Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

110. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 30, 1978

SUBJECT

• A Review of Continuity for Government Programs (U)

As you recall from the Policy Review Committee meeting on PRM–32,² Harold Brown put off making a program choice on “continuity of government” until better analysis is available. You asked for a quick analysis by the working group—in two weeks—to satisfy Harold. That did not prove possible for three reasons. First, the Working Group relied on FPA (for a quick answer there was no other choice) which had failed during a full year to produce acceptable analysis. Second, many aspects of the continuity of government program are close-hold and politically sensitive (particularly the NCA successor problem and plans for Congress which only two members know about), not matters for treatment in an ordinary interagency working group as we had for PRM–32. Third, both the Director of FPA and OMB staffers cogently argued that the continuity of government programs have been neglected for so long that they need a fundamental review. (They received major reviews in 1962 and 1970, but no corrective actions followed. NSSM–58, prepared in 1970, was never ever brought to an NSC meeting.³) Clearly, a more comprehensive effort is needed. (S)

Related developments also give urgency and focus to what needs to be done in FPA programs:

[2 paragraphs (8 lines) not declassified]

— The mobilization inadequacies revealed by the NIFTY NUGGET exercise this fall have stirred follow-up activities which impact heavily on FPA capabilities. (C)

— The FEMA reorganization is now law and to be completed by March 31, 1979. (U)

— The growing Soviet “hard target” capability [less than 1 line not declassified] creates a Minute Man survivability problem. [2 lines not declassified] (S)

These developments are creating a more receptive attitude in Defense and OMB to the idea of a fundamental review of continuity of government. (S)

It should also be obvious to you that this issue is closely related to changing views on strategic doctrine. It is the crux of the C3I issue on the civil side. We could neglect continuity of government and emergency succession as long as we held a significant strategic lead. Today, without that lead, we need an effective leadership protection capability to enhance deterrence. (S)

The argument can be made that PD–41 provides sufficient policy guidance (i.e. directing “greater continuity of government”) for FPA to proceed on its own program review without further assistance from the NSC. The flaws in this argument are two. First, FPA is so deteriorated that it does not have adequate staff for making such a review. Second, FPA does not have adequate clout to make all the Federal agencies—for whose “continuity” FPA is planning—take a review seriously. FPA could not even force all agencies to review the PEADs (Presidential Emergency Action Documents), during the first year of this Administration. (TS)

What is needed, therefore, is a combination of staff reinforcement with expressed support from the NSC and OMB. With these, FPA can make progress. (C)

— Staff support. The “management” part of OMB and Defense can be tapped to augment the FPA staff. If necessary, some tasks can be contracted to outside consultants. (C)

— NSC/OMB support. The first thought, of course, is a PRM, but that is undesirable for two reasons. First, the non-sensitive FPA programs have been through the PRM–32 process with no real result. Second, sensitive programs like Presidential successor plans and maintenance of the NCA in face of a Soviet de-capitation attack on our C3I should not be treated in the PRM working group circles. (TS)

In several meetings with OMB (Szanton and Jayne) FPA (Joe Mitchell), and Hugh Carter, I discovered that the preferred approach is an NSC/OMB jointly mandated study, guided by a small NSC/OMB steering group. The study results, of course, could be reviewed by an SCC if that is later determined appropriate. (S)

The proposed memo at Tab A would authorize the study by FPA (FEMA as FPA passes to FEMA) under a White House steering group signed jointly by you and McIntyre.⁴ I have worked with OMB on the memo’s structure and rationale. If you approve in principle, I shall proceed to get OMB support and return shortly with a final version of the tasking memo at Tab A. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:⁵

Proceed with the joint memorandum _______

Other _____

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 21, PD/NSC–41 [1]. Top Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “Why should OMB co-sponsor it? ZB.”
2. See footnote 3, Document 109.
3. National Security Study Memorandum 58, “Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness,” May 26, 1969, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 29.
4. Not found attached.
5. Brzezinski did not indicate a preference, and wrote: “I don’t see why OMB should play a co-equal role.”