that the components of the air-mobile system other than the missile can be deployed only 1–2 years in advance of a new missile, and thus deploying Minuteman in the system isn’t worth the cost and effort. (C)

In the case of the road-mobile option, they believe that the system could be available somewhat sooner, but that its military value would be small. Given these facts and the fact that almost none of its components would be usable in any of the long-term solutions that employ a new missile—including off-road mobile—they think it is a waste of money. These arguments seem pretty reasonable. (S)

[5 lines not declassified] This would provide more military capability than the proposed road-mobile MAP system, and the decision to do it need not be made right now. (S)

On balance, then, I believe that we should plan on raising alert rates, if necessary, to tide us through the early ’80s.⁵ In the context of an ongoing program to modernize the ICBM force, the perceived strategic balance should be acceptable. (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you ask Harold to carry out an evaluation of alternative plans for modernizing our strategic forces to include the MAP and Air-Mobile concepts. His resulting analysis and recommendations should be forwarded for your approval by April 2nd.⁶ (C)

That you signal the strongest reasonable level of support for modernizing the ICBM force by providing sufficient funds in both the FY 79 supplemental and the FY 80 budget for beginning full-scale development of both a new missile and a new basing scheme.⁷ (C)

That Harold Brown and the Chiefs take the lead in explaining this situation to the Congress.

Attachment

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

Washington, undated

	MAP	AIR MOBILE	OFF-ROAD MOBILE
Concept	Rotate missiles among simplified silos when maintenance needed; approximately 20 silos per missile.	Carry 2 missiles each in C5A aircraft or 1 each in stretched AMST aircraft; strip alert at military bases—disperse to civil airfields in crisis.	Large transporters carrying 1 missile each; normally in garrison but scatter, across wide area on alert.
Interaction with Missile Decision	No advantage to small missiles; larger missiles imply lower total costs to achieve objective of 800 surviving EMT.	Optimal missile smaller than M–X (TRIDENT II size missile could throw 8 RVs with air drop and northern launch areas).	Same as MAP.
Warning Requirement	Completely independent of warning.	Needs tactical warning of incoming missile attack; significantly harder to attack if dispersed.	[5 lines not declassified]
IOC	’86	Early ’86 with M–X partly common missile; late ’86 with common missile.
Systems Cost (’78 $)	$26–27B	$28–30B; very uncertain—some offset if AMST aircraft serves other purposes.	$18–20B (very rough guess).
Public Impact	25–35 sq. miles permanently removed from public use.	100–120 sq. miles may need to be permanently removed for new bases; little recurring public impact except for perceptions of dispersal exercises.	Negligible public land permanently removed; might compare with Pershing; wide dispersals will generate claims damage, and frighten public unless routine.
Verification	Open production/assembly process could support adequate verification by Soviets; reverse verification tougher—will Soviets accept constraints we say we need?	Seems adequately verifiable using currently accepted techniques.	Open production/assembly process could support adequate verification by Soviets; can be made easy to count in normal garrison posture.
Survivability/Endurance	Nominally designed for perhaps 50% survival; endurance can be made a matter of months.	Nominally assessed to have 70% survivability; significant endurance problems if support bases and tactical warning systems are attacked; spread/hide across very large number of airfields helps considerably; ability to counter Soviet surveillance may be important.	Vulnerable to surprise attack but most dispersed systems should survive; 80–90% normally ready for dispersal; endurance can be made a matter of months.
Responsive Threat/Competitive Leverage	Cost to expand system may not be significantly different from costs to expand threat; Soviets could drive our costs considerably higher within SALT.	Probably more expensive for Soviets to expand threat than for us to expand system; SALT limits may ultimately bind Soviets.	May be significantly cheaper to expand system than for Soviets to expand threat; plenty of land available if public will accept idea.
Political Issues	Environmental objections could delay system; would we trust the Soviets with this system? possible breakout problems; confidence in successful deception?	Environmental objections could delay system if new bases needed; excessive dependence on bombers could be argued.	Environmental objections—but may be less focused than for MAP, etc.; wisdom of depending on strategic warning will be continously questioned.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 11/78–4/79. Secret. Sent for action. The date is handwritten.
2. Carter wrote “no” in the right margin next to this point.
3. Carter wrote “spring” in the right margin next to this point.
4. Carter drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the previous sentence.
5. Carter placed a checkmark in the right margin next to this sentence.
6. Carter placed a checkmark in the right margin next to this paragraph.
7. Carter wrote “?” in the right margin next to this sentence.
8. Secret.