Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

102. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 16, 1978

SUBJECT

• Strategic Force Modernization Plan

Harold Brown has sent you a memo (Tab A) laying out a tentative plan for modernizing our strategic forces posture. Overall, I think Harold’s plan looks quite reasonable. It allows for a really serious look at an air-mobile basing mode for a new ICBM. It provides for improved ICBM survivability during the early ’80s (by deploying Minuteman III on trucks). Finally, it seems to strike a realistic balance between the extremes of [6 lines not declassified]

The memo is reasonably short and informative; in reading it you might keep the following points in mind:

— Harold seems to have decided on the mostly common missile (a squeezed M–X) rather than the common missile (TRIDENT II). However, proceeding with full-scale development of the mostly common missile means making an investment that will be largely wasted if we do not identify a good land-based deployment scheme. In light of this, I intend to ask Harold for a short memo outlining his basis for this decision.

— Given the relatively high costs of an air-mobile scheme and the drawbacks we are already aware of in MAP, it might be prudent to give the truck-mobile system that Harold proposes for Minuteman the capability to subsequently carry a mostly common missile.²

— Harold notes that the $22B cost estimate for the air-mobile concept may be too high. However, even a better estimate would probably be overstated, in that the net impact on the defense budget of building this system should subtract the amounts we would have to spend to develop a follow-on cruise missile carrier or an intra-theater cargo transport, since the aircraft Harold has in mind can also serve these other purposes.

— There are a number of underlying issues that seem likely to at least color our attitudes toward some of the more detailed decisions imbedded in this plan; for example, can we develop and deploy the C3I systems needed to support a mobile missile system, and would the indicators of impending Soviet strategic attack be good enough to justify a significant investment in a truck-mobile system carrying the mostly common missile, and how much time-urgent, hard-target kill capability do we really need? In the coming weeks, I will address these issues for you, in appropriate detail.

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter³

Washington, November 4, 1978

SUBJECT

• Strategic Force Modernization Plan

I. Introduction

At the mid-term review I described the requirements for upgrading our strategic forces and presented a tentative program for strategic force modernization.⁴ Subsequently I sent you a paper describing why I believe we need to maintain the vitality of our strategic TRIAD and why this requires the rebasing of our ICBM’s to enhance their survivability.⁵ We have continued to study our strategic offensive forces in general and the alternative solutions to the difficult ICBM problem in particular. I have arrived tentatively at a course of action which seems to me to meet our needs. This paper describes the programs I believe appropriate for modernization of our ICBM force, SLBM force and bomber/cruise missile force. The resulting capability would give us reasonable assurance that our strategic forces would provide essential equivalence with those of the USSR through the 1980’s. Though forecasting beyond that is more risky, I think that the recommended program would also allow our successors to assure essential equivalence into the 1990’s by exercising the appropriate options as that time draws near. The plan is consistent with SALT II provisions as we now envisage them and would put us in a strong position to negotiate major arms reductions in SALT III. The plan can be adjusted as time unfolds to reflect reductions negotiated in SALT II.

II. ICBM Modernization

The ICBM modernization plan has three major components:

(1) Begin full-scale development of a new ICBM this fiscal year (after a review in early December by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Committee), with an IOC (Initial Operating Capability) of 1986, and a goal of deploying up to [less than 1 line not declassified] The missile would be constrained [less than 1 line not declassified] also be used in the TRIDENT II missile.⁶

(2) Conduct a parallel development program for two alternative basing systems—MAPS and an air transportable system—with the objective of making a final choice in one year. If MAPS is selected, and IOC in 1986 could be achieved, with an FOC (Full Operational Capability) of 290 missiles by 1990. The air transportable system we envision requires a new aircraft having fast takeoff, high nuclear hardness, and short takeoff and landing characteristics. It would operate in a land-and-launch mode in conjunction with a few thousand pre-surveyed landing strips (perhaps sod).⁷ Each aircraft would carry one of the ICBM’s described above. An IOC of 1987 and FOC of 200 aircraft by 1990 seems possible. Because this system would have a “dead time” while the aircraft were being dispersed on strategic or tactical warning, I believe it would be wise also to deploy about 100 of the new ICBM’s in existing MINUTEMAN silos, to provide an immediate response capability of the sort that the Soviets will have (though theirs will be much larger). The silos already exist, the missiles would be the same, and the operating costs in a silo mode are very low. This would therefore be a relatively inexpensive diversification.

At the same time, detailed study efforts on other basing modes for ICBM’s, including off-shore and (perhaps hardened) ground mobile versions, would be carried out to provide a backup or a possible follow-on basing system.

(3) Develop a “stop-gap” survivable basing mode for MINUTEMAN, since the program just described will not be operational until four or five years after the threat becomes serious. [2 lines not declassified] On strategic warning they each would be redeployed to one of several thousand pre-surveyed sidings along the existing highways in the states where MINUTEMAN is based.⁸ This system is relatively simple, quick (IOC of 1983), and—by the standards of strategic force—of moderate cost (about $1.5 billion, including necessary improvements in our warning system). It would be effective only until the Soviet Union improves its overhead reconnaissance to achieve an intelligence cycle time short enough to allow targeting of dispersed transporters (which will probably not happen until at least the late 80’s). It is, of course, hardly effective against a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack since we could not move the missile very far in the few minutes warning we would get from an SLBM attack.⁹ On balance, though, it would be a strong move—both militarily and politically—if coupled with a solid program for dealing with the longer term solution to the problem. This move is particularly valuable if we decide on the air transportable ICBM basing mode with its later IOC.

