Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

103. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 17, 1978

SUBJECT

• Enduring Communications, Command and Control and Intelligence (C3I)

Your recent memorandum requested my views as to how we should deal with the problem of providing a communications, command, control and intelligence (C3I) capability that will endure a protracted nuclear conflict.² I share your concerns and agree that further improvement to our C3I systems to support general war is needed—particularly to support other than a limited set of pre-planned retaliatory responses.

In this regard several studies of our [6 lines not declassified] which are both a follow-on to PD–18; a SAC study of strategic C3I which is just getting underway; and a recently completed Defense Science Board (DSB) Study which addressed enduring C3I.³ I am also convening a follow-on task force of the DSB to extend the DSB’s preliminary analyses; and plan to have Navy examine the enduring communications to strategic submarines.

With regard to your question on the continuity of government, we share your concern that the military C3I system and the survivability and endurance of the C3I system serving the NCA are part of a cohesive whole. To this end my staff will continue to work closely with Colonel Odom and Fritz Ermarth of your staff to ensure that changes we propose in military C3I systems are consistent with the President’s desires and the procedures and systems of the Office of the President.

I also share your concerns with respect to the National Communications System, over half of which consists of the Defense Communications System. The impact of the Communications Act of 1978 (HR 13015), in its present form, on the DoD’s national security and emergency preparedness responsibilities is of particular concern.⁴ Our views which have been provided to OMB, point out DoD’s opposition to the bill in its present form and detail the shortcomings of the bill. Policies being developed based on private sector interests, e.g., unregulated competition, and pending legislation resulting from testimony on HR 13015 could very well have an adverse impact on many aspects of DoD operations, including the ability to support enduring general war C3I.

I am encouraged by your recognition of the importance of C3I to our war-fighting and deterrent posture, and am confident that, with your assistance, we can make progress in this extremely important area.

C.W. Duncan

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I): 7–11/78. Top Secret. Odom forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under cover of a November 17 memorandum in which Odom noted: “I see no need for a specific response to Duncan’s memo. You have accomplished your original purposes: Changing the focus in C3I to endurance (see the last paragraph of Duncan’s reply.); Giving the matter top priority attention.” (Ibid.)
2. In his memorandum to Duncan, September 30, Brzezinski expressed concerns about the C3I issue following his visit to SAC/NORAD in August. (Ibid.) See Documents 80–82.
3. For the Executive Summary of the Defense Science Board Study, see the attachment to Document 88.
4. The Communications Act of 1978, as proposed, was a measure designed to amend the original Communications Act of 1934 to introduce private-sector competition into the telephone system.