III. SLBM Modernization

The SLBM modernization plan has four major components:

(1) Begin production of TRIDENT I missiles in 1979 and deploy them on 21 of the POSEIDON submarines (336 missiles deployed) by 1985. Replacing POSEIDON missiles with TRIDENT I will give us our most immediate and effective increase in striking power to offset in part the military and political effects of the Soviets’ major increase in ICBM RV’s.

(2) Begin the development of the TRIDENT II missile in 1979 by taking advantage of the commonality of two propulsion states with the ICBM described above. [2 lines not declassified] If we decide to pursue MAPS as the ICBM basing mode, then we need not rush to deploy the TRIDENT II; in this case we envision a 1990 IOC. However, if we decide to pursue the air transportable basing mode for ICBM’s, and if ways of communicating with SSBN’s in a post-nuclear attack environment improve sufficiently, then we may want to accelerate the TRIDENT II IOC in order to compensate in part for our reduced capability to attack time-urgent hard targets. In either case the TRIDENT II would be deployed on the new TRIDENT subs as they come off the production line and later backfitted in the earlier subs that had been fitted with TRIDENT I.

(3) Continue production of the TRIDENT submarine at a rate of 1½ per year. I believe that the major startup problems are behind us now and that maintaining this program through the 80’s is the proper course of action.¹⁰ The latter conclusion is subject to a size-connected vulnerability to ASW that I think a theoretical possibility, though not a practical one, during the next 15 years.

(4) Begin the design study for a new submarine, conceptually smaller and cheaper than the TRIDENT.¹¹ If this design proves to be successful, consider it for production beginning in the late 80’s, phasing out production of the TRIDENT then. If not, continue production of the TRIDENT. In either case, we will plan to extend the life of the POSEIDON submarines to 25 or 30 years (into the 90’s).

IV. Bomber/Cruise Missile Modernization

The modernization plan for the air-breathing leg of the TRIAD has three components:

(1) Continue development of the first-generation cruise missile, leading to an IOC in 1982 and deploying on B–52G’s at the rate of 500 per year until 1988.

(2) Begin development of the second generation cruise missile. Whether (and when) to phase over production from the first generation to the second generation is covered in a separate appendix.

(3) Begin study of a new strategic bomber. Whether (and when) to begin development and production of this bomber is covered in a separate appendix.¹²

If we decide to pursue the air transportable ICBM basing approach, the aircraft we would develop would also be compatible with the role of cruise missile carrier and would eventually replace the B–52’s in this role (in the 90’s). No additional funding would then be required for this CMC program during the 80’s. Without this new aircraft we might use an adaptation of a commercial aircraft for the cruise missile carrier role—as we have been discussing to date.¹³

V. Funding Requirements

FY 79 funding requirements for all of these programs are covered in the FY 79 enacted budget plus our supplemental request. FY 80 total funding requirements are mostly covered in our FY 80 APDM budget at the “basic” program level (139.5B$), though the detailed distribution among programs would have to be revised. At the “decremented” (135.4B$ FY 80) program level, the strategic program funding is approximately one-half billion dollars less than what is needed for FY 1980 and approximately 3–5B$ less in FY 1981–4. Estimated funding requirements in the 80’s are given in Appendix A for two optional plans depending upon the choice of ICBM rebasing. The costs for the air transportable system are probably overstated. Considerably cheaper airplanes and dispersal schemes are being considered for this application, but we are not yet certain that they will provide adequate base escape. Appendix B contains a portrayal of U.S. versus Soviet expenditures to strategic forces; Appendix C summarizes the principal variations on the basic plan.¹⁴

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 11–12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2. Carter wrote “I agree” in the left margin next to this paragraph.
3. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote “Zbig. C” in the upper right corner of the memorandum.
4. See footnote 2, Document 90.
5. See Document 97.
6. Carter underlined “also be used in the Trident II.”
7. Carter drew an arrow pointing to this and the preceding sentence and wrote in the adjacent right margin: “seems very costly & vulnerable vs ground carriers a la SS 16.”
8. Carter wrote in the right margin next to this sentence and the two preceding sentences: “seems Better.”
9. Carter wrote in the right margin next to this and the preceding sentence: “Could move every night.”
10. Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to the phrase “I believe that the major startup problems are behind us now” and wrote: “optimistic view?”
11. Carter underlined the word “cheaper” and wrote “ha!” in the right margin.
12. Appendix D was not found attached. According to the list of attachments, it was to be provided separately; it was not found. Carter wrote “??” in the right margin next to this paragraph.
13. Carter underlined the phrase “adaptation of a commercial aircraft.”
14. Appendices A–1 “Summary Chart of Funding Requirements—MAP ICBM Basing;”, A–2 “Summary Chart of Funding Requirements—Air Transportable ICBM;” B, “U.S. versus SU Strategic Forces Expenditures;” and C, “Variations on the Basic Plan;” are attached but not printed.